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Abstract 
 
In this study, I analyse total factor productivity (TFP) and its determinants in Chinese 
industrial firms. The results from the system-GMM estimation indicate the existence of 
increasing returns to scale and a positive impact on firms’ TFP arising from technological 
change. Moreover, the following factors were found to be determinants of higher TFP levels 
in most industries: lack of political affiliation, paid-in capital share owned by investors other 
than the State, Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers, age, marketing capabilities, internal 
liquidity and industrial competition. The results from the TFP growth decomposition indicate 
an annual average TFP growth of 9.68% across Chinese industrial firms during the period of 
1998-2007. This was largely determined by the reallocation of resources across existing 
firms. From a policymaking perspective, measures targeting the previously mentioned 
determinants are likely to spur firms’ TFP and consequently drive national long-run 
economic growth.  
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1. Introduction 
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth refers to growth in output that is not attributable to 
factor inputs. This can be further decomposed into efficiency increases and technological 
changes. TFP is important because it generates benefits, both within a firm and beyond. 
Firstly, from the firm’s perspective, TFP growth enables the firm to become more 
competitive and to increase people’s living standards. Beckman and Buzzell (1958) describe 
a connection between productivity and living standards delivered through the wage and price 
channels. On the one hand, a more productive firm can afford to pay higher wages to its 
workers, hence increasing the employees’ living standards through increased consumption 
ability. At the same time, productivity can lower the firm’s output prices or allow the firm to 
provide greater value to consumers at a given price, hence increasing their products’ utility.  
Secondly, TFP growth also generates benefits that go beyond the firm, as suggested by the 
following quote: “In the long run, living standards depend on the efficiency with which our 
economic resources are utilized” (Beckman and Buzzell, 1958, p. 26). At the national level, 
TFP plays a major role in raising living standards and spurring economic growth. Besides the 
accumulation of factor inputs, TFP is the main driver behind differences in long-run within- 
and cross-country economic growth. This has been suggested by the empirical results of 
Easterly and Levine (2001), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994).  
Analysing TFP and its determinants enables the understanding of which factors policymakers 
should target in order to achieve TFP growth, leading to long-run national economic growth 
and higher living standards for citizens. “In models that emphasize TFP growth, national 
policies that enhance the efficiency of capital and labour or alter the endogenous rate of 
technological change, can boost productivity growth and thereby accelerate long-run 
economic growth” (Easterly and Levine, 2001, p. 180). This quote indicates that sustainable, 
long-run economic growth can be achieved through national policies aimed at efficiency 
improvements and technological upgrades, the sub-components of TFP. Macro-level analyses 
of TFP, such as the ones mentioned above, are particularly important in cross-country studies. 
Despite this importance, such analyses often ignore the fact that firms are heterogeneous in 
many respects, TFP being one of them.  
A micro-level analysis of TFP, on the other hand, would enable to infer what determines TFP 
levels and growth rates across firms, thus providing information on how policymakers and 
firm managers can target such determinants to improve TFP. Since they are more targeted, 
micro-level measures are more likely to lead to more successful results than macro-level 
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ones, which would tend to adopt a “one size fits all” approach. Thus, the use of micro-level 
measures would potentially contribute to more competitive firms, the raising of citizens’ 
living standards and sustainable long-run economic growth.  
The Chinese economy is an important area of study, as its performance has been relatively 
strong over the last three decades. Firstly, figures from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
(2012), expressed in constant prices, report an average annual output growth rate of about 9% 
since 1978, while IMF (2013) figures suggest a global output growth of about 3% since 1980. 
Secondly, according to World Bank figures (World Bank, 2013), China has become the 
second largest contributor, after the United States, to global economic output, contributing 
with a 14.25% share as of 2012. Thirdly, the country constitutes an exceptional case in terms 
of its slow and gradual reform path undertaken as it has moved from a socially planned 
economic system to a market-oriented one.  
The achievement of strong economic growth in China has resulted in an improvement in 
living standards for its citizens. According to figures from the World Bank (2013), real GDP 
per capita has increased from $523.95 in 1980 to $7,957.62 in 2012, representing a 15-fold 
increase. However, the gap between China and the high-income countries remains high, as 
these record an average real GDP per capita of $32,166 as of 2012. According to the World 
Bank (2013), China is still classified as an upper-middle income country, since its income per 
capita lies within the $4,086 to $12,615 band. The move to a high-income country status 
could be achieved by adopting national policies aimed at raising TFP. 
Considering the importance of TFP for the Chinese economy, the study conducted in this 
thesis aims to answer the following research questions: 
- What factors determine TFP levels and TFP growth in Chinese industrial firms during 
the period of 1998-2007? 
- How does TFP growth differ across firms differentiated by industry, province and 
ownership/political affiliation?  
The study therefore belongs to the literature analysing TFP and its determinants in China at 
the firm level. There are four important studies on this topic (Yao et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010; 
Brandt et al., 2012; Shen and Song, 2013) that are similar to this one, as they analyse multiple 
determinants of productivity. However, the current study differs from these in four respects.  
Firstly, compared to most existing studies, this study adopts a more comprehensive set of 
TFP level determinants in the estimation. The following determinants are included: political 
affiliation, ownership, exporting activity, competition, Marshallian (or MAR) spillovers, 
Jacobian (or Jacob) spillovers, city spillovers, liquidity, firm age, R&D, time trend, and 
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marketing capabilities. The inclusion of such variables is important because omitting them 
would generate biased estimates of the production function, and of TFP as a result. The 
choice of determinants is also motivated by the empirical results from the literature and the 
information available in the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) dataset from which 
the sample is sourced. A more detailed discussion of the motivation for their inclusion, their 
measurement and their expected effects on TFP is presented in Section 3.3. 
Secondly, the set of industries analysed from the sample taken from the Chinese NBS is 
wider than in most existing studies, as it includes 26 industries belonging to the mining, 
manufacturing and public utilities sectors. This allows for differences in technology between 
firms, avoiding the assumption that all firms operate using a standard technology. The sample 
adopted in this study includes both State-owned and non-State-owned firms with at least 
RMB 5mn in annual sales. Firms are located in 31 provinces, or province-equivalent 
municipal cities. This unbalanced sample comprises 2,183,709 firm-year observations, 
corresponding to a wide number of firms ranging from 148,474 in 1998 to 331,453 in 2007.   
Thirdly, while most existing studies have relied on the semiparametric methodologies of 
Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to analyse the determinants of TFP 
levels, this study adopts SYS-GMM. The major advantage of this methodology, in 
comparison with the previously mentioned semiparametric ones, is the allowance for firms’ 
fixed effects. Previous studies have indicated that firms have unmeasured productivity 
advantages that remain constant over time and that need to be captured. Moreover, SYS-
GMM has the advantage of tackling endogeneity in the right-hand-side variables (including 
the lagged dependent variable) as well as selection bias by using lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments in the first differences equation and first-differences of 
the same variables as instruments in the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). SYS-
GMM is particularly preferable over the semiparametric methodologies of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) because the latter do not allow for fixed effects and 
are based on strong and unintuitive assumptions that generate collinearity problems in the 
first stage of estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2006). 
Fourthly, compared to most existing studies, this study analyses the determinants of TFP 
growth by using the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition approach. Such an approach 
decomposes aggregate TFP growth into the contributions provided by the following: a 
within-firm component representing the impact of the resource reallocation within existing 
firms, according to their initial shares of output in their related industries; a between-firm 
component indicating a change in the output share of firms, weighted by the deviation of the 
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firm’s initial productivity from the initial industry index; a covariance component, measuring 
whether a firm’s increasing productivity corresponds to an increasing market share; an 
entering component indicating the contribution of entrant firms to their related industry’s TFP 
growth, measured with respect to the initial industry index; an exiting component indicating 
the contribution of exiting firms to their related industry’s TFP, measured with respect to the 
initial industry index. Since Melitz and Polanec (2012) find this decomposition to be 
characterized by biases, their methodology is also adopted in order to understand which set of 
results is the most appropriate.  
This study has been built by taking these four distinctions into account, which distinguishes it 
from existing studies on firm-level TFP estimation in China. 
The results of the SYS-GMM estimation indicate the existence of increasing returns to scale 
in most industries, suggesting that firms produce a higher proportion of output from a given 
proportion of factor inputs. Moreover there is a positive impact on firms’ TFP arising from 
technological change. In terms of political affiliation/ownership, a lack of politically 
affiliation with any level of government and a lack of State paid-in capital ownership share 
positively affect TFP. Such factors are likely to enable the firms to undertake decisions aimed 
at maximising TFP rather than satisfying political motives. Regarding spatial variables, there 
is evidence of positive effects on TFP from both Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers. Despite 
such benefits, TFP tends to be hampered by the high costs incurred when firms are based in 
large urban areas. In terms of knowledge variables, the results indicate that younger firms 
tend to be more productive than their older counterparts, suggesting that the former are likely 
to be more dynamic and to use the latest technology available. Moreover, in contrast with the 
initial expectations, R&D expenditures do not seem to lead to higher TFP levels. Likewise, 
export activity does not seem to lead to higher TFP in most industries, suggesting that most 
exporting firms are engaged in processing trade activities. As initially expected, industrial 
competition is found to result in higher TFP, as it pushes firms’ managers to increase their 
efforts and to reduce slack. Firms’ marketing capabilities are also found to be beneficial to 
TFP, indicating that firms are able to differentiate products from their competitors and build 
successful brands. The positive relationship between firms’ liquidity and their TFP indicates 
that Chinese firms are financially constrained and that they must rely on their internal 
liquidity to undertake productive investment activities.  
Results obtained using the SYS-GMM estimation are found to be more valid than results 
from the semiparametric estimation following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), since the latter 
are characterized by inconsistencies in some relationships (e.g. in the case of political 
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affiliation), low coefficients on both the capital and labour inputs, and the indication of 
decreasing returns to scale in most industries, which are unlikely for the dynamic and fast 
growing Chinese economy.  
The analysis of the relative importance of the determinants of TFP levels indicates that 
exogenous technological improvements have the largest positive effect on firms’ TFP levels. 
The effect of an increasing proportion of firms’ paid-in capital owned by either individuals or 
corporates is also found to be large. In contrast, large negative effects on TFP levels are 
found for an increasing proportion of firms’ paid-in capital owned by the State, and firms’ 
high level of political affiliation with either the central or local government. This indicates 
that State influence on firms, through either ownership of paid-in capital or political 
affiliation, is not conducive to higher TFP. In addition, the large negative effect for the 
variable representing city spillovers indicates that the advantages that firms enjoy from being 
based in cities are outweighed by the disadvantages.   
The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and the related cumulative empirical TFP 
distributions are in line with the SYS-GMM results, since they indicate that TFP distribution 
differs across firms with different political affiliations, paid-in capital share ownership, R&D 
and export activities. These also emphasize the importance of estimating TFP separately for 
each industry and taking into account geographical differences. Moreover, they point to the 
existence of TFP growth between 1998 and 2007. 
Chinese firms have recorded an annual average TFP growth of 9.68%, based on the 
Haltiwanger (1997) and the Melitz and Polanec (2012) decompositions. The former 
decomposition indicates that such growth is mainly due to the net entry of more productive 
firms, in line with the findings of Brandt et al. (2012). The latter decomposition, which is 
more appropriate because it addresses the measurement biases included in the former, 
indicates that TFP growth largely results from a between-firm effect representing the 
reallocation of resources through the contraction and expansion of output shares between 
firms characterized by different productivity levels. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 covers total factor productivity. The first 
section discusses what TFP is and its importance. The second section reviews the main 
methods for measuring TFP at the firm level. The third section discusses the determinants of 
TFP and reviews the related studies in the literature. The fourth section discusses how the 
current study contributes to the literature. 
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Chapter 3 analyses the determinants of TFP levels in the Chinese industrial sector. The first 
section presents the dataset utilized. The second section introduces the SYS-GMM 
methodology for analysing TFP levels, and briefly mentions the Levinsohn and Petrin 
semiparametric methodology. The third section introduces the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
methodology for testing the equality of empirical cumulative TFP distributions across firms. 
The fourth section explains the variables utilised, discusses the related descriptive statistics, 
and formulates the hypotheses underlying the estimation of TFP levels. The fifth section 
discusses the results from the SYS-GMM estimation. This is followed in the sixth section by 
a discussion of the results from the semiparametric estimation following Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). In the seventh section, an analysis of the relative importance of determinants of 
TFP is conducted. Finally, the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are discussed. 
Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of TFP growth across firms in the Chinese industrial 
sector. The first section introduces the methodology developed by Haltiwanger (1997), which 
decomposes TFP growth, and discusses the related results. Since Melitz and Polanec (2012) 
find that Haltiwanger’s (1997) methodology generates biases that lead to over-measurement 
of the contribution of entering and exiting firms to aggregate TFP growth, their methodology 
is introduced in the second section. This is followed by a discussion of the related results. 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the findings and discussing the related policy 
implications.  
 
2. Total Factor Productivity 
The previous chapter introduced the thesis. This chapter discusses total factor productivity 
and its importance, followed by a discussion of the main TFP measurement methods and its 
determinants. 
2.1. An Introduction to Total Factor Productivity 
In a firm’s production process, factor inputs, such as labour and capital, are used in order to 
produce output. In other words: “The production function describes the technical relationship 
between the inputs and outputs of a production process” (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 12). A typical 
production function can be represented by the following equation: 
                                                              𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑖𝑡, )                                                         (1) 
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In (1), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the output of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the labour input, and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the capital input. 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the level of output not attributable to factor inputs, also known as total factor 
productivity (TFP), which can also be represented as an index: 
                                                             𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑖𝑡, )
                                               (2) 
TFP, as expressed in (2), is the ratio of output produced to inputs utilised in the production 
process. Graphically, a production function can be represented by an isoquant. Nishimizu and 
Page (1982) decomposed the TFP change into technological change and technical efficiency 
change. Taking the best production function frontier, which is the maximum output attainable 
based on a given level of input, technological change represents the shift in the best frontier 
resulting from technological progress. A change in technical efficiency, on the other hand, 
represents the effect of actions undertaken by the firm, such as an improvement in managerial 
practices in order to “catch up” with industry best practices. Firms having a relatively high 
TFP will produce higher amounts of output with the same set of inputs than firms with a 
relatively low TFP.  
TFP represents the most suitable definition for productivity, compared to, for example, partial 
factor productivity. The latter is given by the ratio of output to a specific factor input such as 
labour, capital, or intermediate materials. The most used among partial factor productivity 
indices has been labour productivity. This is because it has a prominent position in 
organisational debates between labour unions and management concerning changes in 
employment conditions like wage increases. Stigler (1947) argues that attributing changes in 
output to just one input is likely to lead to a limited understanding of productivity and a 
consequent misuse of economic resources. Productivity within a firm is determined by a 
combination of more than one input and the interactions between them. In addition, a partial 
factor productivity index can be affected by the intensity of input use. For example, two 
similar firms adopting the same production processes and the same technology may record 
different labour productivities if one of them uses its capital input more intensively. 
Therefore, considering the limitations of the partial factor productivity measure, productivity 
can be better expressed by a broader definition that encompasses all inputs and outputs 
involved in the production process. Moreover, such a definition is not affected by the usage 
intensity of factor inputs (e.g. capital), which is ignored in a partial productivity measure such 
as labour productivity. TFP, also referred to as multi-factor productivity, is given by the ratio 
of gross firm output to all inputs adopted in the production process. This is because “only by 
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relating output to all tangible inputs can it be determined whether there has been a net saving 
in real costs per unit of output, or conversely, a gain in productivity” (Kendrick, 1956, p. 2). 
TFP is the most suitable definition of productivity for this study, as it can be used to analyse 
firms that combine various different inputs to produce a certain amount of output. In this 
thesis, when the terms “productivity” and “TFP” are used, they refer interchangeably to total 
factor productivity.    
 
2.2. A Discussion of the Importance of TFP 
Having analysed what productivity is, the next step is to understand its importance. 
Productivity is a widely discussed concept, not only in the academic literature but also among 
political leaders, trade unions and industry leaders. In other words, “productivity isn’t 
everything, but in the long run is almost everything” (Krugman, 1997, p.9). This is because 
increased productivity generates benefits for firms, individuals and, consequently, the overall 
economy. It can also be said “it is only in the long term that productivity growth makes a 
large difference to the welfare of a country, and it is only in the long term that the rate of 
productivity growth is subject to fundamental change” (Wolff, 2014, p.12). Within a firm, an 
increase in TFP generates a higher level of output based on a given level of input. Therefore, 
it allows a firm to achieve better economic performance by reducing unit costs. As a 
consequence, the firm becomes more competitive. This idea suggests that increased 
productivity leads to better firm performance. In addition, productivity has benefits that go 
beyond the firm. For example, “in the long run, living standards depend on the efficiency 
with which our economic resources are utilized” (Beckman and Buzzell, 1958, p. 26). 
Beckman and Buzzell (1958) suggest a connection between productivity and living standards 
that is delivered through the wage and price channels. A more productive firm is likely to pay 
its employees better wages in order to reward them for their performance, thus enabling the 
employees to increase their living standards by spending more. Concerning the price channel, 
a more productive firm can lower the prices of its products, making the products more 
affordable to consumers. The consumers can thus receive higher utility by consuming more. 
Therefore, higher productivity is a key factor in improving levels of consumption and, hence, 
standards of living. In addition, productivity is not only related to better firm performance 
and living standards, but also to overall benefits to the public. “At the national level, 
productivity growth has been of paramount importance in raising levels of living, in 
strengthening potential national security, and in the provision for future economic growth” 
(Kendrick, 1956, p. 1). When it is more productive, a firm has a greater ability to compete 
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internationally, leading to increased exports. The earnings obtained by selling products both 
locally and internationally are likely to be reinvested or paid out to shareholders. In summary, 
higher TFP leads to a combination of higher exports, investments and consumption, which 
are likely to generate a positive effect on a country’s national income and living standards. 
2.3. A Review of the Main TFP Measurement Methods 
In the first section of this chapter, TFP was defined within the context of a production 
function, explaining the relationship between output and factor inputs in a firm’s production 
process. TFP was expressed as the level of output produced based on a given level of factor 
inputs. The second section discussed the importance of TFP, not only as a measure of a firm’s 
economic performance but also for national living standards and the nation’s economic 
growth and prosperity. This section describes how TFP is measured.  
Methods for measuring TFP can be categorised into macro-level and micro-level methods. 
Macro-level methodologies measure aggregates that relate to country-, region- or industry-
level productivity. Micro-level methodologies, in contrast, measure firm- or plant-level 
productivity. While it is not in the scope of this analysis to review all methodologies for 
micro-level productivity measurement in depth, Van Beveren (2012) and Del Gatto et al. 
(2011) have provided comprehensive surveys of such methodologies. For the set of micro 
panel data that will be adopted in this work, macro methodologies are not suitable. This is 
because in a macro-level analysis, an economy is viewed as being constituted by only one 
aggregate sector. However, such is not the case in an economy that can be disentangled into 
different sectors, which can then be decomposed further into firms. Each firm is characterised 
by different characteristics, such as different production processes, outputs, inputs, and TFP. 
Therefore, macro-level analyses of production functions do not take into account the 
heterogeneity existing across firms. Micro-level methodologies, on the other hand, analyse 
TFP differences among firms having different characteristics. This enables us to understand 
what determines this heterogeneity and, therefore, how productivity can be improved through 
targeted microeconomic policy measures that are likely to be more successful than their 
macro-level counterparts. Among the micro-level measures of TFP, the first presented in this 
section is ordinary least squares (OLS). The description of OLS is accompanied by a 
discussion of the main methodological issues arising in TFP estimation. This is followed by a 
review of the main methodologies aimed at addressing the endogeneity issue: fixed effects 
(FE), instrumental variables (IV), generalised method of moments (GMM) and system-GMM 
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(SYS-GMM), as well as the semi-parametric estimations developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
2.3.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
The following explanation is adopted from the work of Van Beveren (2012). The estimation 
of TFP through OLS is performed using the following production function: 
 
                                                                  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑘𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑚                                                          (3)   
In the above function, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the output of firm i at time t, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 represents the capital 
input, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 represents the labour input, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the intermediate input, and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents 
total factor productivity. 𝛽𝑘, 𝛽𝑙 and 𝛽𝑚 represent the elasticity of output with respect to 
capital, labour and intermediate inputs, respectively. After applying natural logarithms to 
both sides of the equation (3), it becomes: 
                                          𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                           (4) 
In (4), TFP is given by: 
                                                                    ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                              (5) 
The function has been disentangled into 𝛽0, representing the average firm efficiency level, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, representing the firm’s deviation from this average. When the deviation from the 
average firm efficiency level is negative, it indicates inefficiency. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 can be further 
decomposed into two elements: 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a TFP component that is observable or 
predictable when a firm makes its choice of inputs, or when it decides to enter or exit an 
industry. It can represent the part of TFP resulting from different managerial practices, 
machine breakdowns or workers’ strikes. 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is an unobservable component that represents a 
measurement error or an unexpected productivity shock. It is not observable by a firm when it 
makes its choice of inputs or when it decides to enter or exit an industry. By applying the 
decomposition of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 into 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡, the previous function becomes: 
                                        𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                   (6) 
Where: 
                                                            ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                          (7) 
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A firm’s observed TFP is given by the average firm efficiency level 𝛽0 and the observed 
component 𝑣𝑖𝑡 of the deviation 𝜀𝑖𝑡 from this average:  
                                                            𝑇𝐹𝑃 ≡ 𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                        (8) 
This is estimated through OLS and calculated as a residual representing the level of output 
not attributable to the capital, labour and material inputs: 
                                𝑇𝐹𝑃 = ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?0 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡                       (9) 
The TFP level can be obtained by solving for exp (?̂?𝑖𝑡). OLS estimation is adopted because 
of its practical and theoretical advantages, its ease of implementation in various statistical and 
econometric software applications, and its numerous desirable properties, such as 
unbiasedness, consistency, homoscedasticity and efficiency.   
However, in the context of a production function, the OLS estimation has one main issue. In 
principle, OLS should only work when the inputs are assumed to be exogenous. This means 
that inputs in the production process are chosen independently of a firm’s TFP. Since the 
decision makers within a firm make the choice of inputs according to various factors, among 
them being the observable part of TFP, the assumption of the inputs’ exogeneity is too strong. 
Marschak and Andrews (1944) argue that factor inputs are determined within a firm rather 
than exogenously. This means that the levels of input into the production process are also 
determined according to the observable part of TFP, which itself is also influenced by the 
inputs chosen. Therefore, there is a two-way relationship between factor inputs and 
productivity, generating a simultaneity or endogeneity issue. Such endogeneity is given by 
the inputs’ correlation with ?̂?𝑖𝑡. Ignoring this issue in the OLS estimation leads to estimates 
that are biased and inconsistent. In this specific case, the bias is known as “endogeneity bias” 
or “simultaneity bias.”  
In the context of TFP estimation, three other issues need to be considered. One concerns the 
unavailability of data regarding physical inputs and outputs and their respective prices at the 
firm level. If one assumes the existence of perfect competition, where all firms are subject to 
the same input and output prices, and considering that individual firms’ prices are not 
available, output quantities can be substituted for by sales deflated by an industry price index. 
At the same time, input quantities can be proxied by their deflated values. However, firm-
level prices are likely to differ from those proxied using the industry deflators. If markets are 
assumed to be imperfectly competitive and individual firms’ prices are not available, the use 
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of firm level prices as instruments is likely to cause an omitted price bias. De Loecker (2007) 
argues that if inputs and outputs are positively correlated while output and price are 
negatively correlated, a negative correlation might be generated between variable inputs and 
firm-level prices. The ultimate result of these relationships is bias in the factor input 
coefficients.  
For the Colombian manufacturing sector, Foster et al. (2008) found TFP to be underestimated 
when deflated values of sales were used as a proxy for output. This was particularly true for 
entering firms, which are likely to charge lower prices than existing firms within the industry. 
Therefore, if a firm’s output is represented by deflated sales, it will be underestimated, as will 
TFP. At the same time, if a firm charges higher prices than its industry competitors, output 
will be overestimated, as will TFP (Van Beveren 2012). Van Beveren (2012) furthermore 
suggests that no explicit solution exists for addressing the bias caused by the absence of 
specific firm-level price data.  
A second issue concerns firms belonging to the same industry but producing multiple 
different products, as they are likely to differ in production technology and the nature of the 
demand. Bernard et al. (2009) suggest that biased estimates of TFP are likely to result from 
the assumption that firms use the same technology and have the same nature of demand for 
their products. Therefore, in order to generate consistent estimates of TFP, data on single 
inputs and outputs is needed. This enables the accounting for technological differences across 
firms that produce various outputs (Bernard et al., 2009). Van Beveren (2012) argues that the 
assumption that a firm produces only a single output it is likely to lead to the underestimation 
of TFP, as the synergies generated in producing multiple outputs are likely to be ignored.  
A third issue in the estimation of TFP concerns the self-selection of firms into and out of an 
industry, an issue that was first discussed by Wedervang (1965). Firms are also likely to 
make the decision to enter or exit an industry according to their TFP. Ackerberg et al. (2007) 
argue that if firms know their productivity before exiting an industry, there should be a 
correlation between productivity and the capital stock, as firms with higher capital but lower 
productivity are more likely to survive than firms with a lower capital stock. Such a selection 
bias is likely to generate a downward bias in the capital input coefficient due to the negative 
correlation between productivity and capital stock. Van Beveren (2012) furthermore argues 
that ignoring this issue or coping with it using a balanced sample that excludes entering and 
exiting firms is likely to cause TFP estimates to be biased upwards.  
This section has introduced the measurement of productivity and the main issues arising from 
it. The discussion has suggested that, in estimating productivity, the following potential 
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biases must be taken into account: the endogeneity of inputs in the production process; the 
unavailability of firm output and input prices; the unavailability of data on single inputs and 
outputs; and the self-selection of firms into and out of an industry. Among these issues the 
simultaneity issue has been most widely discussed within the methodological literature (Van 
Beveren 2012). The methodologies reviewed in the following sections mainly focus on 
addressing this issue. The methodologies include the following: the fixed effects (FE) 
approach; the instrumental variables (IV) approach; the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) methodology; the system-GMM (SYS-GMM) approach; and the semi-parametric 
estimation methods developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
 
2.3.2. Fixed Effects (FE) 
The simultaneity issue arising from the estimation of TFP through OLS can be addressed by 
adopting the fixed-effects (FE) estimation methodology proposed by Mundlak (1961) and 
Hoch (1962). One may consider a fixed effects regression model where the 𝑣𝑖𝑡 component of 
TFP observed by the firm varies across firms but does not change over time (firm fixed-effect 
regression model). The constancy of 𝑣𝑖𝑡 over time represents the main assumption of this 
estimation methodology. Since the time index is removed by 𝑣𝑖𝑡, the production function 
becomes: 
                                            𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                           (10) 
Another assumption used in fixed effects estimation is the strict exogeneity of the factor 
inputs included within the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡, which is thus uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡: 
                                                                        𝐸[𝑥𝑖𝑡|𝑢𝑖𝑡] = 0                                                            (11) 
One can apply the fixed effects regression model the firm: first-differencing, mean-
differencing, or least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimations. In the case of the mean-
differencing estimation: 
            (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦?̅?) =  𝛽𝑘(𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘?̅?) +  𝛽𝑙(𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙?̅?) + (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣?̅?) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢?̅?)            (12)  
 
In equation (12), 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣?̅? = 0 because 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣?̅?. The equation thus becomes: 
                               (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦?̅?) =  𝛽𝑘(𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘?̅?) +  𝛽𝑙(𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙?̅?) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢?̅?)                            (13) 
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In the second step, an OLS regression is performed in order to obtain estimates of the input 
coefficients. Ackerberg et al. (2007) suggest that the fixed effects estimation has the 
advantage of addressing the simultaneity bias by considering just the time invariant 
productivity. Van Beveren (2012) furthermore argues that as long as the decision to enter or 
exit an industry is made according to the time invariant productivity, firms’ self-selection bias 
is addressed. However, despite being useful for addressing both the simultaneity and self-
selection biases, the fixed effects estimation methodology is characterised by four main 
weaknesses. First, as Griliches and Mairesse (1995) note, the method yields low and 
insignificant capital coefficients, as well as low estimates of returns to scale. Second, 
according to Del Gatto et al. (2011), the assumption of constant unobserved TFP over time 
does not rest on strong theoretical grounds. The authors suggest that such an assumption is 
more suitable when analysing a short sample period. Thirdly, Del Gatto et al. (2011) also 
argue that the fixed effects methodology only exploits the variation of TFP across time and 
does not consider the cross-sectional information. Fourth, according to Wooldridge (2009), 
the fixed effects estimation requires a strong assumption of strict exogeneity of inputs in 
order to achieve unbiased and consistent estimates. Strict exogeneity means that the current 
and future input choices are not affected by TFP. This is a strong assumption, as TFP can 
affect the decisions of a firm regarding the quality and quantity of inputs to process, and the 
decisions to enter or exit an industry. Fifth, Olley and Pakes (1996) found that fixed effects 
estimation leads to widely different estimates when applied to a balanced and an unbalanced 
sample. For these five reasons, the fixed effects estimation is unsatisfactory for addressing 
the simultaneity issue. 
 
2.3.3. Instrumental Variables (IV) 
The simultaneity issue can also be addressed by applying the instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation. Compared to the fixed effects estimation, this methodology can be performed 
without the assumption of the strict exogeneity of inputs, which Wooldridge (2009) regards 
as too strong. In the instrumental variables estimation, the variation of each input variable can 
be decomposed into two different parts: one, whose correlation with the TFP component 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
generates the simultaneity bias as well as inconsistent estimates, and another that is 
uncorrelated with 𝑣𝑖𝑡. Understanding the variation of each input variable that is uncorrelated 
with 𝑣𝑖𝑡 enables us to ignore the variation that generates biased estimates. Such information 
can be obtained through instrumental variables estimation, which simulates the variation in 
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the independent variables that is uncorrelated with the 𝑢𝑖𝑡. It must be stressed that 
instruments should not enter directly into the production function (Van Beveren, 2012).  
The instrumental variables approach tends to produce consistent and unbiased estimators. 
However, it must also be stressed that a valid IV estimation must satisfy two conditions. One 
is the instrument relevance condition, according to which the instrument 𝑍𝑖𝑡  must be 
correlated with the independent variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that it represents: 
                                                                  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0                                                           (14) 
The more of the correlation that is explained by the instrument, the more information 
provided to explain the independent variable. An instrument explaining only a small part of 
the variation in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is considered weak. The power of an instrument is represented by the F-
statistic obtained in the first-stage regression, whereby the instrument is regressed on the 
related instrumented variable. In this case, the higher the value of the F-statistic, the more 
information regarding the independent variable that is provided by the instrument. Following 
the instrument relevance condition, a valid IV estimation must also satisfy the instrument 
exogeneity condition, according to which the instrument must be uncorrelated with the 
disturbance term: 
                                                               𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0                                                             (15) 
When the instruments adopted are endogenous, the IV approach fails, leading to inconsistent 
estimators. If the previous two conditions are met and the instruments do not enter the 
production function directly, IV estimators can be obtained by applying the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach, whereby estimates are calculated in two stages. In the first stage, 
the IV are decomposed into two: one part that is uncorrelated with the error and another that 
is correlated. In the second stage, the uncorrelated parts of the independent variables are used 
to determine the regressors. Therefore, each independent variable is represented by the 
following: 
                                                           𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝜋0𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑡𝑍1𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                               (16) 
In this function, 𝜋0𝑡 + 𝜋1𝑡𝑍1𝑡 represents the part of the independent variable that is 
uncorrelated with the disturbance 𝑢𝑖𝑡, while 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents the part of the independent variable 
that is correlated with the disturbance 𝑢𝑖𝑡. In the 2SLS approach, only the first part of the 
independent variable is used, while the second one is ignored. In the first stage, an OLS 
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regression is applied for each endogenous variable. Eventual exogenous variables, 𝑊𝑖𝑡, are 
included in the regression. However, since the values of 𝜋0𝑡and 𝜋1𝑡 are unknown, they are 
estimated in the first stage. In the second stage, the predicted values of the previous 
regression are used: 
                                                               ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?0𝑡 + ?̂?1𝑡𝑍1𝑡                                                         (17) 
The 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is then regressed on the predicted values of the  ?̂?𝑖𝑡: 
                                                             𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                       (18) 
This process enables us to obtain estimators that are unbiased and consistent. Despite this, the 
difficulty of the IV approach lies in finding the right instruments. Ackerberg et al. (2007) do 
not recommend using input prices as instruments, since they claim it could potentially 
generate four issues. The first is related to the competitive nature of both the input and output 
markets in which the firm operates. In the case of inputs, when markets are perfectly 
competitive, input prices are uncorrelated with TFP because the firm has no power to set 
prices. In that case, input prices can be used as instrumental variables. However, when a firm 
has market power, input prices are likely to be set according to input quantities and the firm’s 
productivity (van Beveren, 2012). In such a case, the input prices would be endogenous 
variables correlated with TFP, thus resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates. Based on 
the arguments presented above, it can be inferred that input prices are a valid instrument only 
when one assumes that firms operate in perfectly competitive markets.  
The second issue is related to the lack of reporting of input prices by firms. It is difficult to 
find firms that report prices and who report them with a high level of precision. The third 
issue arises when input prices are reported. In this case, prices must vary across firms in order 
to reflect the different input market conditions faced by each firm in particular, rather than 
reflecting different input qualities. This is because input qualities are likely to enter the 
production function through the unobservable 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (representing TFP) and are, therefore, 
likely to be correlated with the instruments used. Ackerberg et al. (2007), for example, argue 
that if wages are related to the quality of employees’ work rather than labour market 
conditions, this would be reflected in productivity, generating a correlation with instruments 
and resulting in inconsistent and biased estimates. The fourth issue is related to the 
assumption of the exogenous evolution of TFP across time (Ackerberg et al., 2007). This is a 
strong assumption, since the choice of inputs within a firm affects TFP. In summary, the 
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existence of the above four issues does not seem to support the use of input prices as 
instruments for estimating TFP. Other than input prices, the instruments that have been 
suggested in the literature include output prices and variables affecting the output demand or 
supply of inputs. Such instruments might have greater validity according to the competitive 
structure of the relative market, although they tend to be more difficult to find in comparison 
to other instruments.  
2.3.4.  Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and SYS-GMM 
Apart from the ordinary least squares, fixed effects and instrumental variables methodologies, 
an alternative proposed for addressing the issue of simultaneity is the use of lagged input 
levels as instruments for input changes, after applying a first-differentiation to the production 
function. Such a methodology is adopted, for example, by Mairesse and Hall (1996) in their 
GMM estimation, in which they control for both the endogeneity of inputs and heterogeneity 
across firms. GMM does not require the assumptions of zero autocorrelation of the error term 
across years and homoscedasticity across firms in order to obtain efficient estimates. 
Moreover, the standard error estimates arising from the GMM estimation are robust in the 
presence of correlation across equations and heteroscedasticity conditions. The explanation of 
the GMM estimator methodology provided here follows Blundell and Bond (1998). Taking 
an individual effect autoregressive model with unobserved firm-specific effects, 
                                                           𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                       (19)   
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇  
In (19), 𝛼 is the parameter of interest, and 𝜂𝑖 is the firm fixed effect, which is potentially 
correlated with 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Following Mairesse and Hall (1996), lagged levels of the 3-year variables 
are used as instruments for the labour, capital and R&D capital variables in the first-
differenced equation. 
Mairesse and Hall (1996) subsequently impose  
(𝑇−1)(𝑇−2)
2
  orthogonality conditions, which 
are: 
                                                                𝐸[𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠, ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡] = 0                                                          (20) 
Where: 
𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇 
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𝑠 = 2, … , 𝑇 
The moment restriction imposed is: 
                                                                          𝐸[𝑍𝑖
′ ?̂?𝑖] = 0                                                            (21) 
Where 𝑍𝑖 is the (𝑇 − 2) × 𝑚 matrix of instruments, omitting the 𝑖 subscripts, and ?̂?𝑖 is the 
(𝑇 − 2) vector. The GMM estimator based on the moment conditions minimises the 
quadratic distance ?̂?𝑖
′𝑍𝐴𝑁𝑍𝑖
′ ?̂?𝑖 for the metric 𝐴𝑁, where 𝑍
′ is the 𝑁(𝑇 − 2) × 𝑚 matrix and 
?̂?𝑖
′ is the 𝑁(𝑇 − 2) vector. This provides the following GMM estimator for 𝛼: 
                                           ?̂?𝑑𝑖𝑓 = (?̂?−1
′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁𝑍
′ ?̂?−1)
−1?̂?−1
′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁𝑍
′?̂?                                           (22) 
Where 𝑦𝑖
′ is a (𝑇 − 2) vector, ?̂?𝑖,−1
′  is the (𝑇 − 2) vector and ?̂? and ?̂?−1 are stacked across 
individuals in the same way as ?̂?. If alternative choices are taken for the weights 𝐴𝑁, this 
provides a set of GMM estimators that are consistent for large 𝑁 and finite 𝑇, but which 
differ in their asymptotic efficiency. The weights are given by: 
                                                       𝐴𝑁 = (𝑁
−1  ∑ 𝑍𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑖
′𝑍𝑖)                                                     (23) 
This is the two-step estimator that is asymptotically efficient in the class of estimators based 
on the linear moment conditions.  
Despite the advantages of the first-differenced GMM estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
found its instruments to be weak. Thus, there is not enough information about the endogenous 
variables represented when the value of 𝛼 increases towards 1, or when there is an increase in 
the variance of the fixed effect 𝜂𝑖 in relation to the variance of the effect 𝑣𝑖𝑡 This is due to the 
persistency of the instruments representing the independent variables, therefore suggesting 
that their lagged levels, which are used as instruments, have a weak correlation with their 
first-differences, which represent the independent variables. Moreover, the authors found that 
using the standard first-differenced GMM estimator leads to a low and insignificant capital 
coefficient, resulting in decreasing returns to scale and imprecise estimates.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that such issues cause finite sample biases. They propose 
that such biases can be reduced by also using the lagged first-differences of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as instruments 
for the equation in levels, in addition to the lagged levels as instruments for the equation in 
the first differences. The authors thus introduce the following additional moment conditions: 
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                                              𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡, ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 4,5, … , 𝑇                                        (24) 
And  
                                                                    𝐸(𝑢𝑖3, ∆𝑦𝑖2) = 0                                                         (25) 
The new GMM estimator, called system-GMM (SYS-GMM), is based on the previous 
conditions, which themselves are based on a stacked system comprising the (𝑇 − 2) 
equations in first differences and the (𝑇 − 2) equations in levels, corresponding to the 
periods 3, … , 𝑇 for which the instruments are observed.  As in the previous case, the GMM 
estimator deteriorates as 𝛼 moves towards 1. However, since |𝛼| < 1, the moment condition 
provides information about the endogenous variables it represents. The two-step estimator is 
calculated in the same way as previously defined. Blundell and Bond’s (1998) framework 
differs from the standard first-differenced GMM in that it allows for an autoregressive 
(AR(1)) component in the production function error term, enabling serial correlation in order 
to obtain valid lagged internal instruments for equations in first-differences or equations in 
levels.  
Using a panel of 509 US manufacturing firms, Blundell and Bond (2000) found that there are 
finite sample biases in the first-differenced GMM estimator resulting from the existence of 
weak instruments and that these biases diminish with the imposition of constant returns to 
scale. The authors also report higher and more significant capital coefficients resulting from 
the SYS-GMM approach, in comparison with the first-differenced GMM estimator, with no 
rejection of the assumption of constant returns to scale. Moreover, compared to the 
instruments in the standard first-differenced GMM estimator, the new instruments are not 
rejected, thus suggesting that they are informative for the endogenous variables in levels that 
they represent, with the imposition of constant returns to scale generating even better results. 
Performing a Monte Carlo simulation, Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that the SYS-
GMM has better finite sample properties and is more efficient than the standard first-
differenced GMM estimator, which was characterised by large finite sample bias and low 
precision. Van Biesebroeck (2007) found SYS-GMM to be the most suitable parametric 
methodology when there is measurement error or technological heterogeneity among firms, 
compared to the following methodologies: index numbers, data envelopment analysis, 
instrumental variables estimation, stochastic frontiers and semiparametric estimation. This is 
because SYS-GMM was found to generate the most robust estimates for both total factor 
productivity levels and growth rates compared to other estimators. Van Biesebroeck (2007) 
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also argues that when technological heterogeneity between firms is absent but there are 
constant productivity differences over time, SYS-GMM provides the most reliable results.  
 
2.3.5.  Olley and Pakes’ (1996) Semi-parametric Estimation 
The explanation of this methodology follows Olley and Pakes (1996). The achievement of 
consistent and unbiased estimates by this approach relies on three main assumptions. The first 
is the assumption of the existence of only one unobserved state variable at the firm level, 
evolving according to a first-order Markov process. This variable is productivity. The second 
is the assumption of monotonicity for the investment variable, meaning that investment 
increases in productivity and only positive values of investment are used in the analysis. The 
third is the assumption that all firms belonging to the same industry are subject to the same 
input and output prices, meaning that they operate in perfectly competitive markets. 
Therefore industry deflators are used for both inputs and outputs. 
In the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation methodology, since a firm maximises the expected 
discounted value of future cash flows at the beginning of each period, the firm will compare 
its sale (or liquidation) value with the expected return it can generate by continuing to 
operate. If it is not worth operating, the firm will liquidate. Otherwise, the firm will decide to 
pursue a positive investment, a choice that is also based on the perception of future market 
structure and input factor prices. 
These decisions can be expressed by an exit rule and an investment demand function, 
respectively: 
                                         𝜒𝑡 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝜔𝑡 ≥ 𝜔𝑡⏟ (𝑎𝑡, 𝑘𝑡), 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒}                                         (26) 
                                                                    𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡(𝜔𝑡, 𝑎𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                             (27) 
Where  𝑖𝑡 is the investment, 𝜔𝑡 is TFP, 𝑎𝑡 is the age of the firm and 𝑘𝑡 is the capital stock. In 
(27), investment is a function of productivity, age and the capital stock. Here, the production 
function is represented by the following: 
                                         𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                   (28) 
In this equation, 𝜂𝑖𝑡 represents measurement error or an unexpected productivity shock. In 
Olley and Pakes’ (1996) estimation algorithm, labour is the only variable factor, and is hence 
affected by the current 𝜔𝑖𝑡 value, while the other inputs, 𝑘𝑡 and 𝑎𝑡, are relatively fixed and 
are affected by the distribution of 𝜔𝑖𝑡 depending on the information at time 𝑡 − 1 and past 
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values of 𝜔𝑖𝑡. Olley and Pakes (1996) impose a strict monotonicity condition for investment, 
which means it increases in  𝜔𝑡 when 𝜔𝑡 is not equal to zero. A positive productivity shock is 
thus likely to result in a positive shock in the future, hence leading to an accumulation of 
capital. The previous two assumptions enable the inversion of the unobservable term 𝜔𝑡 thus 
addressing the endogeneity issue by controlling for 𝜔𝑖𝑡. Investment is thus used as a proxy to 
control for the correlation between input levels and the unobserved firm-specific productivity 
shock, hence addressing the simultaneity bias. With investment increasing in 𝜔𝑖𝑡, the 
previous investment function can be inverted to become: 
                                                                    𝜔𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                           (29) 
By substituting the inverted investment function into the production function, it becomes: 
                                                       𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                            (30) 
Where:  
                                  𝜙𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ℎ𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡)                           (31) 
The equation is estimated with OLS, resulting in consistent estimates for 𝛽𝑙 but not for 𝛽𝑎 
or 𝛽𝑘, thus not allowing the measurement of their effect on a firm’s investment decision. In 
order to estimate, 𝛽𝑎 and 𝛽𝑘, the following relation on productivity at time 𝑡 + 1 is taken: 
                                                      𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝐸[𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1|𝜔𝑖𝑡] + 𝜉𝑡+1                                                   (32) 
Where 𝜉𝑡+1 represents the innovation component in 𝜔𝑖𝑡+1. The relation means that TFP at 
𝑡 + 1 follows a first-Markov process given by the expected value of productivity at 𝑡 + 1, 
conditional on the information on TFP at time 𝑡, plus the innovation component at 𝑡 + 1. 
Firms will decide to operate if: 
                                                          𝜒𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜔𝑡 ≥ 𝜔𝑡⏟ (𝑎𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                     (33) 
Since the innovation component 𝜉𝑡+1 is correlated with the variable inputs  𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡, this is 
subtracted from the output: 
                                                            𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡(𝑖𝑖𝑡, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                      (34) 
The TFP expectation at time 𝑡 + 1 now becomes: 
              𝐸[𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|𝑘𝑖𝑡+1, 𝜒𝑡+1 = 1] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝐸[𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|𝜔𝑖𝑡+1, 𝜒𝑡+1 = 1]                 (35) 
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The second stage of the estimation algorithm is: 
      𝑦𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝑔(𝑃𝑡, 𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡) + 𝜉𝑡+1 + 𝜂𝑡+1     (36) 
In this function, 𝐸[𝜔𝑖𝑡+1|𝜔𝑖𝑡+1, 𝜒𝑡+1 = 1] =  𝑔(𝑃𝑡, 𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡) is the firm’s 
expectation of productivity at time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟 [𝜒𝑡+1 = 1| 𝜔𝑡+1⏟ (𝑎𝑡+1, 𝑘𝑡+1), 𝐽𝑡] is the 
probability of the firm’s survival at time t, and 𝜉𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝜔𝑡+1|𝜔𝑡, 𝜒𝑡+1 = 1] is the 
innovation component. The coefficients for the capital and age inputs can be obtained by 
executing a non-linear least squares regression on the previous equation. Because 𝜉𝑡+1 and 
𝜂𝑡+1 are not correlated with 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 and 𝑎𝑖,𝑡+1, this estimation leads to unbiased and consistent 
estimates of 𝛽𝑎 and 𝛽𝑘.  
2.3.6.  Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) Semiparametric Estimation 
The explanation of this methodology follows the structure of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
The previous section demonstrated how Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy to 
control for the simultaneity between the input choice and productivity. Although investment 
seems to represent a valuable proxy, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) indicate that intermediate 
inputs constitute a better proxy. This is mainly because of the monotonicity condition 
imposed in Olley and Pakes’s (1996) methodology, which results in the consideration of only 
positive investment observations. Since firms do not always invest, such a condition is likely 
to cause an efficiency loss in the estimation, since observations in which investment is equal 
to zero would not be considered in the methodology. Firstly, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
suggest that since firms always report a positive value for their use of intermediate inputs, it 
constitutes a better proxy. Secondly, when non-convex adjustment costs lead to twists in the 
investment demand function, plants might not properly respond to shocks by adjusting 
investment, leaving the correlation between endogenous variables and the unobservable term. 
This is because investment is costly and relatively difficult for firms to adjust in response to a 
shock. In contrast, intermediate inputs are likely to be easier to adjust. This consideration 
provides further support for the use of intermediate inputs as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) adopt intermediate inputs as a proxy rather than investment because it is less 
susceptible to zero values and due to efficiency losses arising in the estimation using 
investment as a proxy. The monotonicity condition is more likely to hold than in the Olley 
and Pakes (1996) method. Moreover, intermediate inputs can be adjusted at a lower cost than 
investments when productivity shocks occur, hence removing the correlation between the 
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independent variables and the disturbance. As in the case of Olley and Pakes’s (1996) 
method, 𝜔𝑡 is the only unobservable term that enters into the function for intermediate 
inputs 𝑚𝑡. The intermediate inputs (e.g. materials and energy) are added into the production 
function: 
 
                     𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛽𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑢 + 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡                 (37) 
In this function, 𝑙𝑡
𝑠 is the log of skilled labour input, 𝑙𝑡
𝑢 is the log of unskilled labour, 𝑒𝑡 is the 
log of electricity input, 𝑓𝑡 is the log of fuel inputs, and 𝑚𝑡 is the log of material inputs. A firm 
index is not adopted in the function because both input and output prices are assumed to be 
the same across all firms. Because of the monotonicity condition, the material input demand 
function can be inverted as follows:   
                                                                   𝜔𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡(𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                            (38) 
Therefore: 
                                         𝜙𝑡(𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡(𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                              (39) 
This equation can be estimated by OLS, as Olley and Pakes (1996) have done. However, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also use a different approach. By regressing output on capital 
and material input, the authors estimate the following conditional moments: 
- 𝐸(𝑦𝑡|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡),    
- 𝐸(𝑙𝑡
𝑠|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡), 
- 𝐸(𝑙𝑡
𝑢|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡), 
- 𝐸(𝑒𝑡|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡), 
- 𝐸(𝑓𝑡|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡). 
These are then subtracted from the production function, where no intercept is used to obtain 
the first stage estimates: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑦𝑡|𝑚𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡)
=  𝛽𝑠(𝑙𝑡
𝑠 − 𝐸(𝑙𝑡
𝑠|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑙𝑡
𝑢 − 𝐸(𝑙𝑡
𝑢|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)) + 𝛽𝑒(𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑒𝑡|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡))
+ 𝛽𝑓(𝑓𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑓𝑡|𝑚𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)) + 𝜂𝑡                                                                                (40) 
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In the second stage of the estimation algorithm, it is assumed that capital and the innovation 
component of productivity are uncorrelated: 
                                                                       𝐸[𝑘𝑡𝜂𝑡
∗] = 0                                                                  (41) 
In addition, innovation in productivity at time t is uncorrelated with the choice of material 
inputs at time 𝑡 − 1: 
                                                                        𝐸[𝑚𝑡−1𝜂𝑡
∗] = 0                                                            (42) 
The residual is obtained by the following: 
           𝜉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡(𝛽
∗) = 𝑦𝑡 −  𝛽𝑠𝑙𝑡
𝑠 − 𝛽𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑢 − 𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑡 − 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑡 − 𝛽𝑚
∗ 𝑚𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘
∗𝑘𝑡 − 𝐸[𝜔𝑡|𝜔𝑡−1]     (43) 
In this function, 𝛽∗ = (𝛽𝑚
∗ , 𝛽𝑘
∗), 𝐸[𝜔𝑡|𝜔𝑡−1] is estimated by using the estimates of 𝜔𝑡 
obtained from the results of the first stage estimation and the (𝛽𝑚
∗ , 𝛽𝑘
∗). 
The authors, by adding six over-identifying conditions to the two already existing ones, arrive 
at the following expectation vector: 
                                                                  𝐸[(𝜉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡)𝑍𝑡]                                                                 (44) 
Where 𝑍𝑡 is a vector: 
                                         𝑍𝑡 = {𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑡−1
𝑠 , 𝑙𝑡−1
𝑢 , 𝑒𝑡−1, 𝑓𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑡−2}                            (45) 
Estimates of (?̂?𝑘, ?̂?𝑚) are obtained by minimising the following function with the GMM 
approach, which uses 𝑡 − 1 values of the materials variable as instruments for the t variable: 
                                𝑄(𝛽∗) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛽∗ ∑(∑ ∑ (𝜉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑡(𝛽
∗))𝑍𝑖,ℎ𝑡
𝑇𝑖1
𝑡=𝑇𝑖0𝑖
8
ℎ=1
)2                           (46) 
In this function, 𝑖 represents the firm index, ℎ represents the instrument index, 𝑇𝑖 represents 
the time index. 
According to the above explanation, Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) semiparametric approach 
differs from Olley and Pakes’s (1996) in four respects. Firstly, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
adopt intermediate inputs rather than investment to control for the simultaneity between input 
choice and productivity. Secondly, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) obtain the coefficient for the 
intermediate inputs’ proxy variable in the second stage of the estimation, rather than in the 
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first stage. Thirdly, while Olley and Pakes (1996) adopt an unbalanced panel and consider the 
survival probability in the second stage of the estimation, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) do not 
include it since Olley and Pakes’s (1996) results showed very small efficiency gains (Van 
Beveren, 2012). Fourth, when a revenue production function is estimated instead of a value-
added function, an additional moment condition is needed to obtain the estimate for 
intermediate inputs. Therefore, the second stage of estimation in Levinsohn and Petrin’s 
(2003) methodology utilises the GMM approach.  
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the intermediate input proxy, Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) adopt plant-level annual data from manufacturing firms in the period of 1979-1986, 
focusing on metals, textiles, food products and wood products. As described above, their 
methodology uses intermediate inputs to control for the correlation between input levels and 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks (i.e. the simultaneity issue). The addition of 
these inputs brings some relevant benefits. Firstly, the investment proxy can only be used for 
firms reporting a positive level of capital investment. As many firms report zero or negative 
capital investment, this leads to an efficiency loss. In comparison, the intermediate input 
proxy allows this problem to be avoided, as firms almost always report positive intermediate 
inputs. Secondly, when a productivity shock occurs, it is costly for a firm to respond by 
changing its capital investment. This maintains the correlation between the firm-specific 
productivity shocks and the regressors. Intermediate inputs are less costly to adjust than 
investment when a productivity shock occurs, thus leading to a weakening correlation 
between inputs and TFP. Thirdly, as intermediate inputs are not state variables, the use of 
intermediate inputs creates a better link between the economic theory and the strategy of 
estimation than does capital investment.  
Despite representing a step forward compared to the Olley and Pakes (1996) model, 
Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) approach has its shortcomings. Ackerberg et al. (2006) argue 
that, as with Olley and Pakes’s (1996) method, the approach suffers from serious collinearity 
problems arising in the first stage of estimation and given this condition, the method requires 
strong and unintuitive assumptions to be made in order for it to be correctly identified. The 
following discussion of such assumptions is based on Ackerberg et al. (2006). 
The first assumption is strict monotonicity. While for Olley and Pakes (1996), investment 
must be strictly monotonic in 𝜔𝑖𝑡, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also require that intermediate 
inputs be strictly monotonic in 𝜔𝑖𝑡. This condition is necessary for the non-parametric 
inversion of 𝜔𝑖𝑡, since the endogeneity issue would otherwise not be addressed. 
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The second assumption states that  𝜔𝑖𝑡 is the only unobservable term in the functions for 
investment, as carried out by Olley and Pakes (1996), and those for intermediate inputs, as 
carried out by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Like the previous assumption, this condition is 
required in order to invert 𝜔𝑖𝑡.  
The third assumption regards the timing of input choices in the two methodologies. In the 
Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is decided at 𝑡 − 1, while in the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) methodology, it is decided at or before 𝑡 − 1. If such were not the case, the 
moment condition would be violated, as 𝑘𝑖𝑡 would not be orthogonal to 𝜉𝑖𝑡. In Olley and 
Pakes’s (1996) approach, the first-stage estimation would be complicated by a choice of 𝑘𝑖𝑡 
earlier than 𝑡 − 1, as 𝑖𝑖𝑡−1 could not be used to invert 𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 thus complicating the estimation 
in the first stage.  
The fourth assumption regards the use of the labour input in the two methodologies. For 
example, in Olley and Pakes’s (1996) method, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 cannot have dynamic implications, while in 
Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) approach, it can. Moreover, in Levinsohn and Petrin’s (1996) 
model, 𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be perfectly variable inputs, meaning that they are defined 
when 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is observed by the firm’s decision maker. If 𝑚𝑖𝑡 was chosen before knowing 𝜔𝑖𝑡, 
then 𝑚𝑖𝑡 cannot be used for the inversion in the first stage of 𝜔𝑖𝑡. If 𝑙𝑖𝑡 was chosen before 
knowing 𝜔𝑖𝑡, then 𝑙𝑖𝑡 would be chosen before 𝑚𝑖𝑡, and thus its choice would be based on 𝑙𝑖𝑡, 
which would not enable us to identify the labour coefficient in the first stage by entering into 
the function. 
Ackerberg et al. (2006) argue that these four assumptions, upon which the semiparametric 
methods are based, are strong and unintuitive, therefore generating serious collinearity issues 
in the first stage of estimation. Based on the ideas of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2006) presented a new estimator that has the advantage 
of not suffering from collinearity issues. In addition, it can be compared with dynamic panel 
data estimators. On the one hand, this is similar to estimators developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996), as well as Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), as it uses investment or intermediate inputs, 
respectively, in order to control for productivity shocks. On the other hand, it estimates the 
labour coefficient in the second stage. While it is not the aim of this section to review this 
methodology, it is important to note that by using the same dataset as the one used by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2006) demonstrate that their method is more 
stable across various potential variables. Other methodologies have recently been developed 
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by Wooldridge (2009), De Loecker (2007) and Katayama et al. (2009). Despite their 
usefulness, discussing them is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
2.3.7. Choosing the Right TFP Estimator 
The previous sections analysed how TFP is measured and the main issues arising from such 
measurements. Following that analysis, it is important to highlight which method constitutes 
the most valuable estimator for analysing TFP determinants at the firm level. Van Beveren 
(2012) reviewed various issues in the estimation of TFP at the firm level, such as the 
endogeneity of input choices (also known as simultaneity bias), the omitted variable bias (due 
to the lack of available data on physical inputs and outputs and their respective prices), the 
sample selection bias (which results from not allowing for firm entry and exit), and the 
production of multiple products by a firm (resulting in differences in production technology 
across products produced by single firm). In tackling such issues, the author compares the 
performance of different estimators, such as fixed effects, GMM, and the semi-parametric 
estimators of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Based on the results 
obtained, Van Beveren (2012) argues that the choice of a specific TFP estimator should be 
based on the data utilised and the related assumptions imposed.  
SYS-GMM represents the most suitable estimator for analysing TFP determinants at the firm 
level, especially compared to the widely used semiparametric approaches, since it has the 
advantage of allowing for firms’ fixed effects. As previous studies have indicated that firms 
have unmeasured productivity advantages that remain constant over time and that need to be 
captured, the SYS-GMM approach enables the consideration of such fixed effects. Moreover, 
SYS-GMM has the advantage of addressing the endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables 
(including the lagged dependent variable) as well as selection bias by using lagged values of 
the endogenous variables as instruments in the first differences equation, and first-differences 
of the same variables as instruments in the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). SYS-
GMM is particularly preferable to the semiparametric methodologies of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), as these do not allow for fixed effects and are based 
on strong and unintuitive assumptions, which generate collinearity problems in the first stage 
of estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2006). Van Biesebroeck (2007) compared the sensitivity of 
five different productivity estimators (index numbers, data envelopment analysis, stochastic 
frontiers, GMM, and semi-parametric estimation) using a Monte-Carlo simulation. Although 
each method has its own advantages and disadvantages, the system GMM estimator was 
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found to be the most robust technique in presence of measurement errors and technological 
heterogeneity.  
In summary, the main total factor productivity estimation methodologies have been discussed 
in this section: ordinary least squares, fixed effects, instrumental variables, GMM and its 
variation, SYS-GMM, and the semiparametric methodologies of Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The conditions in which each of them is most suitable approach 
have also been discussed. The next section presents the main determinants of total factor 
productivity.  
2.4. A Review of the Determinants of TFP 
The first section of the chapter reviewed TFP in the context of the production function. The 
second section discussed the importance of TFP for a firm’s economic performance, people’s 
standards of living and national economic growth. The third section analysed how TFP is 
measured and explained why micro-level measures are more valuable than macro-level ones. 
This section will review the determinants of TFP at the micro level. A micro-level analysis of 
TFP enables us to understand what determines the differences in TFP across firms. As a 
result, it offers a better understanding of TFP than that attainable with aggregate data. The 
determinants of TFP examined in this section are the following: internal and external 
knowledge, political affiliation, foreign direct investment, economies of scale, competition, 
spatial spillovers, city location, export activity, managerial ability and marketing capabilities. 
This is followed by a review of studies analysing multiple determinants of TFP and a 
discussion of the contribution of the study in this thesis. 
2.4.1. Internal and External Knowledge  
 “Knowledge can be defined as a dynamic framework or structure from which information 
can be stored, processed and understood” (Howells, 2002, p. 872). This definition suggests 
that knowledge is taken up and accumulated, and that rather than being static, it increases as a 
result of new knowledge gained. According to Polanyi (1962), knowledge can be explicit or 
tacit. Explicit knowledge can be transmitted in a direct and explicit way. For example, when 
new machinery is installed, workers are provided with instructions on how it functions. 
Workers then acquire tacit knowledge by learning processes and procedures, that are not 
directly or explicitly communicated. For example, a worker who learns a firm’s processes, 
routines, ideals and values without having been provided with any explicit guidance on the 
topics develops tacit knowledge. The importance of knowledge can be exemplified by the 
following quote: “Knowledge is crucial in helping to create innovation which in turn 
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stimulates economic growth and development. It also plays a more specific role in 
establishing and sustaining the long-term capabilities and performance of firms and 
organisations and in enhancing the success and well-being of individuals and communities” 
(Howells, 2002, p. 871). This description suggests that knowledge is crucial in order for firms 
to flourish, while also having effects that go far beyond a firm’s boundaries. Harris and 
Moffat (2013) argue that knowledge is part of a firm’s intangible assets. “Intangible assets 
are a firm’s dynamic capability created by core competence and knowledge resources, 
including organizational structure, employee expert skills, employment centripetal force, 
R&D innovation capability, customer size, recognizable brand, and market share” (Tsai et al., 
2012, p. 67). This definition suggests that intangible assets comprise knowledge that can be 
disentangled into various components, including R&D. These assets are seen as critical 
drivers for knowledge creation, innovation and, consequently, economic growth (Kramer et 
al., 2011, p. 447). 
From the above definitions and descriptions of knowledge, one might infer that, ceteris 
paribus, a firm with a high relative level of knowledge is likely to show greater productivity 
compared to a firm with a relatively low level. However, this is not always the case, as the 
firm must be able to use its knowledge for productive purposes by developing absorptive 
capacity. Absorptive capacity can be explained as follows: “The ability of a firm to recognise 
the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is 
critical to its innovative capabilities. We label this capability a firm’s absorptive capacity and 
suggest that is largely a function of the firm’s level of prior related knowledge” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p.128). Although this definition provides an insight into what absorptive 
capacity is, a more comprehensive definition might also include the ability of the firm to use 
internal knowledge. Eustace (2000, p. 6) suggests that “increasingly, the capacity to combine 
external and internal sources of knowledge to exploit commercial opportunities has become a 
distinctive competency.” Therefore, it is important to develop knowledge and to use it for 
productive purposes, the extent of which is determined by a firm’s absorptive capacity.  
Additional insight into the importance of knowledge for productivity is provided by the 
resource-based theory, of which Barney (1991) is a proponent. He argues that a firm is made 
up of resources, among them knowledge, which are used to implement strategies aimed at 
improving a firm’s efficiency. This suggests that knowledge can contribute to higher TFP 
within a firm. According to Barney (1991), such resources can constitute a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and 
without substitute. Thus, knowledge can add further value when it is a source of competitive 
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advantage, hence improving a firm’s position with respect to its competitors. In addition, 
Teece et al. (1997) state that a competence can constitute a competitive advantage and thus be 
a source of higher TFP only when it is difficult to replicate by competitors and when it can be 
applied from one setting to another.  
The resource-based view of the firm, despite providing a valuable insight into the nature of 
the firm, does not consider the external environment where the firm operates. As discussed 
earlier, the external environment can constitute an additional source of knowledge. In 
addition, “few firms possess all the inputs required for successful and continuous 
technological development” (Almeida et al., 2003, p. 302). For example, a firm can have 
specific relationships with suppliers, with whom it collaborates in improving inputs, or 
customers, with whom it collaborates in improving its products. Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
(2001) decompose knowledge into two parts. The first is the knowledge developed by a firm 
using its own resources. The authors call this first-order competence and suggest that it can 
constitute a source of competitive advantage but can also result in rigidity. The other is called 
second-order competence, or knowledge acquired outside the firm’s boundaries. In summary, 
both internal and external knowledge can be determinants of TFP when a firm possesses 
absorptive capacity and when the knowledge is a source of competitive advantage.  
Having stressed the importance of knowledge, it is important to discuss how knowledge is 
measured. As described above, one approach is to focus on absorptive capacity. Eustace 
(2000) suggests that absorptive capacity comprises R&D, know-how, intellectual property, 
workforce skills, world-class supply networks and brands. Some of these, such as R&D 
expenditure, can be quantified. Others, such as workforce skills, supply network and brands, 
are not easily quantifiable. Romijn and Albaladejo (2002) and Vinding (2006) propose the 
use of human capital measures, while Schmidt (2005) created a knowledge measure that 
combines R&D activities, related prior knowledge, individuals’ skills, organisational 
structure, and human resources management practices. Among the potential measures 
suggested in the literature, one may wonder which is the most valuable. Most studies seem to 
have followed the suggestion of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), in which R&D is used as a 
proxy for absorptive capacity. The authors describe a dual role for R&D. Firstly, it develops 
absorptive capacity, which enables the firm to identify, absorb and exploit external 
knowledge for productive purposes, which are likely to indirectly result in higher TFP. 
Secondly, R&D generates products and process improvements within a firm, which are likely 
to directly lead to higher TFP. This dual role suggests that R&D is the most valuable proxy 
for absorptive capacity because it has both a direct and indirect effect on TFP.  
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However, some R&D investment is unsuccessful and is thus unlikely to result in higher TFP. 
Some R&D expenditures can result in TFP-improving innovations, while others may be a 
waste of resources. In their subsequent paper, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that 
absorptive capacity is path-dependent, or mostly a function of the prior knowledge that a firm 
has accumulated. This means that by already having a certain level of knowledge, a firm is 
able to better process and exploit new knowledge for innovative purposes, compared to firms 
without that level of knowledge. In contrast to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Schmidt (2005) 
argues that R&D does not represent a valuable proxy for absorptive capacity because of its 
path-dependent characteristics. In response to this issue, Harris and Li (2009) measured 
absorptive capacity through a factor analysis on 36 variables representing the following: the 
firm’s ability to exploit external knowledge, the knowledge generated by its networking 
relationships with external bodies, the implementation of new organisational structures and 
human resource management strategies, partnerships built with enterprises or institutions at 
the international level, and the acquisition and absorption of codified scientific knowledge 
from research partners. Harris and Li (2009) argue that their measure of absorptive capacity 
is the most direct and comprehensive. However, the difficulty in using such a measure lies in 
having access to the entire set of 36 variables. Harris and Li (2009) constructed this measure 
for firms based in the UK, for which information is more likely to be available than for those 
in developing countries such as China. Thus, despite the path-dependency issue suggested by 
Schmidt (2005), R&D constitutes the most reliable measure of absorptive capacity.  
Empirically, the positive effect of R&D investment on TFP has been demonstrated by various 
studies. Lokshin et al. (2008) examined the impact of internal and external R&D on labour 
productivity in a sample of 301 Dutch firms during the period of 1996-2001. The change in 
knowledge stock was measured as a function of the investment into both internal and external 
R&D, where internal R&D represented absorptive capacity and external R&D represented the 
acquisition of external technology. The authors’ results prove that both internal and external 
R&D positively affect labour productivity. Their most interesting finding, however, is that 
external R&D only has a positive impact when there is an adequate level of internal R&D. 
This suggests that a firm may particularly benefit from knowledge acquired externally when 
it has a strong level of absorptive capacity, which would enable it to exploit external 
knowledge for productive purposes. Other studies have analysed the relationship between 
R&D and productivity but without separating the two channels by which R&D impacts 
productivity. 
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Griliches (1986), for example, analysed the relationship between R&D expenditures and TFP 
growth in a sample of 1,000 large US manufacturing firms during the period of 1957-1977. A 
knowledge variable was inserted into a standard production function as a factor of 
production. This was measured with the variable K = ∑ wiRt−i, where Rt−i represents the 
lagged effect of real gross investment in R&D on TFP. Griliches’s findings suggest a positive 
and significant contribution of R&D to TFP growth, and this was found to last over time. In 
addition, a larger effect on TFP was found for company-financed research compared to 
federally funded research, and for basic research compared to other types of research. 
In line with Griliches’s (1986) study, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) analysed the relationship 
between R&D and TFP growth by comparing company-financed research with federally-
funded research. The analysis looked at over 2,000 US firms during three different periods 
between 1972 and 1985. In the study, R&D was measured in terms of its intensity, given by 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales. Consistent with Griliches’s (1986) findings, 
Lichtenberg and Siegel’s (1991) results demonstrate a positive contribution of R&D 
investment to TFP growth. In particular, company-financed research was found to provide a 
higher return in terms of TFP than federally funded research. On the one hand, this suggests 
that firms benefit more from internally generated knowledge rather than externally generated 
knowledge. On the other hand, this points to a likely low level of absorptive capacity in the 
firms within the sample.  
As with Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), Griliches and Mairesse (1991) used an R&D intensity 
variable. However, instead of measuring the variable’s contribution to TFP growth, they 
adopted labour productivity growth as a dependent variable. Although this is a valuable 
proxy, a more valuable one would have been TFP, as it considers all inputs utilized within the 
production process. In their study, Griliches and Mairesse (1991) assessed the contribution of 
R&D to labour productivity growth in both the United States and Japan by using firm-level 
data for the period of 1973-1980. In contrast to previous studies, the data only comprised 
company-financed R&D. Despite being minor, R&D contribution was found to be similar in 
the US and Japan. Moreover, the findings suggest that R&D contributed 0.4-0.6% to labour 
productivity growth during the period analysed. However, as Griliches and Mairesse (1991) 
point out, the Japanese R&D data is characterized by missing and inaccurate values, 
suggesting that the results should be interpreted cautiously.  
Regarding the Chinese context, two studies have examined the effect of R&D on productivity 
at the firm level. Hu (2001) analysed the relationship between R&D spending and the 
productivity of 813 high-tech Chinese firms in the Haidian District of Beijing in 1995. The 
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impact of R&D was measured in terms of its share of sales, thus representing its intensity. On 
the one hand, the results indicate the existence of a positive effect of privately financed R&D 
on Chinese firms’ productivity. On the other hand, the results indicate the existence of a 
negative relationship between government financed R&D and firms’ productivity. Despite 
this, the results also suggest that government financed R&D indirectly affects firms’ 
productivity in a positive manner, as it stimulates private R&D expenditure.  
While Hu’s (2001) study focused on high-tech firms, Wu et al. (2007) examined 145 firms 
belonging to the watch and clock manufacturing industry in Southern China. Apart from 
R&D intensity, knowledge was also examined in terms of capital intensity (the ratio of a 
firm’s capital expenditure to its number of employees) and level of product differentiation 
(the ratio of a firm’s advertising expenditure to its gross output). The results suggest that 
technical efficiency is positively affected by knowledge expressed as R&D and capital 
intensity, but negatively by knowledge expressed as product differentiation. 
Based on the above discussion and empirical results from the literature, knowledge creation 
in the form of R&D investment is likely to have a positive effect on firms’ TFP. This positive 
effect is likely to be exerted through two channels: a direct channel, as R&D expenditure is 
undertaken for product and process improvements, and an indirect channel, as R&D develops 
absorptive capacity, which enables firms to absorb external knowledge and use it for 
productive purposes. The empirical literature analysing Chinese firms indicates that privately 
financed R&D directly and positively affects TFP. Government financed R&D, on the other 
hand, directly and negatively affects TFP but provides an indirect positive effect by 
promoting private R&D expenditure.  
Other than through R&D investment, knowledge can be also obtained through experience. 
This is because a firm is expected to become more productive as it ages, according to the so-
called “survival effect.” As it matures, a firm accumulates knowledge according to a process 
defined by Arrow (1962) as “learning by doing,” which is likely to generate improvements in 
TFP. “Learning is the product of experience. Learning can only take place through the 
attempt to solve a problem and therefore only takes place during activity” (Arrow, 1962, 
p.155). This suggests that a firm’s acquisition of knowledge does not just occur through mere 
repetition in production, but also through solving the problems encountered. In addition, “as 
plants age, managers accumulate experience, gain from learning by doing, undertake new 
investments, or achieve economies of scale, all of which can improve plant-level 
productivity” (Jensen et al., 2001, p. 323). Moreover, over time, firms become more 
knowledgeable about the market in which they operate, and learn how to better satisfy their 
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customers’ needs, source inputs and process them. These developments are likely to result in 
higher TFP. Jensen et al. (2001) also suggest another aspect of the relationship between TFP 
and firm age. The authors argue that new firms entering an industry might have higher 
productivity than existing ones. This is because the new firms might utilize more recent and 
innovative capital that represents technological best practices. Thus, older firms are expected 
to be less productive than younger firms because of the so-called “vintage effect.” Marshall 
(1890) also suggests that older firms might be subject to inertia, rendering them unable to 
adjust as quickly to the dynamic market environment as their younger counterparts. Hannan 
and Freeman (1984) also argue that a firm’s negative performance is often due to the so-
called “inertia effect,” by which firms are unable to adjust their structures and strategies to 
the dynamic environment, making them unable to exploit the opportunities the environment 
offers. In summary, the above arguments suggest there is no unilateral relationship between 
firm age and TFP. There can be a positive relationship due to the “survival effect,” or a 
negative relationship due to either the “vintage” or “inertia” effects. 
Jensen et al. (2001) studied the evolution of US labour productivity in manufacturing plants 
from 1963 to 1992. The vintage effect was measured as the change in labour productivity of 
newer plants compared with older ones when entering their respective industry. The survival 
effect was measured as the change in labour productivity of existing plants over time. Both 
effects were found to contribute to the overall growth in manufacturing industry labour 
productivity. In particular, the higher productivity of newer plants compared to older plants 
suggests that newer plants bring with them the latest best practice technology, pointing to the 
existence of the vintage effect. At the same time, Jensen et al. (2001) also demonstrate the 
existence of the survival effect, as plants that were already in an industry became more 
productive over time.  
Majumdar (1997) looked at a sample of 1,020 Indian firms to analyse the impact of firm size 
and age on productivity and profitability over the period of 1998-1994. Firm age was 
measured as the number of years that a firm’s data had been recorded in the database. The 
findings suggest that older firms are more productive than younger ones, while being less 
profitable. From these results, one would infer that the more a firm matures, the more 
productive it becomes. This suggests that older firms learn by doing as they become more 
experienced. Consistent with Jensen et al.’s (2001) study, this suggests the existence of a 
survival effect. However, India has a different institutional setting than the US that is 
characterised by greater barriers to entry and exit.  
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In another study in a developing country, Fernandes (2008) looked at 575 large 
manufacturing firms in Bangladesh belonging to five different manufacturing industries and 
found a non-linear relationship between firm age and TFP. This finding suggests that firms 
are likely to start at a low productivity level that then increases over time as the firms “learn” 
by undertaking investments, entering into new markets, and updating their technology. At a 
certain age, the firms reach a “maturity stage,” from which their productivity decreases as 
their stock of knowledge erodes and becomes obsolete.  
In the developed country context, and using a much wider sample than the above studies, 
Coad et al. (2013) analysed the relationship between firm age and various measures of 
performance. This was done with a sample of 62,259 Spanish manufacturing firms over the 
years of 1998-2006. Similar to Fernandes (2008), Coad et al. (2013) find that as firms age, 
they improve their productivity level in addition to experiencing increased profits, growth in 
size and lower leverage. On the other hand, at a certain age, firms start to experience 
worsening performance in terms of productivity growth, sales, and profitability.  
Within the Chinese context, only two studies have examined the relationship between firm 
age and TFP. Zheng et al. (2003) analysed the technical efficiency performance of 600 State-
owned enterprises belonging to 17 two-digit industries located in four provinces during the 
period of 1990-1994. The estimation was conducted using both a Data Envelopment Analysis 
approach and a Malmquist index of productivity growth. Among the explanatory variables 
analysed, firm age was included. This was found to significantly and positively affect firms’ 
technical efficiency. 
While Zheng et al. (2003) focused only on Chinese firms, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) 
compared Chinese and Indian firms to US firms. In examining the impact of resource 
misallocation on firms’ TFP, the impact of firm age on productivity was also considered. 
Their results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm age and productivity, as 
productivity rose in the youngest 10% of Chinese firms and then remained flat before falling 
for the oldest 10% of Chinese firms. 
The above empirical evidence on the relationship between firm age and TFP suggests that 
firms enter an industry with the best practice technology available, which is likely to result in 
higher productivity. Then, up to a certain point, the effect of age on TFP is likely to be 
positive as firms learn by experience. By solving issues in the production process, and 
learning from them, firms are likely to experience enhanced TFP. In addition, a firm is likely 
to better understand the market environment in which it operates over time. Such 
understanding enables the firm to better satisfy customer needs and to source better inputs, 
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both of which are likely to result in higher TFP. However, as firms mature, the effect of age 
on TFP becomes negative due to struggles in adapting to the dynamic and uncertain external 
environment and keeping up with both industry best practices and new technologies. While 
the literature related to China is scant, it indicates the existence of a positive relationship 
between age and TFP for State-owned enterprises, and a non-linear relationship for firms 
with other kinds of ownership structures.  
Until now, knowledge has been represented by R&D expenditure and age. Alternatively, 
knowledge can be also represented by a time trend, or Hicks-neutral technical change. This 
refers to the positive impact on TFP arising from an exogenous technological change that 
affects all firms at the same time. Such a situation generates an increase in TFP while the 
ratio of the marginal product of capital to the marginal product of labour remains constant for 
a given capital to labour ratio. The Hicks-neutral technical change must not be confused with 
either the Harrod or Solow-neutral changes. A Harrod-neutral technical change is labour 
augmenting, where relative factor shares are constant for any capital to output ratio. A Solow-
neutral technical change is capital augmenting, whereby relative factor shares are constant for 
any labour to output ratio. 
In summary, the above discussion suggests that knowledge is a valuable determinant of total 
factor productivity. Knowledge can be represented in various ways. Firstly, a firm can 
commit funds to R&D, which would result in higher TFP in two distinctive ways. One is 
through product and process improvements. The second is through the development of 
absorptive capacity, which enables a firm to exploit external knowledge for productive 
purposes. The empirical literature analysing Chinese firms indicates that privately financed 
R&D directly affects TFP in a positive manner, while government financed R&D directly 
affects TFP negatively but indirectly affects it positively by promoting private R&D 
expenditure. Secondly, a firm is expected to acquire more knowledge and therefore become 
more productive over time through experience. This is according to the process of “learning 
by doing,” whereby a firm becomes better at production by solving issues encountered in the 
process. In addition, the firm becomes more knowledgeable about the market in which it 
operates, enabling it to better satisfy its customers’ needs and to source better inputs, both of 
which are likely to result in higher TFP. However, a positive effect of a firm age on TFP is 
not always present. An older firm might become slower to adapt its characteristics and 
strategies to the market or to keep its technology up to date with industry best practices. Such 
conditions are likely to result in lower TFP. Moreover, new industry entrants are more likely 
to utilize the latest technology available, thus making them more productive than firms 
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already established within an industry and forcing the older firms to exit. This suggests that 
the relationship between age and TFP can also be negative. In the Chinese context, the 
literature is still scant but it indicates the existence of a positive relationship between age and 
TFP for State-owned enterprises, and a non-linear relationship for firms with other kinds of 
ownership structures. In addition to R&D and age, knowledge can be also represented by the 
time trend, or the Hicks-neutral technical change, which is the impact on TFP of exogenous 
technology that affects all firms at the same time.  
This section has discussed knowledge as a determinant of firms’ total factor productivity. The 
next section discusses firms’ political affiliation.  
2.4.2. Political Affiliation 
“A company is connected with a politician if one of the company’s large shareholders or top 
officers is: a member of parliament, a minister or the head of state, or closely related to a top 
official” (Faccio, 2006, p. 370). In the literature, politically affiliated firms have been found 
to enjoy significant advantages over non-politically affiliated ones.  
Firstly, politically connected firms tend to benefit in terms of preferential access to credit. 
Such was suggested by Johnson and Mitton (2003), who looked at a sample of 424 Malaysian 
firms over the period of 1997-1998 and found that the imposition of capital controls 
following the onset of the Asian financial crisis largely benefited firms linked to the country’s 
then prime minister. Dinç (2005) compared the actions of government-owned banks with 
those of private banks in 43 major emerging markets during general elections in the years of 
1994-2000. The results suggest that government-owned banks increase their lending during 
election years compared to private banks. Such increases were mainly attributed to political 
motivations.  
Secondly, politically affiliated firms tend to benefit from government contracts. Goldman et 
al. (2013) examined the importance of political connections in the United States by analysing 
a sample of companies belonging to the S&P500 before and after the 1994 midterm and 2000 
general US elections. Their results show that companies with connections to the winning 
party tend to experience an increase in procurement contracts.  
Thirdly, politically connected firms also benefit in terms of regulatory protection. This is 
suggested by the results of Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), who investigated the relationship 
between competition among three rival interests groups and its effect on contributions made 
to legislators from the US financial services industry. While abovementioned studies are 
focused on single countries, Faccio (2010) analysed the differences between politically 
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connected and non-politically connected firms in a sample of 16,191 companies across 47 
countries. Her findings suggest that politically connected firms, in comparison with non-
connected ones, have higher leverage, lower taxation, poorer accounting, greater market 
power, lower ROA and lower market valuation. Moreover, differences with non-politically 
corrected firms were found to be wider when the firms are based in countries characterised by 
high corruption, and when political connections are closer, as it is the case for connections 
with company owners and ministers. 
The above empirical results suggest that politically connected firms are likely to benefit from 
preferential access to credit, government contracts, regulatory protection, and lower taxation. 
Since such benefits make it easier for a firm to operate, political connections are likely to 
result in higher TFP levels.  
China can be distinguished from other transition economies due to its continuous Communist 
Party leadership, whose membership includes connections with key figures, both political and 
economic (Li et al., 2008). In the Chinese context, a political affiliation is a lishu relationship 
between a firm and any level of government (Li, 2004; Tan et al., 2007; Xia et al., 2009). The 
empirical evidence is mixed, suggesting that political affiliations have both positive and 
negative effects on Chinese firms’ performance.  
Li et al. (2008) studied more than 2,000 private Chinese firms to examine whether 
Communist Party membership positively affects firms’ profitability. Their results indicate 
that membership in the Communist Party positively affects private firms’ profitability, 
particularly in regions with less developed markets and legal systems. Political affiliation 
enables private firms to overcome the legal, institutional and ideological barriers that are set 
up against private ownership in China. Moreover, the results suggest that politically 
connected private firms benefit in terms of higher availability of loans. Although this study 
provides an insight into the effect on of political connections firm performance, it is limited 
to private firms. A following study might also consider analysing such an effect on other 
kinds of firms, such as State-owned firms. In addition, the study only analysed the effect of 
political connections on firms’ profitability measures, not considering TFP.  
While the above study focused only on private enterprises, Wu et al. (2012) also analysed 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). Specifically, they examined the effect of political affiliation 
on the performance of both SOEs and private firms (as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA) for 
1,408 firms between 1999 and 2007. In their study, a firm’s political connectedness was 
represented by a dummy variable taking the value of 1. A firm was regarded as politically 
connected if either the Chairman or CEO had worked in the Chinese government or the 
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military. The results indicate that private firms with politically connected managers tend to 
record better performance than firms without such connections. In contrast, local SOEs with 
connected managers recorded worse performances than those with non-connected managers. 
In addition, private firms with connected managers tend to benefit from tax incentives, while 
local SOEs with connected managers tend to be subject to overinvestment issues. 
Although the two measures of performance adopted in the previous two studies are valuable, 
TFP could have also been considered, as it indicates the extent to which inputs are 
transformed into valuable output. Du and Girma (2010) evaluated the effect of political 
connections on the survival and growth prospects, as well as the TFP growth, of 106,000 
private Chinese enterprises. The authors represented the extent of political connectedness 
through a vector of three binary variables representing affiliation with local, prefecture or 
town level, and regional or central government agencies. Their findings suggest that 
politically connected Chinese firms have a higher chance of survival and higher employment 
growth. Moreover, firms associated with local and high levels of government, and which 
belong to capital-intensive industries, seem to benefit most from political connections. 
However, firms without political affiliation seem to display better productivity growth. This 
suggests that there might be cases in which political connections are not beneficial to a firm’s 
performance. It might be that a political affiliation makes a firm less likely to focus on 
maximising productivity than pursuing objectives that are politically motivated.  
This section has discussed political affiliation as a determinant of a firm’s TFP. The 
discussion indicates that politically affiliated firms tend to enjoy substantial benefits over 
non-politically affiliated ones. The empirical results from the literature suggest that politically 
connected firms are likely to benefit through preferential access to credit, government 
contracts, regulatory protection, and lower taxation. Such benefits make it easier for a firm to 
operate, likely resulting in higher TFP. For Chinese firms in particular, the empirical 
evidence is mixed, suggesting that political affiliation has both positive and negative effects 
on performance. The only study concerning the effect of political affiliation on Chinese 
firms’ TFP documents a negative relationship, although the analysis was limited to private 
firms. While the consideration of firms with other kinds of ownership structures would 
provide additional insights into this relationship, the study points that political affiliation 
might not be beneficial to a firm’s productivity.  
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2.4.3. Foreign Direct Investment 
While the previous two sections reviewed the importance of knowledge and political 
affiliation as determinants of TFP, this section discusses a firm’s ownership and focuses on 
foreign direct investment (FDI). A foreign-owned firm is expected to have a higher TFP than 
firms with other kinds of ownership. According to the internalisation or transaction cost 
theory developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1981), foreign-owned firms enter into 
new markets when they have firm-specific advantages to exploit. A foreign-owned firm will 
be likely to make such a decision if it expects the future benefits to outweigh the related costs 
of entry. Suyanto et al. (2009) argue that domestic firms have a better performance within 
their domestic markets than foreign-owned firms. Thus, foreign-owned firms require a 
comparative advantage in order to compensate for the lack of experience within a new market 
and the sunk costs of entry. Such advantages can include better technology, know-how, 
superior managerial practices, and innovative marketing techniques, among others. For 
example, a foreign-owned firm may use more innovative machinery than local firms, or have 
managers who are able to select a better combination of factor inputs. For these reasons, 
foreign-owned firms are likely to be more productive than local ones. 
For example, a foreign-owned firm’s investment into a domestic firm is likely to either 
directly or indirectly lead to higher productivity in the domestic firm. The effect is direct 
when the local plant or firm in which the foreign-owned firm has invested benefits directly 
from the comparative advantage brought by the foreign owner. One instance is when a local 
plant benefits from the adoption of more advanced technology that the foreign owner has 
brought as part of the investment contract.  
Caves (1974) suggests that, in addition to its direct effects, FDI can also indirectly affect 
domestic firms’ TFP. This occurs when there are spillovers from foreign-owned plants to 
domestically owned ones. Regarding the channels through which FDI is transmitted 
indirectly through spillovers, Crespo and Fontoura (2007) mention five: 
imitation/demonstration, labour mobility, exports, competition and linkages with domestic 
firms. Firstly, imitation/demonstration concerns local firms’ adoption of the innovations used 
by foreign firms. These innovations can take various forms, such as innovative machinery, 
better managerial practices or improved input allocation. Such improvements enable a local 
firm to reduce costs and produce more and better output, which might ultimately result in 
higher TFP. Secondly, labour mobility concerns the development of a highly-skilled labour 
force by a foreign owner, which will improve TFP through the spread knowledge to other 
parts of the business. Thirdly, local plants can also benefit from the export activity that a 
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foreign owner brings, as it is most likely to be a multinational firm. Since a foreign-owned 
firm has knowledge of international markets, local firms can follow its lead, for example, in 
learning about trading strategies or setting up new trading ventures. Fourthly, 
competitiveness increases for a plant or firm, as managers undertake measures to address 
threats from both potential and actual competitors. Moreover, the entrance of a new firm 
causes a reallocation of output shares within an industry. This is because the least productive 
firms will exit an industry, while the most productive ones will survive and even capture 
higher market share. This could result in increased TFP for the entire industry. Lastly, 
spillovers can also be transmitted through the development of commercial relationships, or 
linkages, between foreign-owned and local firms. Such relationships can include backward 
linkages, where the local firms are suppliers to the foreign-owned ones. Local firms, for 
example, can benefit in terms of learning from the feedback provided by foreign customers 
concerning the products supplied. Commercial relationships can also involve forward 
linkages in which foreign-owned firms are suppliers to the local firms. In this example, the 
local firms can benefit from the higher quality of inputs supplied. In addition, in any 
commercial relationship, foreign-owned and local firms can share both tangible and 
intangible assets, such as know-how and R&D efforts, in order to improve not just their 
products but also their work processes and techniques. 
Based on the above discussion, it seems that FDI is likely to benefit firms in terms of higher 
TFP levels. In some cases, this benefit can be direct, for example, in those firms that a foreign 
owner has invested in. In other cases, the benefit can be indirect through spillovers, which 
manifest themselves through different channels such as imitation/demonstration, labour 
mobility, exports, competition, and backward or forward linkages.  
The empirical research has provided mixed results. Some studies suggest that FDI positively 
affects productivity. For example, Harris (2002) studied the direct effect of foreign ownership 
on the TFP of firms belonging to the motor vehicle industry and four other British 
manufacturing industries (Pharmaceuticals, Electronic Data and Processing Equipment, 
Aircraft Equipment Manufacture and Repair, and Miscellaneous Foods) for the years 1980-
1992, using both plant and establishment data. In the study, foreign ownership was measured 
as a vector of dummies, each taking a value of 1 according to the geographical origin of each 
firm’s owner (US, EU, or Old Commonwealth Enterprise). The results indicate that foreign-
owned plants are more productive than UK-owned plants. In particular, at both the 
establishment and plant levels, plants owned by US and EU firms were more productive than 
local ones within the motor vehicles sector. In the other four industries, plants owned by US 
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firms were found to be more productive than local plants, while those owned by EU firms 
were not found to be more productive than local plants.  
Harris and Robinson (2002) analysed plants in the UK manufacturing sector during the 
period of 1987-1992. They looked at the difference in TFP performance between plants that 
had changed ownership and plants that had not, and particularly at the difference in TFP 
performance between foreign-owned and domestic-owned plants. In the estimation 
methodology used, foreign ownership was indicated by a dummy variable that took the value 
1 if a firm was foreign-owned and 0 otherwise. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that foreign 
owners acquired the most productive domestic plants, whose TFP subsequently decreased 
after the acquisition. The authors suggest that this decline in TFP might be due to post-
acquisition organisational difficulties. From this study, one can infer that foreign ownership 
of a plant may not always result in higher TFP. Foreign firms might acquire plants that have 
higher efficiency and better technology than their own plants, which will likely benefit the 
foreign owner. However, it might prove difficult for foreign owners to integrate their 
operations, organisation, and culture with those of the new plant, likely resulting in a 
decrease in TFP. 
A more general study was done by Harris and Robinson (2003), where they analysed the 
direct effects of foreign ownership on TFP using plant-level data from firms belonging to 20 
UK manufacturing industries in the period of 1974-1995. In general, foreign-owned plants 
were found to be more productive than UK-owned ones. Foreign-owned plants were found to 
positively impact TFP within the UK manufacturing sector by pushing local plants to “catch 
up” with best practices. While plants owned by US firms were found to be more productive 
than local ones in most sectors, this productivity advantage seemed to decline over time. EU-
owned plants were found to record better performance than UK-owned ones in some 
industries, while showing poorer performance in others. In addition, the TFP of EU-owned 
plants was found to decline over time, suggesting that they do not necessarily have better 
performance than UK-owned ones. Mixed effects were found for plants owned by Old 
Commonwealth and South East Asian countries. These results suggest that foreign-owned 
firms bring with them a comparative advantage that enables them to become more productive 
than local firms.  
Regarding the Chinese context, Zhou et al. (2002) analysed the direct effect of FDI on 
Chinese firms’ productivity during the period of 1992-1995. The sample was taken from the 
NBS and comprised 450,000 firms representing 90% of China’s total national industrial 
output. However, the sample only included medium and large firms. Firm performance was 
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measured as value added per employee. Despite the usefulness of this measure, a more 
valuable measure would have been TFP, as it considers all inputs utilized within a firm’s 
production processes. Using OLS estimation, their results suggest that firms based in 
geographical regions characterised by higher levels and a longer presence of FDI tend to have 
higher productivity than firms in areas with lower levels and a shorter existence of FDI. On 
the other hand, firms belonging to industries characterised by high levels and a longer 
existence of FDI tend to have lower productivity. Based on these results, FDI seems to exert 
opposing effects on domestic firms, depending on whether they belong to a high-FDI region 
or a high-FDI industry.  
Zhang et al. (2001) compared productivity levels between SOEs and firms with other 
ownership structures in a sample of 2,000 firms from 22 industries during the period of 1996-
1998. The empirical analysis was conducted using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
methodology, which computes firms’ efficiency scores and compares them with the best 
practice in each related industry. Their results indicate that foreign-owned firms and firms 
owned by investors based in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan recorded the highest efficiency 
scores, while State-owned firms recorded the lowest. The effect of ownership on changes in 
efficiency was also analysed using the Malmquist index, with the results showing that State-
owned firms recorded faster efficiency growth than both collectively-owned firms and firms 
owned by investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
Jefferson et al. (2003) analysed the changing profile, in terms of composition and 
performance, of a sample of 22,000 Chinese industrial large and medium-size firms during 
the 5-year period between 1994 and 1999. In terms of productivity growth, the statistical 
results indicate that State-owned shareholding firms recorded the lowest performance, 
followed by overseas, other domestically owned, collectively owned, foreign owned and 
privately owned firms. In terms of TFP levels, at the end of 1999, the least efficient firms 
were SOEs, followed by shareholding, privately owned, collectively owned, overseas and 
foreign owned firms.  
Zhang et al. (2003) examined the effect of ownership on the R&D efficiency of 8,341 
Chinese industrial firms. Ownership was found to play an important role in both R&D and 
production efficiency. The findings indicate that foreign owned firms are the most efficient, 
while SOEs are the least efficient. Foreign owned firms and firms owned by investors from 
Hong-Kong, Macao and Taiwan seemed to record both higher technical efficiency and 
productive efficiency than collectively owned and joint-stock owned firms. The higher R&D 
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efficiency that characterises foreign-owned firms seems to be due to higher R&D intensity, 
and tends to result in higher firm productivity.  
The above literature review has suggested that FDI has a positive effect on firms’ TFP. This 
means that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestically owned firms due to 
the advantages brought to the firm by the foreign owner, such as better technology, know-
how, superior managerial practices, and innovative marketing techniques. While the 
abovementioned studies have analysed the direct effect of FDI on firms’ TFP, other studies 
have analysed the indirect effects that occur through spillovers from foreign-owned plants to 
the local ones. Crespo and Fontoura (2007) suggest that FDI spillovers can be transmitted 
through five channels: imitation/demonstration, labour mobility, exports, competition, and 
through commercial relationships, or linkages, with domestic firms. In general, the empirical 
research seems to provide support for the existence of an indirect effect of FDI on TFP. 
Harris and Robinson (2004) used the same dataset as in their previous study (Harris and 
Robinson, 2003) to analyse the indirect effect of FDI on the TFP of firms belonging to 20 UK 
manufacturing industries. They considered both intra-industry effects through competition, 
inter-industry effects through forward and backward linkages, and spatial agglomeration 
effects. Their results suggest that for most industries, there are no effects of FDI on TFP 
through spatial agglomeration spillovers. In the industries where the effect does exist, it is 
both positive and negative, suggesting the existence of both economies and diseconomies of 
scale. Inter-industry indirect FDI spillover effects due to backward and forward linkages were 
positive for some industries and negative for others. Regarding intra-industry indirect FDI 
spillover effects, no significant impact was seen in more than a third of industries. Where an 
impact did exist, it was in some cases positive and in other cases negative. These results seem 
to question the impact of indirect FDI spillovers on firm TFP, as there is no clear effect seen. 
Further analysis is needed to confirm these results. 
Girma and Wakelin (2007) analysed the indirect effect of FDI on TFP in the UK electronics 
sector in 1980 and 1992. They separated FDI by the nationality of the multinational firm, 
which was either American or Japanese. Moreover, they evaluated the different effects of 
FDI in regions where government assistance was available compared to those where it was 
not. The type of FDI was denoted by a variable with three variants: one denoting regional 
intra-industry spillovers; one denoting inter-regional intra-industry spillovers; and one 
denoting local inter-industry spillovers. Their findings suggest a generally positive indirect 
effect of FDI on TFP through regional spillovers, both intra-industry and inter-industry. 
However, they did not find any evidence of inter-regional spillovers on plants belonging to 
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the same sector. In addition, plants located in areas where government assistance was 
provided were not found to particularly benefit from FDI, suggesting that the domestic plants 
do not possess adequate absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI spillovers.  
In addition to horizontal FDI spillovers, Suyanto et al. (2009) considered the effect of the 
competition channel in their investigation of the indirect effect of FDI spillovers for 568 
firms belonging to the Indonesian chemical and pharmaceutical sectors from 1988 to 2000. 
FDI was represented by a dummy variable that was equal to 0 when there was no foreign 
ownership share and 1 if there was a positive share of foreign ownership. Their results 
suggest the presence of intra-industry spillovers, which benefit firm TFP. Moreover, firms 
that commit funds to R&D expenditures were found to benefit more so than those who do 
not. This suggests that a firm with a relatively high level of absorptive capacity, as measured 
by the stock of R&D, is likely to benefit more from spillovers than a firm with a relatively 
low level. In addition, productivity spillovers were found to be higher in the presence of 
competition, which was measured by an index representing the concentration of sales among 
producers. These results suggest that competition stimulates firm managers to undertake TFP-
enhancing actions in response to threats from both actual and potential competitors. 
Concerning the imitation/demonstration channel of FDI, Ben Hamida and Gugler (2009) 
analysed the intra-industry spillovers from FDI using Swiss firm-level data on manufacturing 
and services firms’ productivity in 1998 and 2001. Their focus was mainly on analysing the 
effect of the demonstration channel of FDI spillovers on productivity, which was measured 
by foreign firms’ sales share within an industry. In particular, how these shares of sales 
varied according to the firm’s level of absorptive capacity was analysed. When the 
heterogeneity of the firms in terms of absorptive capacity was not considered, the results did 
not suggest the existence of spillovers. However, when this heterogeneity was taken into 
account, FDI spillovers were shown to manifest themselves through the demonstration 
channel for firms investing in R&D, which builds up absorptive capacity. This underlines the 
idea that in order to benefit from FDI spillovers through the demonstration channel, firms 
should aim to build high levels of absorptive capacity, for example, through R&D 
investments. 
Concerning the FDI spillover effect on productivity through the labour mobility channel, 
Todo et al. (2009) analysed how multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) employment of workers 
determined the spillover of knowledge to local firms. The analysis was conducted in a 
Chinese high tech cluster using panel data for 798 manufacturing firms during the period of 
2000-2003. The knowledge spillovers from MNEs were measured in two ways: the MNEs’ 
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total labour force, and the number of educated workers. The results indicate the existence of 
within-industry FDI spillovers through a labour-mobility channel, represented by the 
employment of educated workers. The results suggest that labourers can learn by working for 
technologically advanced MNEs, and when these workers move to domestic firms or set up 
their own firms, they can apply their innovative knowledge and skills, resulting in higher 
TFP. Despite providing interesting results, the analysis in this paper only concerned a 
technology cluster, thus offering limited insight into the overall effect of FDI spillovers on 
TFP through the labour mobility channel. 
Also in the Chinese context, Liu (2008) examined the effect of FDI spillovers on the TFP of 
medium and large Chinese manufacturing firms. Intra-industry spillovers were measured as 
the sum of the average foreign equity share owned by foreign investors in each firm, 
weighted by the firm’s share of sectorial output. Inter-industry spillovers were divided into 
backward and forward linkages. Backward linkages were measured as the sum of firms’ FDI 
within a sector, weighted by the share of intermediate output in another sector from which the 
firms source their inputs. Forward linkages were given by the sum of firms’ FDI within a 
sector, weighted by the share of intermediate output in another sector to which the firms sell 
their inputs. The results of the study suggest that both intra-industry and inter-industry 
spillovers have a positive effect on TFP. In particular, backward linkages were found to have 
the strongest positive effect on firms’ TFP. This suggests that local firms can learn by 
supplying foreign-owned firms with intermediate inputs, about which they might be asked to 
provide very detailed specifications, and about which they will receive important feedback 
from which to learn. 
Xu and Sheng (2012) analysed how FDI spillovers affect the productivity of Chinese 
manufacturing firms during the period of 2000-2003. Spillovers were divided into three 
categories: horizontal (arising from firms within the same industry), backward (generated 
when a firm supplies a multinational firm) and forward (generated when a firm sources its 
inputs from a foreign supplier firm). Results from the estimation suggest that forward FDI 
spillovers have a positive effect on firm productivity through the import of qualitative 
intermediate goods and equipment by foreign firms belonging to the upstream sectors. 
However, horizontal and backward FDI spillovers were found to negatively affect TFP. 
Therefore, the overall results were not as positive as one might expect. Interestingly, the 
firms that benefitted the most from a foreign presence were the large and medium-sized firms 
not belonging to the state sector, and which were engaged in export activities. It would be 
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interesting to extend the time period of study, as firms might require more time to assimilate 
knowledge gained from FDI. 
A different approach to studying the effect of FDI spillovers was adopted by Fu and Gong 
(2009). They included in their model R&D spillovers from innovation activities undertaken 
by foreign-invested firms, measured by the industry average R&D intensity according to 
ownership type, and international R&D spillovers, measured as the world R&D stock. FDI 
intensity was measured at both the firm and industry levels. As in previous studies, the 
dataset was taken from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. However, in this case, the 
sample was much smaller, comprising 53,981 firms, while considering a wider period, from 
2001 to 2005. The study’s results show that TFP grew at about 4.8% per year during the 
period, mainly driven by technical change rather than changes in efficiency. Such growth 
confirms the findings of previous studies. Moreover, the strong technical change occurred 
particularly in industries dominated by domestic firms, suggesting that foreign-owned firms 
possess advantages, such as better managerial practices and knowledge, that result in higher 
TFP. In terms of R&D, investment activities undertaken by foreign-invested firms were 
found to negatively affect TFP, while those by domestic firms at the industry level were 
found to positively affect technical change.  
In a later study, Wei and Liu (2006) adopted a much different approach. The effect of FDI on 
productivity was measured together with spillovers from R&D and exports, which represent 
valuable sources of knowledge. FDI spillovers were measured as the share of foreign-owned 
firms’ capital in the total capital in an industry, region, or industry within a region. Secondly, 
the authors only focused on the impact of spillovers on domestic firms, rather than combining 
firms with different origins. The sample comprised 9,900 Chinese manufacturing firms 
during the period of 1998-2001, with the data taken from the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics. In order to address the issue of endogeneity, the authors adopted one-year lags of 
potential endogenous variables as instruments. In addition, the estimation was corrected for 
both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Interestingly, their results suggest a positive 
effect on productivity of inter-industry spillovers from R&D and exports, and a positive 
effect on productivity of both inter- and intra-industry spillovers from the presence of foreign 
firms. Moreover, firms in which investors from OECD countries were major shareholders 
were found to have higher productivity than those in which the investors were from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This suggests that Chinese firms benefit in terms of spillovers 
from firms in which investors from developed countries are the major shareholders, as these 
firms are likely to have more advanced technology and up-to-date knowledge.  
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A study that found differing results from the previous ones was conducted by Hale and Long 
(2011). They used a data set of Chinese domestic firms taken from a 2001 World Bank 
survey that provides information on 1,500 firms located in 5 cities and 10 industries for the 
year 2000. The presence of FDI within a specific city or industry was measured as the 
average of foreign ownership share in the same city-industry as the domestic firm, weighted 
by firm employment. Upstream FDI spillovers were measured as the sum of FDI presence in 
all other industries in the same city, weighted by the input coefficients corresponding to the 
firm’s industry. Downstream FDI presence was computed as the sum of FDI presence in all 
other industries, weighted by the output coefficients of the firm’s industry to these other 
industries. The results suggest that foreign-owned firms tend to be more productive than 
domestically owned ones. The study represents a step forward from past studies analysing the 
impact of FDI spillovers on productivity since it adopts different methodologies. However, its 
limitation lies in not having a time dimension. It only provides a snapshot of productivity 
performance at a specific point in time, rather than analysing a trend. Therefore, it would 
have been better to extend the study over more years. 
Another study by Wei et al. (2008) differs from the previous study in that it examined the 
effect of reverse productivity spillovers in China, which refer to the positive effect of 
knowledge from domestic firms on the productivity of multinational firm. The investigation 
consisted of an econometric analysis of more than 10,000 firms belonging to 193 industries, 
including both domestic and foreign-invested firms, during the period of 1998-2001. To 
measure spillovers, the authors used R&D, capital investment and employment. Moreover, 
the firms were differentiated according to their origin: Chinese domestic firms; Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan-invested firms; and OECD-invested firms. The results from the 
econometric estimation suggest that foreign-invested firms exert a positive but diminishing 
spillover effect on the productivity of local Chinese firms. These local firms, in turn, tend to 
exert a positive but diminishing spillover effect on the productivity of foreign-invested firms. 
Therefore, the results suggest that domestic and foreign-invested firms complement one 
other. Although the study provides an innovative insight into reverse spillovers in a 
developing country by using a wide sample, the time period considered seems short, as firms 
might need more time to learn and productively implement the knowledge acquired.   
While the abovementioned studies have looked at the spillover effect arising in a variety of 
industries, Motohashi and Yuan (2010) analysed the spillover effects arising from the 
innovative activities of multinational firms in two industries: automobiles and electronics. 
Data from 22,000 firms was taken from the annual Survey of Science and Technology 
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Activities, which includes medium and large firms from 1995 to 2004. Spillovers were 
measured using four variables: (i) the sum of technology stock of multinational firms in the 
assembly sector of each province in a specific year; (ii) the sum of technology stock of local 
firms in the assembly sector of each province in a specific year; (iii) the sum of technology 
stock of multinational firms in the supply sector of each province in a specific year, excluding 
one of the firms considered; and (iv) the sum of the technology stock of local firms in the 
supply sector of each province in a specific year, excluding one of the firms considered. The 
automobile industry showed vertical spillovers from multinational and local firms in the 
assembly industry to local suppliers. In the electronics industry, on the other hand, vertical 
spillover effects were only seen only from local firms in the assembly industry to local 
suppliers. The presence of horizontal spillovers was not detected. Among the control 
variables, the import of technology and research collaboration were found to positively affect 
the value of firms. This study, like previous ones, suggests a mixed effect of vertical 
spillovers. However, in contrast to the previous studies, it does not suggest the existence of 
horizontal spillovers. This finding may an anomaly due to the study limiting its analysis to 
two industries. 
Li et al. (2001) analysed the indirect effect of FDI spillovers and competition arising from the 
presence of foreign firms on labour productivity. Data for the manufacturing sector was taken 
from the 1995 Industrial Census of the National Bureau of Statistics. Since labour 
productivity is not an ideal measure, it would have been better to adopt TFP. In the equation, 
FDI spillovers from demonstration and contagion effects were represented by two variables 
measuring the ratio of the foreign firms’ employment to total employment, and the ratio of 
foreign firms’ assets to total assets. Moreover, FDI spillovers through competition were 
measured by the labour productivity of the other firms in the sample. The study’s results 
suggest that spillovers have different positive effects on firms. Spillovers positively affect 
SOEs through competition effects, and positively affect the other local firms through 
demonstration and contagion effects.  
Lin et al. (2009) studied the effects of both horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers through 
backward and forward linkages on Chinese manufacturing firms’ TFP during the period of 
1998-2005. Horizontal spillovers were measured as the foreign share in the total output of 
each industry. Backward spillovers were measured by the proportion of the output of one 
industry purchased by another industry. Forward spillovers were measured as the foreign 
share of an industry’s intermediate input that was supplied by another industry. The results 
support the existence of vertical forward spillovers, meaning that local firms are likely to 
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benefit indirectly in terms of higher TFP from FDI spillovers through relationships with 
foreign-owned suppliers. However, vertical backward spillovers seemed only to exist for 
firms whose foreign owners were not from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan. This result 
suggests that local firms are likely to benefit indirectly from FDI spillovers in terms of higher 
TFP by supplying foreign-owned firms. Moreover, foreign-owned firms from countries 
belonging to the Organisation and Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) are likely 
to have higher requirements for products supplied, pushing local firms to improve their 
products and processes and thus increasing TFP. Regarding horizontal spillovers, FDI 
spillovers generated by owners from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan negatively affected TFP, 
while spillovers generated by owners from OECD countries positively affected TFP. The 
results indicate that Chinese firms learn from OECD foreign-owned firms belonging to the 
same industry, which are likely to be more advanced technologically. 
The studies described above, from both outside and within the Chinese context, suggest that 
FDI indirectly contributes to TFP through intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, R&D 
and other innovative activities, and competition. The empirical evidence complements 
previous evidence suggesting a positive direct contribution of FDI to firms’ TFP. It could 
thus be inferred that FDI is a positive determinant of TFP. However, this does not seem to 
always be the case. According to Driffield and Love (2007), FDI might result in lower 
productivity for the following reasons.  
Firstly, FDI might be aimed at accessing technology owned by local firms belonging to 
R&D-intensive sectors or to research centres through a process of technology sourcing. This 
suggests that a foreign firm may extract local technology through FDI, transferring it to its 
home country and thus not generating any direct or indirect benefits to local firms in terms of 
TFP. Secondly, a foreign-owned firm might undertake FDI in a particular country due to 
location advantages such as low taxes. Thirdly, a foreign-owned firm might undertake FDI to 
seek efficiency by exploiting cheaper local factor inputs, through an “efficiency seeking” 
process. For example, a firm might invest in a firm based in a developing country because of 
low labour costs. Fourthly, FDI could also result in lower TFP due to the “market stealing” 
effect discussed by Aitken and Harrison (1999). This occurs when a foreign firm generates 
higher TFP in its related industry through positive spillovers effects, but which is negatively 
offset when the foreign firm steals market share from local competitors, leading to lower 
industry TFP. Fifthly, Harris and Robinson (2003) argue that in the short run, difficulties can 
be caused by cultural differences between foreign owners and local workers. For example, a 
foreign firm that acquires a plant is likely to bring a new culture and management practices 
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that contrast with the existing ones, which might negatively impact TFP in the short run. 
Harris and Moffat (2011) also argue that TFP performance might differ according to the form 
of investment the foreign firm undertakes, which can be through a “greenfield” or a 
“brownfield” plant. Greenfield plants provide the firm with the freedom to bring its own 
management practices, culture and production techniques, among the various factors. 
However, they do not enable a firm to source any technology. Brownfield plants, on the other 
hand, provide a firm with local technology. However, a foreign owner will bring a new 
culture that is likely to contrast with the existing one. Lastly, when a firm acquires new 
technology, it must devote its resources to assimilating the technology and learning to use it 
productively. For example, when a local automotive firm adopts the working processes of a 
foreign-owned firm, these processes are not likely to be implemented immediately. There 
might be a period of adjustment in which all of the parties involved learn about the new 
procedure. Moreover, even when a new technology is implemented, it might take additional 
time for workers to become familiar with it. Thus, in the short term, FDI can have a negative 
effect on firms’ TFP. This idea is supported by some results in the empirical literature.  
Driffield and Love (2007) analysed this topic using a dataset of FDI flows from 30 different 
countries to 11 manufacturing sectors over the period of 1987-1997. A lagged measure of 
FDI was used to represent the effect of FDI externalities on TFP.  This was then combined 
with four binary dummy variables, each representing a different motivation for undertaking 
the FDI. The findings indicate that inward FDI in the UK manufacturing industry has a 
positive effect on firms’ TFP, but only when the motive for undertaking the FDI is the 
ownership advantage. Inward FDI motivated by local technology sourcing or efficiency 
seeking was found to have a negative impact on TFP.   
Other empirical results indicate the existence in some cases of the previously mentioned 
“market stealing” effect, according to which the positive spillover effect exerted by FDI is 
negatively counterbalanced by the foreign firm stealing market share from local competitors. 
This might ultimately lead to decreased TFP. Aitken and Harrison (1999) looked at a sample 
of 4000 Venezuelan firms over the years of 1976-1989 and analysed whether foreign-owned 
firms display higher productivity than local firms and whether FDI spillovers to other firms 
occur. The direct effect of FDI was measured as the share of foreign equity at the plant level. 
The indirect spillover effect was measured as the average share of foreign equity for all the 
plants within each sector, weighted by each plant’s contribution to employment in the sector. 
In addition, the authors included a variable combining FDI at the plant and sectorial levels in 
order to measure the effect of FDI on joint ventures. A positive direct effect of FDI was 
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found only for small firms, while a negative indirect effect was found for large firms, 
suggesting that foreign firms invest in the most productive local firms. It seems that the 
higher the FDI, the lower the productivity of domestic firms, suggesting the existence of a 
market-stealing effect. Since they are more productive, foreign-owned firms might gain 
market share at the expense of local firms, thus “stealing” customers and causing a decrease 
in the productivity of the overall industry.  
FDI also negatively affects firms’ TFP when it takes time to assimilate foreign-brought 
technology and to use it productively. This idea is supported by the study of Liu (2008), 
which analysed the effect of FDI spillovers through the imitation channel on Chinese 
manufacturing firms’ rate of growth and level of TFP. Liu’s findings suggest a positive 
indirect effect of FDI on firms’ TFP level in the long run and a negative effect on TFP growth 
in the short run. These results indicate that there are cases in which firms take time to 
assimilate a new technology and use it productively.  
In summary, this section has analysed the importance of ownership, and especially FDI, for 
firms’ productivity. The results from the empirical literature suggest that FDI has both direct 
and indirect effects. The effect is direct when a local firm in which a foreign firm has 
invested benefits from the technology brought, superior know-how, or innovative managerial 
practices and machinery. The effect is indirect when a local firm in which a foreign firm has 
not invested but is based in the same geographical area benefit from technology spillovers. 
These seem to occur through five different channels: imitation/demonstration, labour 
mobility, exports, competition, and commercial relationships, or backward and forward 
linkages, with domestic firms. It has also been suggested that in order for a firm to receive the 
greatest benefit from the indirect effects of FDI, it must have absorptive capacity, or the 
ability to absorb and utilise knowledge for productive purposes. A firm with a higher level of 
absorptive capacity is likely to be more productive than a firm with a lower level.  
However, there are cases in which FDI does not generate a positive effect on TFP. For 
example, such is the case when a foreign firm is more interested in sourcing superior local 
technology, seeking efficiency from low input costs or placing its plants in an advantageous 
low-tax location. In addition, it has been suggested that FDI might have short-term negative 
effects on productivity due to the “market stealing” and “technology learning” effects. 
Moreover, a clash of cultures between a foreign owner and local foreign-invested firm might 
hinder improvements in productivity. 
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2.4.4. Economies of Scale 
In general, a firm can achieve economies of scale by increasing the quantity of output 
produced while decreasing the cost per unit of output. Differing from economies of scale are 
economies of scope. These are achieved by a firm when, by jointly producing a range of 
different products, the costs per unit of output are lower than would be if each kind of output 
was produced individually. Economies of scale can be distinguished between internal (related 
to a firm having an individual plant) and external (related to a firm having multiple plants).  
Internal economies of scale do not directly affect TFP, but rather do so indirectly. In equation 
(2), TFP is expressed as the ratio of output produced to inputs utilised in the production 
process. TFP is not affected directly by internal returns to scale (𝛽𝑙 + 𝛽𝑐) because any change 
in the denominator on the right-hand side of (2), which represents a change in factor inputs 
utilised, is reflected by a change in the related numerator, which represents a change in output 
produced, maintaining 𝐴𝑖𝑡 unchanged.  
Internal economies of scale mainly arise from indivisibilities, specialisation, and greater 
efficiency of large machines. Indivisibilities refer to the fact that a minimum quantity of 
indivisible inputs is required for a plant to function. These constitute fixed costs because, 
regardless of the input level, the plant must pay for them in order to operate. When a plant 
increases the amount of output it produces, these fixed costs can be spread over more output, 
thus reducing the cost per unit of output. Specialisation concerns the role of workers within a 
plant. When a plant has a relatively low scale, a worker is likely to undertake many different 
tasks, reducing his or her efficiency and leading to higher costs per unit of output. For 
example, in a small plant, the director is likely to perform both manual and administrative 
tasks. When a plant’s scale increases, the director might focus on just the administration 
while delegating the manual tasks to a deputy. This is likely to result in higher efficiency and, 
therefore, lower costs per unit of output. Economies of scale can arise from the greater 
efficiency of large machines because they can transform inputs into more outputs. This 
allows the plant to operate at higher capacity, reducing the costs per unit of output. For 
example, if an automotive plant increases its scale by raising the number of vehicles it 
produces, the increased output of its large machinery will lower the costs per units of output. 
However, a plant can also experience diseconomies of scale if increasing the quantity of 
output produced causes the costs per unit of output to rise. When they occur within a specific 
plant, diseconomies of scale are internal. They might be due, for example, to the inability of 
managers to lead a plant that has become either too large or complex, indirectly causing a 
decrease in productivity.  
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External economies of scale can arise when a firm has multiple plants. According to Baldwin 
et al. (2010), “multi-establishment firms may be better able to collect and analyse information 
that can improve management practices and thus raise productivity” (p. 921). Harris and 
Moffat (2011) suggest five other additional reasons why multiple plants lead to economies of 
scale. Firstly, a multi-plant firm has plants located in its clients’ markets; thus, by being 
closer to clients, transportation costs are reduced. A multi-plant firm is also likely to adapt 
more quickly to the market in which it operates and to better respond to client needs, 
compared to single-plant firms. Secondly, central services such as human resources, research 
and development, marketing, and sales are likely to be shared across plants, thus providing 
the benefit of spreading fixed costs across plants. Thirdly, the burden of excess capacity is 
likely to be spread across plants rather than being concentrated within a single plant, thus 
benefiting the firm as a whole. Fourth, as they are more geographically diversified, multi-
plant firms are likely to have access to less costly sources of funding than single-plant ones. 
Lastly, as Harris and Moffat (2011) argue, Jarmin’s (1999) “Government Technical 
Assistance Programs and Plant Survival: The Role of Plant Ownership Type” suggests that 
multi-plant firms have easier access to information compared to single-plant ones since 
technology is shared among multiple plants. For example, a technological advancement 
achieved in one plant might be successfully applied in another plant.  
However, there are also reasons why multi-plant firms may be at a disadvantage with respect 
to single-plant firms. Firstly, since single-plant firms concentrate production in one 
geographical location, they are likely to have higher productivity than multi-plant firms. 
Secondly, as argued by Leibenstein (1966), managers of multi-plant firms might face 
difficulties in allocating resources among plants. For example, resources that would 
otherwise be used more effectively by the most productive plants might instead be allocated 
to the least productive ones. Thirdly, as multi-plant firms are likely to be multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in which ownership and control is separated, managers might not have 
the right motivations in terms of remuneration and incentives, making them less likely to 
make decisions aimed at improving productivity. Managers of single-plant firms, on the other 
hand, are more likely to also be owners who bear more risk, and thus their decisions would be 
aimed at improving productivity. Fourth, the greater complexity of multi-plant firms makes 
them more difficult to manage. Such can be the case when a firm has plants based in different 
markets, or produces a wide product range. Fifth, since they are less complex from an 
organisational point of view, single-plant firms are likely to be faster in decision making and 
adjusting production to client needs, resulting in higher productivity. 
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Productivity is one of the factors that managers must take into account when considering 
whether to enter, thrive within or exit an industry. This is because “efficient firms grow and 
survive; inefficient firms decline and fail” (Jovanovic, 1982, p. 649). Concerning exiting, the 
empirical research has looked at differences in the probability of survival between single and 
multi-plant firms. Bernard and Jensen (2007), for example, studied the impact of firm 
structure on the probability of plant closure in two panels of about 170,000 US manufacturing 
plants during the periods of 1987-1992 and 1992-1997. A dummy variable was used to 
represent whether a plant was part of a multi-plant firm. A plant was deemed part of a multi-
plant firm if there was at least one other plant with the same ownership in the sample. The 
study’s results suggest that the probability of shutting down is the lowest for plants belonging 
to multi-plant firms, those owned by US multinationals (compared to plants owned by 
domestic firms), and those having changed ownership. These plants were also found to have a 
range of characteristics (larger, older, more productive, more likely to export, more capital 
intensive, employing more highly skilled workers and operating in industries characterised by 
lower probability of shutdown). Once these characteristics were controlled for, the results 
were the opposite. Thus, the study concludes that the probability of shutting down is higher 
for plants belonging to multi-plant firms compared to single-plant firms.  
The above results differ from those of Dunne et al. (1989). Using a larger US sample (about 
200,000 plants) and an “older” time period (1967-1977), the authors analysed the 
relationships between plant characteristics and its employment growth and failure rate. Plants 
were differentiated according to two ownership categories, single-unit plants and multi-unit 
plants, to which the estimation methodology was applied separately. The relationship 
between age and failure rate was found to be negative and did not seem to differ between the 
two kinds of plants. The relationship between size and failure rates was also negative, 
particularly for plants that belonged to multi-plant firms. Accounting for the failure rate, 
plants owned by single-plant firms were characterized by a negative effect of size on 
employment growth. Plants owned by multi-plant firms, on the other hand, showed a positive 
effect of size on employment growth. The results suggest that plants owned by multi-plant 
firms are less likely to fail and more likely to employ more people as they increase the scale 
of their operations, compared to plants owned by single-plant firms.  
Lieberman (1990) studied how divestment occurs within the chemical industry by analysing 
US data on 30 different chemical products and different forms of divestment, such as cutting 
capacity or exiting. To analyse the effect of a plant’s scale and size on its closure, a dummy 
variable was included that took the value of zero if the firm operated with a single plant and a 
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value of one if a firm had multiple plants. The results show that during industry decline, 
multi-plant firms that represent a large share of industry capacity are more likely to close 
individual plants than single-plant firms. This suggests that during a downturn, multi-plant 
firms might decide to close their least productive plant rather than keeping it alive and 
reducing the support provided to the other plants. 
Disney et al. (2003) studied establishment entry and exit in UK manufacturing. By applying 
an exit hazard function separately to single and group establishments, they found the single 
establishments to have a higher hazard exit rate in comparison with group establishments. 
However, when single establishments were conditioned on the average characteristics of the 
group establishments, they were found to have a lower hazard exit rate than group 
establishments conditioned on the average characteristics of the single ones. This implies that 
the hazard exit rate is determined by an establishment’s characteristics rather than by its 
organisational structure. Based on this study and that of Bernard and Jensen (2007), it thus 
seems that single and multi-plant firm structures do not directly determine plant failure rate. 
However, there are other characteristics that play a role in this relationship, such as a firm’s 
size and age. 
Using the same database as Disney et al. (2003), Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002) adopted a 
large number of explanatory variables and conducted their analysis at the plant level (rather 
than the establishment level) to analyse the effect of plant ownership and age on the 
probability of plant closure, using a hazard function. Plants were differentiated using a 
dummy variable that indicated whether they belonged to a single-plant or multi-plant firm. 
Their findings contrast with those of Disney et al. (2003), suggesting that single-plant firms 
are much less likely to fail compared to multi-plant firms. This likelihood was found to 
increase with plant age. 
This section has reviewed the importance of economies of scale as a determinant of higher 
TFP. Economies of scale are achieved by an economic unit if the costs per unit of output 
decrease when the quantity of output produced is increased. Internal economies of scale are 
related to an individual plant and external ones are related to firms with multiple plants. In 
contrast to economies of scale, economies of scope are obtained when different outputs are 
produced and costs per unit of output are lower than would be by producing each kind of 
output individually. Internal economies of scale mainly arise due to indivisibilities, 
specialisation, and greater efficiency of large machines. However, a plant can also experience 
diseconomies of scale, both internal and external, if its costs per unit of output rise when it 
increases the quantity of output produced. Concerning external economies of scale, Harris 
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and Moffat (2011) suggest five reasons why they arise in a multi-plant context: reduction in 
transportation costs; ease in adapting to client markets and needs; spread of costs such as 
R&D, human resources and marketing across different plants; spread of excess capacity 
across plants; access to less costly funding sources due to the diversified structure; and easier 
access to information, as technology is shared across plants. However, such benefits are not 
always the case: single-plant firms have more concentrated production and are thus likely to 
be more productive; managers of multi-plant firms might misallocate resources; in multi-
plant firms, managers might not be provided with the right motivation in terms of 
remuneration and incentives; multi-plant firms are likely to be more complex and thus more 
difficult to manage than single-plant firms; and single-plant firms are likely to have a more 
flexible organisational structure and thus respond more quickly to changes in the market 
environment. The empirical research has looked at the difference in the probability of 
survival between single and multi-plant firms. Productivity is one of the factors that 
determine whether a firm enters, thrives within or exits an industry. The empirical findings do 
not clearly suggest a specific relationship between whether a plant is from a single-plant or 
multi-plant firm and its probability of survival. Some studies have documented that single-
plant firms are more likely to survive than multi-plant ones. Others have documented an 
opposite effect. However, in this relationship, certain plant characteristics, such as size and 
age, need to be considered, as these play a critical role in the achievement of economies of 
scale. 
2.4.5. Competition 
A fifth determinant of TFP is the competitive structure of the market in which a firm 
operates. Nickell (1996) suggests that an industry is more competitive if there are less 
monopoly rents. In this case, a firm’s managers are likely to increase their efforts and to 
reduce slack, thus leading to an increase in productivity. It is also because the higher the 
competition, the more likely a firm is to exit an industry if its productivity is relatively low. 
In addition, Nickell (1996) argues that monopoly rents benefit workers in the form of higher 
wages and reduced efforts. In this case, higher competition would lead to reduced wages 
within an industry, consequently lowering labour costs and increasing workers’ efforts, 
resulting in higher  productivity. Meyers and Vickers (1997) argue that since firms within an 
industry can be compared to one another, investors reward the relatively high-performing 
ones by providing them with a lower cost of capital while withdrawing capital from or 
increasing its cost for the relatively low-performing ones. This pushes firms to improve their 
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productivity. Tang and Wang (2005) state that an increase in product market competition 
leads to higher demand elasticity, which is likely to result in higher potential profits and thus 
increased managerial efforts. Lastly, a firm not only responds to increased competition by 
increasing its “efforts” in order to improve productivity; it might also pursue the opportunity 
to innovate by upgrading its technology to match industry best practices.  
One would therefore infer that competition benefits a firm’s total factor productivity. 
However, this does not seem to always be the case. Hermalin (1992) argues that increased 
competition is likely to diminish a firm’s profits and a manager’s income, which might result 
in a reduction in effort (Schumpeterian effect) due to a risk-adjustment effect, changing the 
risk profile of different kinds of actions and resulting in lower productivity. In addition, Horn 
et al. (1994) argue that there exists a negative relationship between competition and the effort 
incentives provided to managers by their working contract. By examining three different 
settings, each characterised by a different level of competition, the authors argue that 
managerial effort is the greatest when the extent of competition is the lowest. Moreover, 
according to Tang and Wang (2005), Kamien and Schwartz (1982) suggest in Market 
Structure and Innovation that a firm in a monopoly position is more able to finance 
innovative projects and dominate its market than a firm without such power. From the above 
discussion, it appears that the relationship between competition and productivity has two 
different directions.  
One of the first studies to consider the effect of competition on TFP was done by Nickell et 
al. (1992). The authors analysed the connection between product, labour and financial market 
effects, and the change in TFP for 100 UK manufacturing companies for the period of 1972-
1986. Competition, or the product market structure, was represented by three variables: 
market share, or the share of a company’s sales in the three-digit industry sales; 
concentration, or the five-firm concentration ratio in the industry according to domestic sales; 
and import penetration, given by imports as a proportion of industry production. An increase 
in market share was found to cause a long-run reduction in TFP levels. This suggests that, as 
a firm increases its monopoly power, the managers and workers do not improve their 
“efforts” because they are enjoying monopoly rents. On the other hand, increased market 
share was found to result in higher TFP growth, suggesting that firms with a relatively large 
market share have a higher TFP than those with a small market share, and indicating that 
large firms are more incentivised or have a higher capacity to innovate.  
In a subsequent study, Nickell (1996) looked at 670 UK manufacturing companies to 
examine the relationship between competition and productivity. The effect of competition on 
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productivity was measured using a variable to indicate a firm’s market share within an 
industry. The effect of competition on productivity growth was proxied by two dummy 
variables, the first taking the value of 1 when the manager stated that there were more than 
five competitors in the product’s market, and 0 otherwise; and the second measuring rents, as 
given by the average of profits minus capital costs during the sample period, divided by the 
value added. Two-digit industry dummies, namely average firm size, industry concentration 
and industry import penetration, were included to measure the effect of competition on 
productivity growth. Consistent with the findings of Nickell et al. (1992), the higher a firm’s 
market share, the lower its productivity level. Moreover, higher competition, represented by a 
higher number of competitors and lower rents, was found to be beneficial to productivity 
growth. From these results, one could infer that higher competition pushes managers and 
workers to reduce slack and improve their efforts in order to survive, thus stimulating higher 
productivity. 
Sjöholm (1999) analysed the effects of regional characteristics, among them competition, on 
labour productivity growth for Indonesian manufacturing plants in 1980 and 1991. The 
variable representing competition was constructed using the Herfindahl index. High values of 
this index suggest that a high level of concentration and thus a low level of competition 
characterize an industry, while the opposite is the case for low index values. The results 
indicate that the effect of competition on labour productivity growth is insignificant, not 
affecting productivity growth. However, its effect on the labour productivity level was found 
to be positive and statistically significant. This means that as competition increases, 
productivity decreases.  
Inui et al. (2008) measured the effect of market competition, represented by the inverted-
Herfindahl and inverted-Lerner indices, on TFP growth and R&D intensity for Japanese 
manufacturing firms during the period of 1997-2003. Here, the inverted-Herfindahl index 
measures a firm’s share of sales in its industry at a given time. As this refers only to domestic 
competition, the import ratio, or the percentage of the import of the total production in a 
specific industry, was also adopted as a proxy for international competition. The results show 
a positive effect of competition in terms of the inverted-Herfindahl index, the inverted-Lerner 
index and the import ratio on firms’ TFP. This suggests that as competition increases, firms 
are more likely to improve their efficiency and undertake innovations, both of which are 
TFP-enhancing actions. An inverted U-shaped relationship was found between competition, 
as measured by the inverted-Herfindahl index, and productivity. Subsequently, the authors 
added the square terms of the competition measures in order to understand whether 
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competition and productivity were characterised by an inverted-U relationship. The existence 
of such a relationship was only supported when the inverted-Herfindahl index was used as the 
competition measure. This would suggest that productivity increases as competition 
increases, thus pushing firms to improve their efficiency as well as to innovate. This effect 
occurs up to a certain point, after which increased competition causes firms’ incentive to 
innovate to decline. This study provides a valuable insight into the relationship between the 
Herfindahl index and TFP. However, the insight is limited since the authors perform the 
estimation using the index method. Although the authors acknowledge that using the Olley 
and Pakes’ (1996) semiparametric methodology takes into account both the simultaneity 
issue and the selection bias due to firm entry and exit, the methodology does not consider 
fixed effects and is based on strong assumptions.  
Tang and Wang (2005) studied the effect of competition and skill shortages on labour 
productivity for 5,320 Canadian firms in the manufacturing sector, using a survey covering 
the years of 1997-1999. Innovation was represented by the firms’ perception of their 
competitive environment, both domestic and international, upon which their effort and 
innovation activities would depend. The perception of the competitive environment was 
based on four different factors: easy substitution of products, constant arrival of competing 
products and competitors, and obsolescence of products. These seem to provide a better 
indicator of competition compared to those used in the previously-mentioned studies. The 
existence of high competition, measured in terms of market share or number of competitors, 
does not mean that competition poses a threat to a firm’s performance. However, a survey 
providing such detailed information might not be possible in every country; one would 
consequently need to rely on standard measures of competition. The study’s results suggest 
that the higher the degree of competition perceived by a firm, the higher the productivity 
level achieved, an effect that is likely to occur through higher innovation or improved efforts. 
Further evidence regarding the effect of competition on TFP is provided by Griffith (2001), 
who studied how changes in competitive pressures affect managers’ and workers’ efforts in 
UK manufacturing firms during the period of 1980-1996, and how these pressures affect both 
TFP levels and growth rates. Here, managerial firms, which are characterised by the 
separation of ownership and control and, consequently, by agency costs, were compared to 
single or entrepreneurial firms, in which owners and managers are the same person and which 
are thus not characterised by agency costs. The results suggest that as a consequence of the 
increase in product market competition, increased TFP is only found for managerial firms but 
not entrepreneurial ones. This suggests that an increase in competition arising from product 
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market reforms is likely to lead to reduced agency costs for firms in which there is a 
separation of ownership and control, ultimately resulting in higher TFP.  
In the Chinese context, Perkins (1996) examined the effect of enterprise, market and 
ownership reforms on the productivity of 300 State-owned, collective and foreign funded 
Chinese firms based in three coastal provinces in 1993. Among the determinants of TFP 
considered in the analysis, the firm’s exposure to international competition, measured as the 
ratio of exports to output for each firm, was used. The results suggest that firms that are more 
exposed to international competition are 22-34% more productive than firms that are not 
exposed. 
Zhang et al. (2001) analysed the effect of both ownership and competition on the productive 
efficiency of 1,989 Chinese industrial firms located in Shanghai. In contrast with Perkins’s 
(1996) approach, the authors decomposed competition into international and domestic. The 
extent of the firms’ exposure to international competition was measured as the ratio of the 
firm’s export revenue to its total assets. The extent of domestic market competition was 
measured using the Herfindahl index of industrial concentration. The results suggest a 
positive effect of international competition on firm productivity. Moreover, it seems that 
firms belonging to industries characterised by higher concentration, as suggested by the 
Herfindahl index, have higher efficiency scores, indicating that they are more productive. 
In estimating the effect of productivity spillovers from FDI to between 124,944 and 143,974 
domestic Chinese firms during 1998-2005, Lin et al. (2009) included in their model a variable 
representing the intensity of domestic industrial concentration within each industry. This was 
found to have a significant and negative coefficient, suggesting that a higher extent of 
domestic competition within an industry positively affects firms’ TFP. 
This section has reviewed the importance of competition as a determinant of higher total 
factor productivity. The findings from the empirical research suggest that competition is a 
positive determinant of productivity. Firstly, competition is likely to reduce monopoly rents, 
resulting in reduced slack and higher managerial efforts. Secondly, it lowers the wages within 
an industry, reducing the cost of labour and improving firms’ TFP. Thirdly, it represents a 
threat, causing least productive firms to exit while the most productive firms thrive and 
survive. Fourth, it enables the most productive firms to be rewarded with a lower cost of 
capital from investors, compared to the least productive ones. Lastly, higher competition 
leads to higher demand elasticity, which is likely to result in higher potential profits and thus 
increased managerial efforts. Theoretically, a manager would be incentivised by these 
reasons not just to increase his or her efforts and reduce slack, but also to innovate, thus 
 68 
improving the firm’s productivity. However, there are some reasons why higher competition 
might not lead to productivity improvements. This is because competition might reduce a 
firm’s profits and the manager’s income, thus reducing the manager’s efforts and propensity 
to innovate. In contrast, a firm in a monopoly position might be more able to finance 
innovative projects that could ultimately result in higher TFP. Therefore, from a theoretical 
perspective, the effect of competition on TFP might have different directions. Despite this, 
the empirical results indicate that competition has positive effects. It seems that the higher a 
firm’s market share, the lower is its TFP, as managers enjoy the rents provided by the 
monopoly condition. In addition, the higher the number of competitors, the higher the firms’ 
productivity, as managers feel threatened, and thus pushed, to increase their efforts and 
pursue innovative projects. In the empirical studies discussed above, the managers’ 
perception of competition seems to be more representative variable than the actual 
competition itself, as represented by the market share, import penetration and industry 
concentration. This is because the potential TFP-enhancing measures undertaken by 
managers in a situation of increased competition are likely to depend on their perceptions of 
the competition. In addition, an increase in product market competition has been found to 
increase TFP, particularly for managerial firms characterised by agency costs, as a result of 
the separation between ownership and control. Overall, the results from the empirical 
research indicate the existence of a positive effect of competition on firms’ productivity. 
2.4.6. Spatial Spillovers 
Ornaghi (2006) defines spillovers, or technological externalities, as the pool of general 
knowledge to which a firm has access. A firm can obtain this knowledge in the following 
ways: by being based in a particular location (spatial spillovers); from its industrial relations 
(intra and inter-industry spillovers); from its export activities (export spillovers); from R&D 
activities (R&D spillovers); and from FDI (FDI spillovers). In order to obtain a higher benefit 
from spillovers, a firm needs to have absorptive capacity, or “the ability of a firm to recognise 
the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990, p.128). Therefore, in order to further improve its TFP, a firm must be 
able to use the knowledge available for the most productive purposes.  
“Spatial spillovers or agglomeration externalities are benefits that accrue to plants from being 
located in the vicinity of a large concentration of other plants” (Harris and Moffat, 2012a, p. 
763). In general, such spillovers can be classified as either Marshallian or Jacobian. In 
addition, spillovers can also manifest differently according to whether a firm is based in a 
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city, or not. City spillovers will be discussed in the following section (2.4.7.), while this 
section will focus on Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers.  
Marshallian spillovers, also known as agglomeration, location or specialisation externalities, 
were first suggested by Marshall (1890), who described them as a range of benefits for a firm 
arising from being in close proximity to industry peers. This effect occurs because “if one 
man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; 
and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas” (Marshall 1890, p. 271). Marshall’s 
statement suggests that these externalities manifest themselves through imitation and 
adoption of ideas among firms. Subsequently, Glaeser et al. (1992) combined the ideas of 
Marshall (1890) with those of Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) in the Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
model, which proposes the existence of knowledge spillovers across firms that ultimately 
benefit intra-industry growth. Therefore, as suggested by Marshall (1890), if a firm develops 
an TFP-enhancing innovation such as a new working practice or an innovative product, other 
firms are likely to imitate and adopt it. A contagion thus develops from one firm to another, 
which is likely to result in higher TFP growth for the industry as a whole. Other than 
imitation/demonstration, Marshallian spillovers can manifest themselves in other ways. The 
close geographical distance of firms belonging to the same industry fosters cooperation, 
potentially resulting in higher industry TFP. Firstly, firms can exploit synergies, for example, 
by collaborating on R&D projects to improve products and processes. Secondly, firms 
located at different levels within an industry supply chain can develop commercial 
relationships. In this case, spillovers manifest themselves through backward and forward 
linkages. In backward linkages, a supplier firm obtains knowledge by learning from its 
customers through feedback concerning the products it provides. In forward linkages, 
customer firms obtain knowledge by using innovative products from their suppliers. Thirdly, 
firms based in the same geographical area can benefit from sharing assets. For example, two 
firms can reduce their input transportation costs by jointly leasing or renting trucks. Fourth, 
as Marshall (1890) suggests, externalities can be manifested through the development of an 
industry-related labour market pool. This means that in an industry-specific geographical 
area, workers will develop industry-specific skills. This provides two benefits. On the one 
hand, workers benefit in terms of the ease of mobility from one firm to another. On the other 
hand, firms benefit from the opportunity to more easily hire specialised workers than in the 
case of a more industry-diverse geographical area. These four cases represent the ways in 
which Marshallian externalities manifest themselves among firms based in a specific location 
and belonging to a specific industry. These spillovers are likely to result in higher TFP for the 
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industry as a whole. It must be stressed that spatial spillovers and FDI spillovers are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather are complementary. This means that they can interact with 
each other to facilitate the transmission of knowledge among firms, thus contributing to TFP 
growth. 
Different from Marshallian spillovers are Jacobian spillovers, also known as diversification 
or urbanisation externalities. According to Harris and Moffat (2011), these occur when plants 
located in an industry-diverse area benefit from the economies of scope such a location 
provides. Compared to Marshallian externalities, Jacobian externalities manifest themselves 
across economic units belonging to different industries. As Jacob (1970) states: “The greater 
the sheer numbers and varieties of divisions of labour already achieved in an economy, the 
greater the economy’s inherent capacity for adding still more kinds of goods and services” (p. 
59). Therefore, it seems that plants with different knowledge and capabilities can complement 
each other’s skills sets, resulting in mutual benefits. Moreover, Jacob (1970) suggests that the 
diversity in terms of industry and occupation that characterises urban economies favours the 
spillover of innovations across different industries. For example, an automotive firm can 
benefit from knowledge acquired by interacting with scientists from a university’s 
mechanical engineering research department. This interaction generates knowledge spillovers 
from the research department to the firm, bringing benefits in terms of product or process 
improvements and ultimately being likely to result in higher TFP. Jacobian externalities can 
also occur, for example, when a firm involved in the production of aluminium, absorbs 
knowledge from a food production firm located nearby. This example suggests that by being 
located in the same geographical area, firms belonging to different industries can obtain 
mutually benefits that are likely to result in higher TFP. 
The above discussion suggests that spillovers, both Marshallian and Jacobian, are likely to be 
positive determinants of a firm’s TFP. Micro-level empirical results seem to support the 
existence of Marshallian externalities, while no significant evidence has been found for 
Jacobian externalities.  
López and Südekum (2009) looked at data on 4,911 plants belonging to the Chilean 
manufacturing sector during the period of 1990-1999 to examine the impact of spatial 
spillovers on TFP. Attention was also paid to the spillovers that might arise from the vertical 
relationships between suppliers and customers. Intra-industry spillovers were measured by 
the number of plants belonging to a firm’s industry and region at the same time. Moreover, as 
intra-industry spillovers are not necessarily localised, a variable representing the number of 
plants from the same sector but based in different regions was included. Inter-industry 
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spillovers were represented by the number of firms belonging to different industries based in 
the same region. While no effect was found for Jacobian spillovers on plants’ TFP, 
Marshallian spillovers were found to exert a positive impact on plants’ TFP. It might be that 
plants do not productively exploit, or do not find worth exploiting, the knowledge pool 
created by plants located in the same area but belonging to different industries. However, the 
plants were found to benefit from the presence of suppliers. Therefore, it seems that plants 
benefit from forward linkages, through which spillovers can manifest themselves.  
Cingano and Schivardi (2010) provide further evidence from Italian manufacturing firms 
belonging to 784 local labour systems. In their study, localisation economies in a local labour 
system were measured as the share of the sectorial city employment in the total 
manufacturing employment. Urbanisation economies were measured by the Hirschman- 
Herfindahl index. The results indicate a positive effect of Marshallian externalities and city 
size on local TFP growth, while no evidence for an impact of Jacobian externalities was 
found, thus confirming the results of the previous study. 
Baldwin et al. (2010) used plant-level data for the Canadian manufacturing sector over the 
period of 1989-1999. In order to measure localisation economies, they adopted the following 
multiple variables: a variable representing the industry mix in a metropolitan area (as a proxy 
for industry labour pool); an upstream supplier-weighted location quotient (as a proxy for the 
density of upstream suppliers in a specific location); and the density of plants in a 
geographical area (as a proxy for intra-industry knowledge spillovers). Urbanisation 
economies were measured as the population of the metropolitan area or agglomeration where 
the plant was located. On the one hand, their findings suggest a positive effect of localisation 
economies on productivity. On the other hand, urbanisation economies were found to have a 
negative effect on productivity, suggesting that firms do not benefit from Jacobian 
externalities. 
In the case of France, Martin et al. (2011) analysed the effect of geographical spillovers on 
manufacturing plant and firm-level TFP over the period of 1996-2004. Marshallian spillovers 
were measured for each plant as the number of other workers employed in the same industry 
and in the same area. Jacobian spillovers for a plant were calculated as the difference between 
the numbers of workers in other industries based in the same area as the plant. The study’s 
results support the existence of Marshallian externalities that make a positive contribution to 
TFP in the short run. A 10% increase in the number of plant workers from the same industry 
was found to increase firms’ TFP by 0.55%. Therefore, one would infer that having firms 
belonging to the same industry in the same area would be beneficial in terms of TFP. 
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However, this relationship was found to be bell-shaped, meaning that when a plant is based in 
an area with a high number of workers (i.e. the area is overcrowded), TFP is likely to suffer. 
In addition, the results do not indicate the existence of Jacobian externalities, at least in the 
short run. However, since Jacobian externalities manifest themselves across plants belonging 
to different industries, it might take longer for them to spread and for the related knowledge 
to be applied productively than with Marshallian externalities because the plants need to 
complement their diverse set of skills and knowledge.  
Within the Chinese context, Lin et al. (2011) examined the effect of spatial agglomeration, 
measured in terms of concentration of manufacturing activity, on firms’ labour productivity. 
The firms analysed belonged to the textile industry, during the period of 2000-2005. The 
dataset comprised 22,152 firms taken from the National Bureau of Statistics, including all 
SOEs and large and medium-sized non-State-owned textile enterprises having sales higher 
than RMB 5mn. Although this was a highly representative sample, small firms were not 
included. In the estimation, the spatial agglomeration variable was measured using the Ellison 
and Glaeser (1997) index, which compares the actual geographical distribution of firms and 
their expected distribution in the absence of agglomeration in a city. The index figures 
suggest that spatial agglomeration has an increasing trend and differs among sub-industries. 
Estimation was conducted using both fixed and random effects and their validity was tested 
using the Hausman test, which tends to favour the fixed effects model. Overall, the findings 
suggest that industrial agglomeration has a significant positive impact on productivity. The 
relationship between industrial agglomeration and productivity showed an inverted U-shape: 
the higher the concentration of firms, the higher the firms’ productivity through positive 
externalities, although this effect declines if the extent of agglomeration is excessively high. 
Li (2004) analysed the effect of agglomeration and privatisation on the labour productivity of 
80,000 foreign-owned firms between 1994 and 1996. Output per employee was used as a 
measure of productivity, despite not being as valuable as TFP. The advantage of having 
access to the labour force and product markets was represented by an index measured at the 
provincial level. Moreover, agglomeration economies were measured through two variables 
representing the concentration of foreign firms and the industry concentration of domestic 
firms, respectively. Results from a multiple linear regression model suggest that foreign firms 
benefit from location advantages such as infrastructure and factor inputs. The concentration 
of foreign firms and the effect of reforms were found to positively affect firms’ productivity. 
In contrast, concentration of domestic firms was found to negatively affect firms’ 
productivity. This study provides interesting insights into the effects of location and 
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agglomeration externalities on foreign firms’ productivity. However, it would have been 
interesting for this study to consider other kinds of firms. 
Yang et al. (2013) examined the effect of spatial concentration of manufacturing and R&D 
activities on a price-adjusted measure of labour productivity for Chinese firms belonging to 
the electronics industry during the years of 2005-2007. As a measure of spatial concentration, 
the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index was adopted. The index values obtained suggest that 
both production and R&D activities are highly concentrated, particularly R&D. The effect of 
spatial concentration was examined through fixed and random effects techniques. These do 
not take into account the simultaneity issue, suggesting that the estimates may be biased and 
inconsistent. Despite the presence of this issue, production agglomeration was found to be 
positively related with firm productivity, particularly for smaller firms, while R&D 
agglomeration seemed to have a negative relationship, suggesting the overcrowding of R&D 
activity. 
This above paragraph examined spatial spillovers or agglomeration externalities, which are 
benefits that a plant obtains by being geographically close to other plants. These are 
differentiated between Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers. Marshallian spillovers relate to 
firms that are in close proximity to their industry peers. They are manifest through the 
channels of imitation/demonstration, synergies, commercial relationships, asset sharing, and 
labour pooling. Other than Marshallian, externalities can also be Jacobian, which occur when 
plants are located in an area characterised by different industrial activities, allowing the plants 
to benefit from the economies of scope this provides. For example, a firm in one industry can 
absorb and exploit knowledge from a firm in another industry, likely resulting in higher TFP. 
Therefore, compared to Marshallian externalities, Jacobian externalities manifest themselves 
across economic units belonging to different industries. Based on the above discussion, one 
would expect both Marshallian and Jacobian externalities to be positive determinants of firm 
TFP. Some of the most recent studies concerning agglomeration externalities have been 
examined. While Marshallian externalities have been found to exert a positive effect on 
firms’ TFP, Jacobian externalities have not. Therefore, one would infer that by placing firms 
belonging to the same industry in the same geographical area, TFP will improve as a result of 
positive mechanisms (imitation/demonstration, synergies, commercial relationships, asset 
sharing, and labour pooling). However, locating firms belonging to different industries in the 
same area might not lead to higher firm TFP. It may take longer for Jacobian spillovers to be 
transmitted within a geographical area because of the firm diversity and the greater difficulty 
of applying the diverse knowledge productively compared to Marshallian spillovers. In 
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addition, plants might not find it worthwhile to explore the knowledge of plants from 
different industries, or they may not even be able to exploit such knowledge productively. 
Regarding the Chinese context, empirical evidence is still scant. The evidence available 
points to the existence of location and agglomeration economies, although the relationship 
does not seem to be linear. Another study suggests that firms owned by foreign investors 
benefit from a higher concentration of foreign firms but suffer from a higher concentration of 
domestic firms. Although these represent valuable results, further investigation is required to 
both extend and confirm the findings.  
2.4.7.  City Location 
Knowledge spillovers can also manifest differently depending on whether a firm is based in a 
city, as cities are likely to have a higher population density than other locations such as towns 
or villages. “By facilitating face-to-face contact, the concentration of people in a particular 
area will facilitate the transfer of knowledge. In addition, workers will find it easier to move 
from one firm to another. This process will cause the transfer of knowledge across firms. The 
same diffusion of knowledge will occur when plants are better able to learn from their 
customers and suppliers when they are located in cross proximity” (Harris and Moffat, 2012a, 
p.764).  
By being based in a city, a firm is likely to reap benefits for four different reasons. Firstly, a 
firm benefits in terms of knowledge spillovers, which are likely to be higher in comparison to 
smaller locations. This is because, in such a location, people are likely to interact more with 
each other, thus enabling a faster transfer of knowledge than would be possible elsewhere. 
Moreover, as Borowiecki (2013) argues, the cost of transmitting knowledge rises with 
distance. A city is therefore an environment where knowledge can be spread relatively 
quickly and where new ideas are constantly created. “The new impressions and new ideas 
that are the heart of technological progress are probably most likely to occur in such a 
setting” (Sveikauskas, 1975, p.394). Using a 2007 survey of 6000 French workers concerning 
workplace communication, Charlot and Duranton (2004) suggest that city size and urban 
schooling positively impact workplace communication. Therefore, the larger the city, the 
higher the workplace communication is likely to be. If a firm’s workers live within the city 
and interact with fellow citizens, they are likely to bring outside knowledge to the firm, likely 
resulting in higher TFP. Secondly, when a firm is based in a city, it is more able to obtain 
important insights into its customer base. In this way, it can better adapt its products to 
customer needs. Moreover, since the customers are in close proximity, the firm has the 
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opportunity to reduce transportation costs and respond more quickly to customer feedback 
and to any issue that might arise from product sales. Thus, the closer level of interaction of a 
firm with its customers would enable the firm to undertake TFP-enhancing actions such as 
product improvements. Thirdly, another benefit that a firm might reap by being based within 
a city is the availability of a wider labour pool. A firm would therefore have to struggle less 
to find an employee with the right skills for a specific job. In addition, the larger the city, the 
higher the availability of a more skilled labour force than in a smaller city. This was found by 
Bacolod et al. (2009) for a sample of US cities. In addition, using a survey of US 
establishments, Elvery (2010) demonstrated that companies based in large metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs) have a more skill-intensive workforce than those based in small 
MSAs. Therefore, the availability of a large and more highly skilled labour pool in a city is 
likely to benefit a firm in terms of higher TFP. Fourth, another advantage a city might 
provide to local firms is the high availability of business services such as accounting, legal 
and financial services.  
Despite the abovementioned benefits, companies might face other issues from being based in 
a city. Carlino (1987) argues that in a city, the time and cost of transporting goods and 
commuting are likely to be high, along with the high commercial and residential rents. The 
extra time and costs of commuting experienced by a firm’s workers is likely to result in a 
demand for higher salaries. In addition, the relatively high rent paid by a firm to be located in 
a city results in additional costs. These two aspects are, therefore, likely to negatively impact 
a firm’s TFP. 
From the above analysis, it seems that being based in a city is likely to bring firms more 
advantages than disadvantages. The empirical evidence on this matter is mostly at the 
aggregate level, while the research at the micro-level remains scant. 
In one of the first micro-level studies on the topic Mitra (1999) analysed how the size of a 
city impacted the efficiency index of Indian firms belonging to the electric machinery (212 
firms) and cotton textiles (294 firms) industries, using a cross-sectional sample for the year 
1992-1993. The estimation was performed using both a production function and a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). In the production function, the impact of city agglomeration 
economies was measured through a function representing the total city population, or its total 
workforce. In the SFA, agglomeration economies were measured as the difference in 
efficiency between firms based in large cities and firms based in small ones, followed by an 
examination of the relationship between efficiency and agglomeration externalities. The 
results obtained using the production function were not highly significant. However, the SFA 
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analysis suggests a positive impact of city size and workforce size on firm efficiency, 
although this effect declines for very large cities. These results imply that firms might 
generally benefit in terms of higher efficiency from being located in a city. However, after a 
city reaches a certain size, it might not have a sufficient infrastructure to support firms’ 
activities, thus making it costly for firms to be based there. Although these results provide a 
useful insight into city spillovers, they should be interpreted with caution. Firstly, the sample 
size was very small. Secondly, the analysis was limited to two sectors. Thus, the results 
represent a specific case in point that cannot be extended to other sectors or countries. 
Pan and Zhang (2002) studied the relationship between urban productivity and city size using 
data on 119,790 firms across 28 Chinese industries and 224 cities. Thus, they used a larger 
sample and considered a wider industrial base than Mitra (1999). For the study’s urban 
production function, a shift function for city size was used to proxy the urban population. By 
using OLS, the authors found evidence of significant positive agglomeration effects across 19 
out of 28 industries. The elasticity of agglomeration was 0.051, suggesting that as a city size 
doubles, the corresponding increase in productivity is 3.6%. Thus, one would infer that firms 
located in a city are likely to become more productive as city size increases. In addition, these 
agglomeration gains were found to derive from localisation economies. Therefore, the 
benefits that a firm gains by being located in a city come mainly from the presence of firms 
belonging to the same industry. While the authors did take into account the effects of 
ownership and geography on firm performance, they ignored other issues that compromise 
their results, such as the endogeneity of inputs, and firm fixed effects.  
Harris and Moffat (2012a) measured the determinants of TFP using a UK plant-level panel 
dataset for the years 1997-2006 for almost all industries in both the manufacturing and 
service sectors. City spillovers were measured using a dummy variable that took the value of 
1 if the plant was located in a major city and 0 otherwise. In addition, they used the SYS-
GMM estimation methodology, which accounts for firms’ fixed effects. Their results suggest 
that plants based in cities have higher TFP than plants based in the same region, but outside 
of cities.  
In the Chinese context, Pan and Zhang (2002) examined the effect of city size on the 
productivity of 119,970 firms spread across 28 industries in 224 cities. The city’s size was 
proxied by its urban population. The results suggest that as the city size doubles, a firm’s 
productivity increases by 3.6%. When this effect was decomposed, it was found that the 
productivity increase was mainly due to the concentration of firms belonging to the same 
industry, as measured by the total district industry sales, rather than urban development, as 
 77 
measured by the urban population. Although this study is the only one that has been done at 
the firm level for China, it suggests that being based in a city brings firms a wide range of 
benefits that will likely result in higher TFP. In summary, despite being scant at this stage, 
this empirical evidence suggests that a plant or a firm based in a city is likely to benefit in 
terms of higher TFP. 
This section has analysed the benefits gained by plants or firms based in cities that are likely 
to result in higher TFP. Firms seem to enjoy four main benefits that cities provide. One is the 
relatively high transfer of knowledge that occurs among people and workers, and the creation 
of new ideas arising from their interactions. This knowledge is likely to result in TFP-
enhancing actions, such as product and process improvements. The second is the insight into 
its customers that a firm can obtain through close proximity to them, enabling it to adapt its 
products and respond more quickly to customers’ needs, as well as reducing transportation 
costs. The third is the availability of a wide labour pool and, specifically, a skilled labour 
force, from which a firm can hire those employees who are likely to contribute the most to 
the firm. The fourth is the relatively high availability of business services, such as legal, 
accounting and financial services, which might not be as available elsewhere, thus providing 
the firm with support for its needs.  
Based on the empirical results from the literature, it seems that being located in a city is likely 
to positively impact firms’ TFP. However, the benefits of cities might be counterbalanced by 
high costs, such as transportation of goods, building rentals or purchasing, and the costs to 
workers of commuting or living in the city. Despite these negative aspects, the benefits of 
cities seem to prevail. Regarding the Chinese context, although the empirical evidence is 
scant, the available findings suggest that cities positively impact firms’ TFP. 
2.4.8.  Export Activities 
Another factor that is expected to be a determinant of TFP is export activities. Regarding this 
relationship, there seems to be two contrasting views. One suggests that TFP is likely to 
determine a firm’s decision to export and hence to self-select into a new market. This is 
because only the most productive firms might be able to afford the sunk costs that entering 
into an export market entails. Roberts and Tybout (1997) analysed the entry and exit of plants 
in four industries in the Colombian manufacturing sector during the years 1981-1989, using a 
model in which a plant’s current exporting status was a function of its prior export experience 
(a proxy for sunk costs), its observable characteristics (age, capital stock and corporate 
ownership, which influence its profits from export activities), and unobserved serially 
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correlated shocks. The study’s results suggest that a plant’s decision to export in the current 
year is influenced by whether it exported in the past year. Specifically, a plant has a 60% 
higher probability to export in the current year if it exported in the past year, compared to a 
plant that has never exported. This suggests that after a firm has overcome the cost of entry, it 
is more likely to keep exporting than a firm that still is facing such costs. In addition, the 
authors found that once a plant exits from foreign markets, its costs for re-entering are not 
much different from those faced by new exporters. The study suggests that sunk costs 
constitute a hurdle that a firm must overcome in order to enter into foreign markets. Only the 
most productive firms are able to overcome such a hurdle and thus they self-select into the 
export market. In making the decision of whether to export, a firm is likely to consider 
different factors, among them TFP. Therefore, TFP might determine whether or not a firm 
self-selects into a new market. 
In contrast to the “self-selection” view is “learning by exporting.” According to this view, a 
firm learns how to become more productive and competitive through actually exporting. The 
more a firm exports, the more it is able to increase its productivity. This is because by 
participating in foreign markets in addition to the domestic market, a firm faces a larger 
number of competitors. In order to survive in such an environment, the firm would need to 
constantly improve its productivity by undertaking TFP-enhancing measures. Moreover, 
exporters are likely to benefit from the commercial interactions that exporting entails, as 
suggested by Grossman and Helpman (1991). For example, an entrepreneur that trades 
internationally has the opportunity to increase his stock of knowledge by interacting with 
foreign economic agents, learning from customer feedback, and observing more innovative 
technologies, more advanced products and better working practices. This knowledge might 
be adopted and exploited by the entrepreneur to increase the firm’s TFP. Among the many 
possible actions an exporter can undertake, improving products and processes and adopting 
innovative machinery are likely to increase the firm’s TFP. Therefore, according to the 
learning by exporting view, a firm learns how to improve its productivity by engaging in 
exporting activities.  
After having examined both the self-selection and the learning by exporting views, it is 
reasonable to ask which one prevails, or whether both occur and to what extent. Do firms 
self-select into export markets after they have improved their productivity? Or do firms 
become more productive by actually exporting? Alternatively, do both effects coexist and to 
what extent? The empirical results from the literature seem to support the self-selection view, 
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which indicates that the most productive firms are more capable of affording the sunk costs 
that entering into an export market entails. 
Clerides et al. (1998) provided support for this view by looking at plant-level data for firms 
belonging to export-oriented industries in Colombia, Mexico and Morocco over the period of 
1984-1991. The authors analysed whether the firms’ productivity growth improved after 
exporting and whether this led to positive spillovers to domestic industry non-exporters. To 
do this, they built a system of two equations: one testing a firm’s self-selection into an export 
market, and  the other testing whether exporting determines learning. The authors found that 
prior to exporting, firms had relatively low average variable costs, while those who stopped 
exporting had relatively high average variable costs. At the same time, the firms were found 
to have relatively high labour productivity prior to exporting, while those who stopped 
exporting had relatively low labour productivity. Apart from Colombian firms’ labour 
productivity, these figures did not improve after the firms started exporting. Therefore, these 
findings support the self-selection of the most productive firms into export markets.  
Bernard and Jensen (2004) analysed the role of export activities in determining US TFP 
growth rates in the manufacturing sector for the period of 1983-1992 at the plant and industry 
levels. The independent export variable was represented by the export status of a firm at 
time 𝑡, which was expected to affect productivity growth at time 𝑡 + 1. The authors adopted a 
different methodology than Clerides et al. (1998), a cross-sectional regression of the TFP 
growth rate to some independent variables, among them a variable representing exporting. At 
the aggregate and industry levels, export growth was found to result from higher productivity, 
while the opposite was not the case. At the plant level, no strong evidence was found for the 
existence of a “learning by exporting” effect, thus confirming the results of the previous 
study. In addition, the TFP of plants was found to increase before entering into an export 
market and during its entry. This suggests that the most productive plants self-select into the 
export market. Employment and output growth rates were found to be much higher for 
exporters, and this process continued after exporting started. Therefore, it seems that export 
activity supports the TFP growth of exporting firms. In addition, at the industry level, it was 
found that 42% of TFP growth during the years 1983-1992 was due to reallocation of output 
across plants, as relatively high-TFP exporters had grown at faster rates in terms of 
employment and output than relatively low-TFP non-exporters. Therefore, a reallocation 
effect occurred whereby exporting firms contributed more to their industry aggregate TFP 
growth than non-exporting firms. In the results of Bernard and Jensen (2004), exporting did 
not seem to affect TFP directly. Since exporting firms had higher employment and output 
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growth, the reallocation of output shares from less productive plants to more productive ones 
led to a higher aggregate TFP, where exporters provided the largest share of the contribution. 
Thus, there seems to be an indirect effect of exporting on TFP at the industry level. It can be 
inferred that exporting benefits productive plants the most, enabling them to grow in terms of 
output and employment.  
Another study by Arnold and Hussinger (2009) used firm-level data for 389 German 
manufacturing firms over the years 1992-2000. In the study, export activity was represented 
by a firm’s export status. The findings suggest that larger, more R&D intensive, and more 
productive firms are more likely to become exporters. Thus, firms with a relatively high TFP 
are more likely to start exporting than those with a relatively low TFP. Using both a Granger 
causality test and a matching technique, exporting was not found to improve the firms’ TFP 
and there were no evident differences in terms of TFP between exporting and non-exporting 
firms. Thus, it seems that the “learning by exporting” effect does not exist, thus providing 
additional support for the existence of only the “self-selection” view. 
In comparison with the relatively small sample used by Arnold and Hussinger (2009), Kim et 
al. (2009) examined the relationship between exporting and TFP for 1,335 Korean 
manufacturing firms belonging to eight industries during the years 1997-2003. Exporting was 
represented by a firm’s exporting status. Using the same method as Clerides et al. (1998), 
they found that exporting did not lead to higher productivity, except for in the machinery and 
equipment industry. Therefore, the effect of “learning by exporting” was almost non-existent. 
The self-selection effect was measured following Roberts and Tybout (1997), with the 
finding that productivity led to exporting for just three industries out of eight, namely 
machinery and equipment, computers and office machinery, and electronic components. 
Since they were limited to these industries, the existence of these relationships cannot be 
extended to the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
This section has thus far discussed the possibly two-sided relationship between exporting and 
TFP. On the one hand, there may be a self-selection effect, whereby more productive firms 
self-select into new markets and start exporting. On the other hand, there may be “a learning 
by exporting” effect, whereby firms learn how to increase their productivity by getting 
involved in export activities. The studies analysed above were focused on gaining a better 
understanding of these effects in both developed and developing countries. Most of the 
studies document the existence of a self-selection effect and the absence of a “learning by 
exporting” effect. One study found that both effects are irrelevant, while two others suggest 
that exporting has an indirect effect on aggregate industry productivity. This is because 
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exporting firms have a higher employment and output growth and the reallocation of output 
shares from the least productive plants to those that are the most productive leads to a higher 
aggregate TFP, where exporters provide the largest share of the contribution. Thus, there 
seems to be an indirect effect of exporting on TFP at the industry level. It can be inferred that, 
in some cases, exporting benefits the most productive plants, enabling them to grow in terms 
of output and employment. In general, one can infer from the literature reviewed that 
exporting does not determine higher productivity at the firm level.  
However, there have also been studies demonstrating the existence of a positive effect of 
export activity on TFP, supporting the idea that firms “learn by exporting.” Castellani (2002) 
argues that most studies supporting the self-selection view have adopted variables that are not 
representative of export behaviour. This is because they all use a variable where export 
behaviour can either take a value of 1 or 0, which does not represent the intensity of a firm’s 
involvement in export activities. Thus, he uses the ratio of a firm’s foreign to total sales as a 
measure of export intensity. Using firm-level data for about 5,000 Italian manufacturing firms 
in the years 1989-1994, Castellani (2002) found that export intensity has a positive effect on 
labour productivity. Therefore, the higher the export intensity, as measured by the ratio of 
foreign to total sales, the higher a firm’s labour productivity growth. “Learning requires 
experience of foreign markets, which comes with time and specific investments, and can be 
very much correlated with the share of foreign exports” (Castellani, 2002, p.625).  
Blalock and Gertler (2004) take a different view from Castellani concerning the prevalence of 
findings supporting the self-selection thesis. They argue that the previous studies 
documenting the existence of a self-selection effect mainly focused on developed countries, 
which are likely to be as productive as their trading counterparts. In contrast, firms in 
developing countries might still have room for learning from their trading partners and 
experiencing technological transfers, that give them a greater opportunity to improve their 
TFP. By adopting a dichotomous variable for exporting in a sample of 20,000 Indonesian 
manufacturing plants during the period of 1990-1996, they found that plants experienced a 2-
5% gain in productivity after starting export activities. Their findings thus support the view 
that firms learn by exporting. 
De Loecker (2007) introduced the destinations where firms export their goods by splitting the 
sample into destination markets. He also used a dichotomous dummy variable as proxy for 
the firm’s probability to start exporting. By using firm-level data for 7,915 Slovenian 
manufacturing firms during the period of 1994-2000, he found that firms experienced 
productivity increases after starting to export, an effect that increased in the following years. 
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Exporting firms were found to be 8.8% more productive on average and to learn by exporting 
in 13 out of 16 sectors. In particular, firms that exported to regions characterised by high 
income, such as Western Europe and North America, were found to achieve the largest 
improvements in productivity. Therefore, it seems that firms achieve a higher TFP as a result 
of learning and technology transfers by exporting to developed countries. Moreover, 
consistent with Blalock and Gertler (2004), firms in developing countries might still have 
room for learning from their trading partners and experiencing technological transfers, which 
improve their capacity to increase TFP. De Loecker (2007) also suggests that the existence of 
the learning effect in Slovenia was motivated by the country’s economic transition from 
socialist to market-oriented, and by the fall in 1990 of the CMEA trading system, which 
provided firms with the opportunity to export towards developed regions.  
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) analysed the effect of learning by exporting in a sample of 
UK manufacturing firms during the period of 1989-1998. The authors compares TFP between 
exporters with non-exporters having similar observable characteristics, focusing on whether it 
differed according to firms’ existing level of exposure to foreign firms within their domestic 
market. The rationale is that firms, by operating in export markets, are likely to benefit in 
terms of TFP growth from competition and technology transfers arising from the presence of 
foreign firms. In the analysis, exporters were differentiated from non-exporters using dummy 
variables. The exposure to foreign firms was expressed by three measures, two representing 
international competition and one knowledge: one was the Grubel and Lloyd index, 
representing the extent of the similarity between imported and exported products; the second 
was a combination of the share of industry exports in the related output and the Grubel and 
Lloyd index; and the third was the ratio of industry R&D expenditure to related industry 
output. The results suggest the existence of a learning-by-exporting effect. However, this 
effect was found to be lower for those industries whose firms already had a high exposure to 
foreign firms through international competition. From these results, it seems that firms learn 
and increase their TFP once they start exporting. However, firms that have already been 
exposed to foreign firms, and thus whose TFP has already increased as a result of competition 
and technology transfers, are likely to experience less of a “learning by exporting” effect and 
lower TFP growth as a result. 
García et al. (2012) took a different approach from the previous studies by considering how 
firms with different levels of absorptive capacity, measured as R&D expenditure, benefit 
from learning by exporting. The measure of exporting used was the export status, which took 
the value of 1 if a firm was exporting and 0 otherwise. From a sample of 1,534 Spanish 
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manufacturing firms during the period of 1990-2002, the results indicate that firms learn by 
exporting. In particular, the firms benefiting the most from learning by exporting, in terms of 
both labour productivity and TFP, were those with a relatively high level of absorptive 
capacity, measured in terms of R&D and, hence, technological advancement. Firms having 
relatively high levels of R&D investment were found to have better performance than those 
having relatively low levels.  
The findings of the above-mentioned studies suggest that firms that engage in exporting 
benefit in terms of higher TFP, supporting the learning by exporting view.  
In the Chinese context, Sun and Hong (2011) analysed how exporting affects productivity by 
looking at a firm-level dataset spanning 2001-2005. Exporting was represented by a measure 
of export intensity. The data came from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and 
considered about 70,000 SOEs and non-SOEs with at least RMB 5mn of sales. In order to 
analyse how various ownership types interact with the export premium, the export variable 
was combined with ownership variables. In addition, in order to analyse how firms belonging 
to different industries are exposed to export markets, an industrial export intensity variable 
was included. The authors subsequently investigated the learning-by-exporting effect by 
adding a variable representing experience (the number of years since a firm started exporting) 
and another representing the interaction between experience and export intensity. The results 
from their fixed effects’ estimation suggest the existence of a positive effect of export 
intensity on firm productivity. However, since this analysis was likely to be characterised by 
the presence of the endogeneity issue, they also adopted an instrumental variable approach. 
The coefficients for ownership variables suggest that SOEs are less productive, while 
foreign-owned companies are the most productive. However, it appears that as the share of 
foreign ownership increases, the positive effect of exporting decreases. When the variables 
representing export experience and its interaction with export intensity were added to the 
model, exporting experience was found to have a positive effect on productivity, while the 
interaction variable had a negative effect. These results suggest that firms with longer 
exporting experience are more productive. However, the positive effect decreases with the 
length of export experience. When the instrumental variables approach was adopted, the 
effect of export intensity became insignificant. 
Yu (2010) examined the effect of exporting on Chinese firms’ TFP in terms of processing 
trade and import competition through tariff reduction policies. Firm-level production data for 
2000-2006 was taken from China’s National Bureau of Statistics of manufacturing 
enterprises, which covers both SOEs and non-SOEs. The number of firms studied ranged 
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from 162,885 in 2000 to 301,961 in 2006. TFP was estimated using the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) approach. As this approach tends to overestimate the coefficient on capital, the author 
also adopted the system-GMM developed in Blundell and Bond (1998). A 10% tariff 
decrease was found to generate a 12% productivity gain.  
Du et al. (2012b) examined how Chinese firms’ TFP is impacted by entry into and exit from 
export markets. In contrast with previous studies on the effect of exporting on productivity, 
the study separated exporting firms into domestic and foreign-owned. The number of firms 
studied varied from about 150,000 at the end of the 1990s to over 240,000 in 2005. In order 
to deal with the potential endogeneity issue, the authors adopted the OP (1996) approach and 
some variants, while the matching technique was adopted to isolate the impact of export 
participation on firm productivity. The results suggest that domestic firms achieve 
productivity gains once they start exporting, an effect that increases in the following years. 
Foreign firms, on the other hand, do not show any significant productivity increase once they 
start exporting or when they continue to export. When domestic firms exit from export 
markets, their productivity slows, while the same effect is not seen in foreign-owned firms. 
Interestingly, after classifying firms according to their technology level, it appears that the 
productivity gains achieved by firms that were starting to export were more significant in 
industries characterised by high and medium technology levels than for firms with low 
technology levels. It might be that foreign-owned firms do not need significantly improve 
their efficiency or innovate by exporting. Domestically owned firms might have more room 
for productivity improvements. Based on above results, it seems that exporting has a positive 
effect on firms’ TFP.  
This section has analysed the relationship between a firm’s engagement in export activities 
and its TFP. In this regard, there exist two main contrasting views. One suggests that TFP is 
likely to determine a firm’s decision to export, and hence to self-select into a new market. 
This is because only the most productive firms are able to afford the sunk costs that exporting 
activity entails (e.g. spending time collecting information on export markets, structuring a 
platform to support potential exporting activities, sustaining distribution and marketing 
costs). Therefore, the benefits gained from the export activity should outweigh its costs. In 
such a decision, a firm will consider various factors, among them TFP, which is a measure of 
the firm’s economic performance and competitiveness. Therefore, TFP is likely to determine 
whether a firm self-selects into the export market.  
In contrast to the “self-selection” view is the “learning by exporting” view. According to this 
view, a firm learns by engaging in exporting how to become more productive and thus more 
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competitive. The more a firm exports, the higher its productivity becomes. This is because by 
participating in foreign as well as domestic markets, the firm faces a larger number of 
competitors. In order to survive in such an environment, the firm would have to constantly 
improve its productivity by undertaking TFP-enhancing measures. Moreover, exporters are 
likely to benefit from the commercial interactions that exporting entails (e.g. interacting with 
foreign economic agents, learning from customer feedback, and observing innovative 
technologies, competing products and competitors’ working practices). However, the learning 
by exporting effect is likely to be lower in those industries whose firms have already had high 
exposure to foreign firms through international competition. The knowledge of international 
markets and competition is adopted by the entrepreneur and can be exploited to increase the 
firm’s TFP through product and process improvements and the adoption of innovative 
machinery. Therefore, according to the learning by exporting view, a firm learns how to 
improve its productivity the more it exports. Some studies support the self-selection view, in 
which the most productive firms enter into the export markets. Most of these studies 
document the existence of a self-selection effect along with the absence of a “learning by 
exporting” effect. However, by focusing on developing countries and using different proxies, 
other studies have found that once firms start exporting, they learn how to improve their 
productivity. The empirical results indicate that exporting has a positive effect on TFP. 
2.4.9. Managerial Ability 
Managerial ability can be defined as “the knowledge, skills and experience, which is often 
tacit, residing with and utilized by managers” (Holcomb et al., 2009, p.459). Managerial 
ability represents the combination of manager characteristics that, through interaction, results 
in decisions that shape how a firm operates. It can be further decomposed into general, firm-
specific and industry-specific managerial ability, leading to differences among decision 
makers. Since all managers are unlikely to possess the same characteristics, some might be 
more skilled than others. Holcomb et al. (2009) suggest that managerial ability results from 
domain and resource expertise. Domain expertise is the ability of managers to understand 
their industry and the main components of their firms, such as products, markets and 
strategies. Resource expertise represents the ability of managers to best use the resources they 
possess, such as labour and capital. Concerning domain expertise, a manager at an 
automotive firm might be more knowledgeable than his competitors regarding consumer 
preferences, and thus more capable of adapting the company’s products accordingly. 
Moreover, concerning resource expertise, the same manager might be more capable than 
 86 
others of devising strategies to match the firm’s workforce with its physical assets. In 
particular, it is crucial for managers to foster creativity and innovation among employees, 
which is likely to result in higher TFP. Managers with higher managerial ability are expected 
to achieve superior firm performance, which can be seen in terms of TFP growth. Managers 
play a prominent role within firms. “Managers are conductors of an input orchestra. They 
coordinate the application of labour, capital, and intermediate inputs. Just as a poor conductor 
can lead to a cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect poor management to lead 
to discordant production operations” (Syverson, 2011, p.336). Although a firm may possess 
qualitative inputs, employ the most highly-skilled employees, and possess the best production 
techniques and most innovative machinery, managers have the ultimate power to combine the 
available resources in the best possible way for productive purposes. Koprowski (1981) 
argues that good management practice occurs when the management is focused on increasing 
productivity. For example, rewarding or promoting high performing employees within a firm 
is likely to generate TFP growth. If this does not occur, such employees are likely to leave the 
firm, possibly resulting in a TFP decrease. A manager has the opportunity to make the best 
use of the available resources to achieve TFP growth. The manager’s decisions can also allow 
the firm to simply survive, or, in the worst case, lead the firm to exit its industry due to low 
TFP. The empirical results from the literature seem to support a positive effect of good 
managerial practices on TFP. 
For example, Ichinowski et al. (1997) studied the effect of human resource management 
(HRM) variables on the productivity of 36 finishing lines owned by 17 different steel 
companies. Productivity was measured as the percentage of the operating time that a 
production line was running. In this study, the HRM variables provide a measure of the work 
practices adopted by steel firms in their management of personnel: incentive pay, recruiting 
and selection, teamwork, employment security, flexible job assignments, skills training and 
communication. As the authors acknowledge, examining the impact of a single practice on 
productivity would produce biased estimates since practices interact and form synergies. 
Therefore, the practices were grouped into four different combinations, or “systems”, based 
on their level of innovation. The study’s results provide an interesting insight, as HRM 
systems were found to be determinants of productivity. However, the effects on productivity 
of single HRM practices were found to be small. This suggests that within a firm, the 
introduction of a single HRM practice is not likely to cause a significant TFP improvement. 
However, its effect is more likely to be significant when combined with other complementary 
practices due to the creation of synergies. From these results, one would infer that the 
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introduction of HRM systems leads to productivity improvements. However, the results 
should be interpreted with caution since the study only looked at steel companies. Therefore, 
such an analysis should be extended to more sectors. Moreover, the size of the sample 
adopted was small, with only 36 production lines examined.  
Lazear (2000) analysed improvements in productivity due to a change in pay practices by 
examining the output produced by 3,000 workers within an auto glass company over a period 
of 19 months. Rather than analysing many practices or systems of practices as did Ichinowski 
et al. (1997), the study focused on just the pay practice. When it was switched from an hourly 
wage to piece-rate pay, the output per worker was found to improve by 44%. This was due to 
the incentive effects associated with the new pay practice, which pushed workers to increase 
their efforts and increased the ability of the firm to hire and retain the most productive 
workers. Although there was a strong increase in productivity, it would be interesting to see 
whether this was accompanied by a decrease in quality as workers shifted their focus to 
output quantities. Since the observed unit was the worker, the study had a much larger sample 
than Ichinowski et al.’s (1997). In addition, it focused on a specific management practice. 
Although the pay practice had a positive effect on productivity, it does not mean that other 
potential management practices are likely to be successful in raising productivity. Moreover, 
since the results are focused on a specific activity in a firm, the results cannot be extended to 
other industries. 
A more comprehensive study than the above two was done by Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007), who examined 18 management practices through a survey of 732 medium-sized 
manufacturing firms across the US, France, Germany and the UK. Management practices 
were measured using answers provided by firm managers regarding five different categories 
concerning operations monitoring, targets and incentives. The study found the measures of 
management practice to be positively associated with measures of firm performance, among 
them TFP, for all the countries. Therefore, it seems that good management practices are 
positively associated with productivity. Poorly managed firms were found to be mainly 
family-owned and to operate in environments characterised by low competition. The former 
effect might be because family-owned firms, which often choose their CEOs from among 
their primogeniture, are less likely to be well managed. In the latter effect, an environment 
characterised by low competition would enable the least productive firms to survive and 
disincentivise managers to upgrade their practices by reducing slack and pursuing innovation, 
which are supposed to increase TFP. In a more competitive environment, on the other hand, 
the least productive firms are likely to exit the industry while allowing the most productive 
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firms to thrive and gain market share. It must be noted that the authors of the study measured 
the correlations between management practices and the various measures of firm 
performance and not the causal effects of management practice changes on firm performance. 
In a subsequent study, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) extended the same methodology to a 
larger sample of 5,850 firms across 17 countries. Their results suggest that the US, Japan and 
Germany have the highest management scores, while countries such as China, Brazil and 
India have the lowest scores. By measuring the correlation between measures of firm 
performance, among them productivity, and management practices, their results suggest a 
positive association. However, being correlations, the results could indicate that good 
management practices result in high productivity, or that high productivity results in the 
adoption of good management practices. 
The studies by Ichinowski et al. (1997) and Lazear (2000) suggest that when firms adopt 
good managerial practices, productivity is likely to improve. However, since these analyses 
were limited to one sector each, the results cannot be extended to other industries. The studies 
by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007; 2010), on the other hand, cover more firms, sectors and 
countries. They suggest that there is a positive association between management practices 
and productivity. However, since the relationship is represented by a correlation, no direction 
of causality from one factor to the other can be inferred.  
In this section, the relationship between managerial ability and productivity has been 
discussed. Managerial ability represents the combination of a manager’s characteristics, 
which, by interacting with one another, result in decisions that shape how a firm operates. 
The term can be further decomposed into general, firm specific and industry specific. 
Managers might differ in their abilities because of different domain and resource expertise. In 
particular, within resource expertise, it is crucial for managers to foster creativity and 
innovation among employees, which is ultimately likely to result in higher TFP. Managers 
with greater abilities are expected to achieve superior firm performance, which can be 
measured in terms of TFP growth. Thus, managers have a prominent role within firms. 
Although a firm may use qualitative inputs, employ the most skilled employees, possess the 
best production techniques and the use most innovative machinery, managers have the 
ultimate power and responsibility to combine the available resources in the best possible way. 
Koprowski (1981) argues that good management practice occurs when the management is 
focused on increasing productivity. The empirical results from the literature support a 
positive effect of good managerial practices on TFP, although the studies are focused on 
specific sectors and small samples. Other studies that have extended the analysis to a large 
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number of firms, sectors and countries suggest a positive correlation between managerial 
practices and productivity. However, since these studies do not look at the direction of 
causality, further investigation is needed. 
2.4.10. Marketing Capabilities 
Barney (1991), a proponent of the resource-based view of the firm, argues that firms within 
an industry differ according to the resources they possess. This suggests that each firm has a 
set of resources that are unique. A resource can, therefore, represent a firm-specific advantage 
(FSA), that is “a unique capability proprietary to the organization. It may be built upon 
product or process technology, marketing or distributional skills. The FSAs are based 
ultimately on a firm’s internalization of an asset, such as production, knowledge, managerial, 
or marketing capabilities over which the firm has proprietary control” (Rugman, 2005, p.34). 
According to this definition, among the various firm-specific advantages are the firm’s 
marketing capabilities. Vorhies and Morgan (2005) argue that these represent the capacity of 
a firm to transition resources into valuable output. It can also be said that the “marketing 
capability of a firm is reflected in its ability to differentiate products and services from 
competitors and build successful brands. Thus, a firm that spends money on advertising and 
promoting its products can increase sales both by expanding the sales of the product category 
and by getting customers to switch to their brands. Firms with strong brand names can charge 
premium prices in foreign markets to enhance their profitability as well” (Kotabe et al., 2002, 
p.82). Vorhies and Morgan (2005) identify the following marketing capabilities: product 
development, pricing, channel management, marketing communications, selling, market 
information management, marketing planning, and marketing implementation. These may 
therefore constitute a crucial determinant of a firm’s performance. The findings from the 
literature seem to support this view.  
Morgan et al. (2009) analysed a cross-industry sample of 114 US firms to examine the effect 
of three marketing capabilities (market sensing, brand management, and customer 
relationship management) on the firms’ revenue and margin growth rates. The three 
marketing measures were assessed through a survey, using a point scale. Market-sensing 
capabilities had a significant positive effect on the revenue growth rate, while having a 
negative effect on the margin growth rate. Customer relationship management capabilities 
had a significant negative effect on revenue growth rate and a positive effect on margin 
growth rate. Brand management capabilities were found to have a significant positive effect 
on revenue growth rate and a negative effect on margin growth rate. Therefore, the results 
 90 
point to the different effects of each capability on the various measures of firm performance. 
Although the results of this study provide an insight into the relationship between marketing 
capabilities and firm performance, the measurement of capabilities might be too subjective, 
as it is scored from questions asked to firms’ managers. The use of a more objective measure 
of marketing capabilities would have been preferred. 
For the UK, Nath et al. (2010) examined the impact of firms’ functional capabilities 
(marketing and operations) and diversification strategies (product/service and international 
diversification) on financial performance. The sample comprised 102 UK-based logistics 
companies over the period of 2005-2006. Given the importance of marketing and operational 
capabilities and diversification strategies in logistics, the industry is valuable for analysing 
the effect of these factors on financial performance. However, it would have been preferable 
to extend the analysis to many other sectors. Despite this limitation, the authors adopted a 
valuable measure of marketing capabilities, with the variables being marketing expenditures, 
intangible resources, relationship expenditures and installed customer base. The result of the 
estimation, conducted through a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), indicate that marketing 
capabilities strongly affect the financial performance of firms. 
Yu et al. (2014) examined the impact of marketing capabilities and operational capabilities on 
firms’ financial performance. This relationship was studied by applying an input-oriented 
constant return to scale DEA model on a sample comprising 186 retail firms in the UK during 
2010. To measure marketing capabilities, they followed Nath et al.’s (2010) approach, 
whereby sales were used as an output measure of marketing activity, while marketing 
resources were measured by the following three inputs: stock of marketing expenditure, 
intangible resources and relationship expenditure. Their results suggest that marketing 
capabilities have a significant positive effect on operational capability, consequently 
improving efficiency in the financial sector. 
While the above studies looked at firms based in developed markets, Wu (2013) looked at 
19,653 firms spread across 73 emerging economies to examine the effect of the firms’ 
marketing capabilities on their performance. The geographic breadth of the sample enabled 
the author to shed light on the overall effect of marketing capabilities on firm performance in 
emerging economies. In the study, marketing capabilities were proxied by an indicator that 
averaged the following three items: the number of months the firm took to plan its product 
mix and target markets; the number of months it took for the firm to allocate the necessary 
human resources; and the number of months in which the investment was made. Although the 
proxy for marketing capabilities was comprehensive, adopting time measures does not seem 
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ideal, as time might not indicate the true extent of firms’ marketing capabilities. Despite this 
shortcoming, the results suggest that marketing capabilities positively affect firm 
performance. It also appears that marketing capabilities have a stronger effect on firm 
performance in countries with higher levels of economic development, individualistic 
societies and weak legislative systems.  
Also in the developing country context, Lee and Rugman (2012) analysed the impact of 
firms’ specific advantages on performance by looking at a sample of 150 Korean 
multinational enterprises for the year 2004. The firm-specific advantages considered were 
innovation capabilities measured by R&D, and marketing capabilities measured by selling, 
general and administrative expenses. Specifically, a firm’s marketing capabilities were 
measured as the total amount of selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by the 
number of employees. The extent of the relationships was examined using a two-stage 
feasible generalised least square regression model. The results suggest that both marketing 
and innovation capabilities affect the performance of firms in a non-linear, U-shaped manner. 
Moreover, it seems that Korean firms can exploit their firm-specific advantages when they 
attract FDI from the Asian Pacific region, enabling them to strengthen these advantages.  
The empirical results from research at firm level seem to suggest that marketing capabilities 
positively affect a firm’s performance. However, the studies have not considered the impact 
of marketing capabilities on any specific productivity measure. Despite this, the relationship 
between marketing capabilities and productivity is expected to be negative. 
2.4.11. Other Studies 
This section differs from the previous sections in that it covers different determinants rather a 
single specific determinant. Since significant research on these determinants has not been 
done for Chinese firms, they are discussed together in this section. 
Chen and Guariglia (2013) looked at the relationship between Chinese firms’ financial factors 
and productivity. In particular, they analysed the link between the availability of internal 
finance and productivity by examining this relationship from different perspectives: 
ownership, liquidity level and involvement in exporting. Firms in the sample belonged to the 
manufacturing sector, according to annual accounting reports filed with the National Bureau 
of Statistics during the period of 2001-2007. The sample included 130,840 SOEs and non-
SOEs from 31 provinces, and which had at least RMB 5mn sales. The empirical analysis of 
TFP was conducted using the SYS-GMM approach. The results show that the firms’ TFP was 
positively affected by their cash flow, suggesting that the firms were financially constrained 
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and mainly relied on internal funds. In terms of ownership, private and foreign-owned firms’ 
TFP was positively affected by their cash flow, while SOEs’ TFP was not, suggesting that 
only the first two categories of firms were financially constrained. For both private and 
foreign firms, the effect was found to be worse for those firms characterized by negative 
liquidity. This suggests that firms use their liquidity in order to pursue productivity-
enhancing activities when there are fluctuations in their internal finance. In terms of 
exporting, foreign-owned firms that did not export had a higher sensitivity of TFP to cash 
flows than those who did, although the difference in sensitivity with private firms was not 
significant.  
Zhang and Liu (2013) examined the relationship between wages and labour productivity in 
the manufacturing sector. This was analysed using a dataset of manufacturing enterprises for 
the period of 1998-2007 taken from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The sample 
covered both SOEs and non-SOEs having sales of more than RMB 5mn. Therefore, the 
sample was the same as used by Chen and Guariglia (2013). Two labour productivity 
variables were used as measures of performance. The main difference with the previous 
studies in the area was the use of productivity as an independent variable, while previous 
ones used it as a dependent variable. The results suggest a positive correlation between wages 
and labour productivity, although this effect decreases over time.  
This section has reviewed studies on different determinants of productivity. For each 
determinant, significant research at the firm level for the Chinese context is still lacking. 
Thus, further evidence is needed to confirm the extent of the relationship of the main 
determinants discussed (liquidity and wages) with productivity. The studies discussed in the 
following section consider multiple determinants of productivity. 
2.4.12. Studies Analysing Multiple Determinants 
The studies discussed in the previous sections focused on analyzing how firm-level 
productivity was affected by one or a few determinants. Although they provide a valuable 
insight, they suffer from one major limitation. Productivity has many more determinants that 
interact together and generate synergies. Ignoring the other important determinants of 
productivity would generate biased estimates of the production function and of productivity. 
Moreover, productivity-enhancing actions undertaken by a firm according to such results are 
likely to be limited. A few studies have addressed this issue by considering multiple 
determinants of productivity. A firm can implement better TFP-enhancing decisions by 
considering a wider range of potential factors determining TFP. Only four studies have 
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analysed TFP at the firm level in China by considering multiple determinants. These studies 
differ in terms of their estimation methodologies, the samples adopted, and the determinants 
analysed.  
For example, Yao et al. (2007) considered the following determinants of TFP: size, 
ownership, direct sales, and human capital. In order to calculate the efficiency scores of 
firms, they adopted a Data Envelopment Analysis approach. TFP growth was subsequently 
measured using the Malmquist index, while a Tobit regression was adopted to estimate the 
effects of TFP determinants. The sample size was small, comprising a panel of only 22 firms 
belonging to the insurance industry during the period of 1999-2004. Despite the small sample 
size, the empirical results suggest that size, direct sales and human capital have a positive 
effect on firms’ productivity. Interestingly, in contrast to what has been suggested by 
previous studies regarding ownership, State-owned firms showed better performance than 
non-State-owned ones. The authors suggest that such performance is the result of the 
dominance of State-owned enterprises within the industry, as the firms are backed by the 
government, and by the characteristics of the industry itself, in which customers emphasize 
brand name, trust and reliability.  
Li et al. (2010) looked at effect of the following institutional factors on firms’ productivity: 
regional differences in commercialisation and the existence of market segmentation. They 
also considered the following determinants of productivity: exporting, R&D, interest 
payments, age, size, management level, and ownership. Moreover, they analysed the 
relationship between TFP, exporting, financing and innovation. This study was conducted 
using a sample of 647,987 firms belonging to 30 industries over the period of 1999-2007. 
This data was taken from the Chinese NBS, and included medium and large-sized firms 
having at least RMB 5mn in sales. Although the sample seems to be representative of the 
Chinese industrial sector, it would have been better to also consider smaller firms, as this 
would have provided additional insight into the determinants of small firms’ TFP. In the 
study, TFP was estimated using a translog production function and the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) semi-parametric approach. The results suggest that firms based in regions 
characterized by a faster commercialisation process record higher productivity. On the other 
hand, firms based in more segmented regions tended to record lower productivity. Overall, 
the results of the study indicate that regional imbalances and differences in commercialisation 
and market segmentation have different effects on productivity.  
Brandt et al. (2012) analysed TFP growth for a panel of firms representing 90% of Chinese 
manufacturing output during the period spanning 1998-2007. The number of firms studied 
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ranged from 148,685 in 1998 to 313,048 in 2007. The dataset was obtained from the National 
Bureau of Statistics, and included SOEs and non-SOEs having sales above RMB 5mn. In 
comparison with other studies using the same dataset, the analysis also included industry 
deflators, industry agreements and programmes to match firms over time and capital stock 
series. In the estimation, productivity growth was measured using the Tornqvist index 
number. Productivity levels were measured using a Caves’ index, which allows the 
comparison of a firm’s productivity to the industry average. In order to confirm the 
robustness of their results, the authors also estimated productivity using the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) approaches. According to the estimation results, TFP 
growth was 2.85% on average when a gross output production function was utilized, and 
7.96% when a value added production function was utilized. In comparison with the previous 
studies, productivity growth was decomposed following the methodology developed by 
Foster et al. (2001), enabling an understanding of the extent to which TFP growth is 
determined by “within-firm” productivity growth, “between-firm” productivity growth, the 
entrance of relatively high productive firms or the exit of low productive ones. The empirical 
results indicate that the entry of relatively high productive firms contributed to two-thirds of 
the productivity growth in the Chinese industrial sector during the period. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the growth of value added in the Chinese industrial sector was largely 
due to improvements in existing firms and the entry of relatively high productive firms. 
Despite providing valuable findings, the methodologies adopted by Brandt et al. (2012) did 
not allow for fixed effects, and did not include the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 of TFP determinants, making 
them unable to explain what determines TFP levels.  
While the above two studies analysed TFP across a wide range of industries, Shen and Song 
(2013) focused only on the iron and steel industry during the period of 1998-2007. In the 
study, the following determinants of TFP were considered: capital intensity, the share of total 
revenues generated by new products, the market share within the iron and steel industry, the 
Herfindahl index of industrial concentration, firm scale, a marketization index, and the share 
of exports in total revenue. While the sample source was the same as in previous studies, its 
size was considerably smaller, with the number of firms ranging from 1,654 in 1998 to 4,929 
in 2007. In order to estimate TFP, the authors adopted the one-step Wooldridge (2009) GMM 
method and tested the robustness of their results using the Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2007) methodologies. Their results showed that TFP 
increased during the period analysed and was positively affected by R&D investment, firm 
size, market share and marketization reform. On the other hand, TFP was negatively affected 
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by market monopoly power and capital intensity. Moreover, determinants of productivity 
varied across firms having different characteristics, such as size, ownership and location. It 
seems that, for small firms, productivity is positively affected by market share, while R&D 
negatively affects it. In contrast, for large SOEs, productivity is not sensitive to market share 
or R&D. For large private firms, productivity is determined by their intensity of export 
activities, measured as the share of exports in total revenue. 
This section has reviewed firm-level productivity studies, which, compared to those 
presented in the previous sections, consider the effect of multiple determinants on TFP rather 
than focusing on only one determinant. This approach is important because TFP is 
determined jointly by a combination of factors rather than just one. By interacting with one 
another, these factors are likely to generate a different effect on productivity than when they 
are considered individually. For this reason, these studies provide better insight into the 
potential determinants of productivity at the firm level. The next section discusses how the 
study conducted in this thesis differs from the previous ones, and how it contributes to the 
existing literature. 
2.4.13. The Contribution of this Study 
The study conducted for this thesis belongs to the literature analysing TFP and its 
determinants in China at the firm level. Previous studies in this area differ from one another 
in terms of their aims, estimation methodologies, datasets, determinants and the time periods 
considered. There are four important studies that analyse Chinese TFP at the firm level (Yao 
et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010; Brandt et al., 2012; Shen and Song, 2013). The study conducted 
for this thesis differs from them in four respects.  
The first distinction is the use of a more comprehensive set of determinants of TFP in the 
estimation, providing a better and broader understanding of the potential determinants of total 
factor productivity in China. Such determinants are included in the estimation of TFP because 
their omission would produce biased estimates of the production function, and hence biased 
estimates of TFP. The choice of determinants is also motivated by the empirical results from 
the literature and the information available in the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) dataset from which the sample used in this study has been sourced. Thus, although the 
previous studies have provided valuable insights, the current study has extended the set of 
TFP determinants studied to include the following: political affiliation, ownership structure, 
engagement in exporting, extent of competition, Marshallian (or MAR) spillovers, Jacobian 
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(or Jacob) spillovers, city spillovers, liquidity, age, R&D expenditure, time trend, and 
marketing capabilities.  
The second major distinction from the studies reviewed above is the analysis of a wider set of 
26 industries. In this study, the sample is taken from the yearly accounting reports filed by 
industrial firms to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Such a sample considers all 
industrial medium- and large-sized firms, both State-owned and non-State-owned, having 
annual sales above RMB 5mn. These belong to the entire manufacturing and mining sectors 
and are located in 31 provinces or municipalities. The estimation of TFP determinants across 
a wide range of industries allows the accounting for differences in technology, thus avoiding 
the assumption that firms operate using a standard technology shared across all industries. 
While most previous studies have used the Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) methodologies to analyse the determinants of TFP at the firm-level in China, this 
study adopts SYS-GMM, an approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998), and subsequently applied in a production function by Blundell and Bond 
(2000). SYS-GMM is a system of estimated equations, comprising an equation in first-
differences, instrumented by its lagged levels, and an equation in levels, instrumented by its 
lagged first-differences. The major advantage of this methodology, compared to the widely 
used semiparametric approaches, is the allowance for firms’ fixed effects. As previous studies 
have indicated that firms have unmeasured productivity advantages that remain constant over 
time and that need to be captured, the SYS-GMM approach enables the consideration of such 
fixed effects. Moreover, SYS-GMM has the advantage of addressing the endogeneity of the 
right-hand-side variables (including the lagged dependent variable) as well as selection bias 
by using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments in the first differences 
equation, and first-differences of the same variables as instruments in the levels equation 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). SYS-GMM is particularly preferable to the semiparametric 
methodologies of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), as these do not 
allow for fixed effects and are based on strong and unintuitive assumptions, which generate 
collinearity problems in the first stage of estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2006). Van 
Biesebroeck (2007) compared the sensitivity of five different productivity estimators (index 
numbers, data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontiers, GMM, and semi-parametric 
estimation) using a Monte-Carlo simulation. Although each method has its own advantages 
and disadvantages, the system GMM estimator was found to be the most robust technique in 
presence of measurement errors and technological heterogeneity.  
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The fourth major distinction from most of the previously mentioned studies is the 
decomposition of TFP growth using the approach developed by Haltiwanger (1997). These 
methods separate TFP growth into the contribution provided by the following: a within-firm 
component representing the impact of the resource reallocation within existing firms, 
according to their initial shares of output in their related industries; a between-firm 
component indicating a change in the output share of firms, weighted by the deviation of the 
firm’s initial productivity from the initial industry index; a covariance component, measuring 
whether a firm’s increasing productivity corresponds to an increasing market share; an 
entering component indicating the contribution of entrant firms to their related industry’s TFP 
growth, measured with respect to the initial industry index; an exiting component indicating 
the contribution of exiting firms to their related industry’s TFP, measured with respect to the 
initial industry index. In order to gain an additional understanding into the determinants of 
TFP growth, this decomposition is also performed at the industry, province and political 
affiliation/ownership levels. Since Melitz and Polanec (2012) have found this decomposition 
to be characterized by biases, their approach is also adopted in order to understand which set 
of results is the most appropriate. 
In summary, most of the existing studies on this topic do not use multiple covariates in their 
models to explain what determines TFP in China, do not include firm-level fixed effects, do 
not cover the broad range of industries studied in the present paper, and do not decompose 
TFP growth. Therefore, this study builds on the existing literature by taking these four issues 
into account, thus distinguishing this study from previous studies on firm-level TFP 
estimation in China and contributing to the literature in that way. Overall, this study aims to 
understand what has determined TFP levels and growth rates across Chinese firms during the 
period of 1998-2007, and how total TFP growth has differed across firms belonging to 
different industries, based in different provinces, and characterised by different combinations 
of ownership structures and political affiliations. The results can be used to infer potential 
microeconomic productivity-enhancing reforms targeting the most relevant determinants of 
TFP.  
3. An Analysis of the Determinants of TFP Levels  
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis. Chapter 2 discussed TFP, its importance, its measurement 
and its determinants. It also reviewed the existing studies on Chinese firm-level TFP and 
proposed the contribution provided by the current study. This chapter analyses what 
determines TFP levels across Chinese industrial firms. 
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Section 3.1 describes the dataset adopted, while Section 3.2 describes the SYS-GMM 
estimator. Section 3.3 introduces the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Section 3.4 
describes the variables adopted, the related descriptive statistics and the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3.5 presents the results of the SYS-GMM estimation. In order to check which 
set of results is the most valid, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semiparametric estimation is 
also applied, and its results are discussed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 analyses the relative 
importance of the determinants of TFP levels. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
are discussed in Section 3.8. 
3.1. Dataset 
The dataset adopted in this study is taken from the yearly accounting reports filed by 
industrial firms with the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. In this dataset, the unit 
observed is the firm, which is defined as a legal unit and identified by a unique ID. Brandt et 
al. (2012) point out that large Chinese firms might include many subsidiaries that would be 
represented as additional firms if they were registered as legal units. Moreover, a firm 
receives a new ID any time it changes its legal registration, for example, after a restructuring, 
merger or acquisition. In order to address this issue, Brandt et al. developed an algorithm that 
makes possible to match firms’ IDs over time using both their code and other identifying 
information. The same algorithm is adopted in this study and is available online.
1
 Where 
possible, Brandt et al. (2012) tracked firms using other types of information, such as their 
name, industry and address. 95.9% of firms’ matches were performed using their IDs, while 
4.1% using other identifying information. The sample adopted in the current study includes 
both State-owned firms and non-State-owned firms with at least RMB 5mn in annual sales. 
The firms are located in 31 provinces, or province-equivalent municipal cities, and belong to 
the mining, manufacturing and public utilities sectors. The related industries are classified 
according to two-digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) codes. A firm’s membership in 
an industry is defined according to the sales generated by its major product. The industries 
are the following: Other Mining (SIC10+80), Food Production (SIC14), Tobacco (SIC16), 
Textile (SIC17), Apparel & Footwear (SIC18), Leather (SIC19), Timber (SIC20), Furniture 
(SIC21), Papermaking (SIC22), Printing (SIC23), Cultural (SIC24), Petroleum Processing 
(SIC25+70), Chemical (SIC26+28), Medical (SIC27), Rubber (SIC29), Plastic (SIC30), Non-
metal Products (SIC31), Metal Products (SIC32+33+34), Machinery & Equipment 
                                                          
1
 The complementary information needed to use the NBS dataset developed by Brandt et al. (2012) can be 
downloaded from the following link: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/  
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(SIC35+36), Transport Equipment (SIC37), Measuring Instruments (SIC41), Other 
Manufacturing (SIC42+43), Electronic Power (SIC44), Gas Production (SIC45), Water 
Production (SIC46) and Coal Mining (SIC60). 
Since the National Bureau of Statistics dataset does not consider firms having annual sales 
lower than RMB 5mn, 80% of industrial firms are excluded from the sample. Despite this 
exclusion, Brandt et al. (2012) found that by using the full census of firms periodically 
carried out in China, the omitted firms only accounted for about 9.9% of output and 2.5% of 
exports. In addition, Brandt et al.’s (2012) comparison between the 1995 National Bureau of 
Statistics dataset and the 2004 census indicate that the former has similar coverage, which 
enabled them to argue that the exclusion of small firms with annual sales lower than RMB 
5mn in the NBS dataset did not generate systematic bias in their estimates. 
The unbalanced sample adopted in this study comprises 2,183,709 firm-year observations, 
which correspond to a wide number of firms, ranging from 148,474 in 1998 to 331,453 in 
2007. The sample’s structure can be seen in Table A of the appendix. Only 5.4% of firms, 
corresponding to 14.8% of firm-year observations, are included in the accounting information 
for the entire sample period. 14% of firms, corresponding to 16.7% of firm-year observations, 
have data for one to two years before exiting from the sample. Brandt et al. (2012) suggest 
that this is due to ownership restructuring caused by the economic reforms implemented 
during the 1990s. Some firms also do not have information on variables used to calculate 
TFP. According to Brandt et al. (2012), this is because the information was not originally 
reported, or because variables such as real capital stock or value added have negative values. 
Moreover, firms with less than eight employees are not considered because they fall into a 
different legal regime. This implies that 17% of the original number of firms is removed from 
the sample in 1998, and the ratio falls by 6% each year after 2001. 
3.2. System-GMM Estimation 
Total factor productivity is the level of output that is not attributable to the level of factor 
inputs, and is thus measured as a residual. Section 2.3 discussed the estimation of TFP 
through different approaches: ordinary least squares, fixed effects, instrumental variables, 
GMM and system-GMM, and the semiparametric methods developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  
Each of these approaches adopts different statistical analyses and is based on different 
assumptions. Moreover, each is appropriate under specific circumstances. Van Beveren 
(2012) compared the following estimators: fixed effects, instrumental variables and SYS-
 100 
GMM, and the semiparametric methods of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003). These were evaluated under the existence of the following estimation issues: 
endogeneity of inputs, omitted variable bias, sample selection bias, and multiple-output 
producing firms. Based on the results obtained, Van Beveren (2012) argues that the choice of 
a specific TFP estimator should be based on the data utilised and the related assumptions 
imposed.  
The estimation approach adopted in this study is the SYS-GMM. Roodman (2006) suggests 
that this estimator is designed for panel data analyses, such as the one conducted in this study, 
having the following characteristics: 
- A relatively short time period and many units considered. In this study, the time 
period spans 1998-2007 and the sample ranges from 148,474 firms in 1998 to 331,453 
in 2007. 
- A linear functional relationship. In the production function adopted in this study, there 
is a functional relationship between outputs produced, factor inputs adopted, and TFP.  
- A left-hand side variable dependent on its own past realisations. In this study, this is 
the case for firm output, since decision makers are likely to choose each year’s output 
according to the previous year’s output. 
- Independent variables that are not strictly exogenous. This indicates that independent 
variables can be correlated with the past and possibly current realisations of the error. 
In this study, output, employment, capital, intermediate inputs, the R&D dummy and 
the exporting dummy are treated as endogenous, since firm managers are likely to 
make decisions according to both the past and current realisations of the error, in this 
case TFP. Because it seems that causality runs in both directions, from endogenous 
variables to productivity and vice versa, the independent variables might be correlated 
with the error term, represented by TFP. 
- Fixed individual time-invariant effects, also known as fixed effects. Such a 
consideration in this study is based on the findings of Baily (1992), Bartelsman and 
Dhrymes (1998), Haskel (2000) and Martin (2008), who demonstrated that firms are 
heterogeneous in terms of productivity and tend to spend long periods of time in the 
same area of the productivity distribution. This suggests that firms tend to have fixed 
characteristics that do not change significantly over time. As explained earlier, 
productivity is likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables, potentially 
generating biased and inconsistent estimates.  
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- Idiosyncratic errors, except for fixed effects, that are characterised by 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms but not across them. In this study, 
productivity shocks represented by 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially correlated, and relative factor 
inputs are likely to respond to these shocks. 
 
In this study, TFP is measured through a log-linear Cobb-Douglas firm production function, 
which includes fixed effects: 
 
                                𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (47) 
 
Here, y, e, m and k are the natural logarithms of real gross output, employment, intermediate 
inputs and the capital stock, respectively, for each firm i at time t (whereby 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇). 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector that includes all the variables determining TFP: 
political affiliation, ownership, exporting, competition, Marshallian spillovers, Jacobian 
Spillovers, city spillovers, liquidity, age, R&D and marketing capabilities. All of these 
variables are included in the model because the empirical results from the literature indicate 
that they either positively or negatively affect TFP. Although some of these variables might 
be correlated, not including them would generate the issue of omitted variable bias, which 
results in biased and inconsistent estimates. In equation (47), 𝑡 is a time trend representing 
exogenous gains in TFP over time. 𝛼𝑖 is a time-invariable, unobserved, firm-specific fixed-
effect, and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an observation-specific error term. 
Measuring TFP requires the adoption of price deflators for both inputs and outputs. Since 
deflators at the firm level are not available in the dataset adopted, industry deflators are taken 
from various Chinese statistical yearbooks, while the investment, or capital stock, deflator is 
adopted from Brandt et al. (2012). The deflator is built through a procedure that converts the 
estimates at original purchase prices into real values that are comparable across both time and 
firms.  
Once TFP is estimated according to equation (47) for each industry, the elasticity of output 
with respect to each of the three inputs (employment, intermediate inputs and capital stock) is 
obtained. This enables the measurement of TFP as a residual, or the level of output that is not 
attributable to the level of factor inputs: 
 
                    𝑙𝑛𝑇?̂?𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐸𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑀𝑚𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝐾𝑘𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?𝑡                 (48) 
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In measuring TFP as a residual, the above approach should be the preferred one. Harris and 
Moffat (2013) argue that a common mistake in existing TFP studies lies in excluding the 
vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as a regressor when estimating the equation (47) and subsequently using (48) in 
order to measure TFP. In such a case, the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 would become part of the error term 𝜀?̂?𝑡. 
TFP tends to be subsequently regressed on the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in order to obtain the determinants 
through a two-stage estimation. Since 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is initially omitted, this would cause estimates to be 
biased, generating an “omitted-variable” bias. This is the reason why the former approach for 
measuring TFP is preferred to the latter. 
The initial equation (47) is estimated through SYS-GMM. In comparison with other 
approaches, SYS-GMM allows for the presence of fixed effects. Moreover, SYS-GMM 
addresses the endogeneity and selection bias issues by using lagged first-differences as 
instruments for the equation in levels, in addition to lagged levels as instruments for the 
equation in first-differences
2
. The use of additional instruments enables the efficiency of the 
estimation to be increased. Moreover, SYS-GMM allows for both endogenous regressors and 
a first-order autoregressive error term, and also provides results for three additional 
diagnostic tests: the Hansen test regarding the validity of the set of instruments used, and the 
tests for autocorrelation, namely AR(1) and AR(2).  
SYS-GMM exploits more moment conditions than other GMM approaches and can still face 
the issue of weak instruments. This suggests that the parameter estimates and the related 
diagnostic tests are sensitive to the instrument set adopted. An important assumption for the 
validity of SYS-GMM is the joint exogeneity of instruments. The Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are distributed 
independently of the production function and are uncorrelated with the residuals. Thus, a 
strong rejection of the null hypothesis of the test would strongly counter the estimates’ 
validity.  
The Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation has the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation in the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 disturbances. The test for AR(1) in the first differences usually 
rejects the null hypothesis. This is because the ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 is likely to be correlated 
with ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2, as the two equations share the same 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 item. One should pay 
greater attention to the test for AR(2) in the first-differenced residuals 𝜀𝑖𝑡, as this potentially 
detects autocorrelation in levels. This test analyses the relationship between 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 in 
                                                          
2
 A lagged value of the dependent variable is included for SIC30, SIC32 and SIC44. For these industries, the 
short-run coefficients are transformed into long-run coefficients. 
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the ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2in the ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), the presence of 
first-order autocorrelation does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent, while the 
presence of second-order autocorrelation does. 
Since the validity of lagged levels dated 𝑡 − 2 in the first-differenced equations tends to be 
rejected by the Hansen test, lagged levels dated 𝑡 − 3 (and earlier) are used, as these tend to 
be accepted. This is combined with lagged first-differences dated 𝑡 − 2, which are used as 
instruments in the levels equations, and tend to be accepted by the Hansen test. 
In the set of variables adopted in the estimation conducted in this study, year, industry and 
province dummies are included in order to control for year, industry and location effects, 
respectively.  
SYS-GMM is applied using Stata by performing the command xtabond2 developed by 
Roodman (2006).  
In order to check whether the SYS-GMM results are the most appropriate, the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) semiparametric approach is also used to analyse the relationship between TFP 
and its determinants. Its choice is based on its widespread use in previous studies on TFP 
estimation.  
This section has discussed the SYS-GMM estimation approach adopted in this study to 
analyse what determines TFP levels in Chinese industrial firms. The following section 
discusses the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
 
3.3. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test 
This section discusses how the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests of equality of empirical 
cumulative distributions of TFP levels are conducted and the related distributions plotted.  
In the KS test, the calculated two-sample case D-statistic represents the highest horizontal 
distance, or highest difference, between the empirical cumulative distributions of TFP levels, 
representing the two groups compared. In the test, a binary variable with two distinctive 
values is taken. Subsequently, the empirical cumulative distribution of a random variable, in 
this case the natural logarithm of TFP, is compared for the first value of the group variable 
with the empirical cumulative distribution of TFP level for the second value of the group 
variable. Thus, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test D-statistic is based on the maximum horizontal 
deviation between two plotted curves representing the two groups’ empirical cumulative 
distributions of TFP levels.  
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In the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the null hypothesis (H0) states that two groups have the 
same empirical cumulative TFP distributions. The p-value indicates whether the maximum 
horizontal deviation, or gap, between the two empirical cumulative distributions of TFP 
levels is statistically significant. Therefore, a relatively small p-value is preferred to a 
relatively high one, since this would reject the null hypothesis of equality of empirical 
cumulative distributions of TFP levels.  
Calculating a two-sided KS statistic and plotting the related empirical cumulative 
distributions of TFP levels enables to test whether the distribution for one sub-group of firms 
lies to the right of the distribution for another sub-group. In such case, there is first-order 
stochastic dominance between such (random) variables. 
One of the advantages of using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is that it does not 
assume that the analysed data has a specific distribution. Compared to the t-statistic, the value 
of the D-statistic and the related p-value cannot be influenced by scale changes such as 
logged values or reciprocal ones. This means that its results do not differ when the data 
values are transformed. A transformation only modifies the distribution’s frequency, 
represented on the x-axis, while keeping the maximum distance between the two empirical 
cumulative TFP distributions unchanged. Therefore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test focuses 
on the relative distribution of data, and is thus robust to outliers.  
In this section, KS tests are implemented and empirical cumulative distributions of TFP 
levels are plotted for Chinese manufacturing firms according to the following determinants: 
industry, time, political affiliation, paid-in capital ownership, province, R&D expenditure, 
and exporting.  
This section has introduced the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of empirical cumulative 
TFP distributions. The next section describes the variables adopted, the related descriptive 
statistics, and the underlying hypotheses. 
3.4. Variables, Descriptive Statistics and Hypotheses 
In the empirical analysis conducted in this study, different sets of variables are used. Nominal 
variables, except for capital stock, are transformed to enable their comparison over the 
sample period. They are thus expressed in constant year prices by adopting the industry-
specific price deflators developed by Brandt et al. (2012). As part of the production function, 
the following determinants of TFP are included within the vector of variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡: political 
affiliation, ownership, exporting, competition, MAR spillovers, Jacobian spillovers, city 
spillovers, liquidity, age, R&D expenditure, time trend and marketing capabilities. A more 
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detailed motivation for their inclusion, their measurement and the expected effects on 
productivity are discussed in this section.  
3.4.1. Ownership 
Various major firm shareholders might be driven by different motivations, which would be 
reflected in decisions impacting firm performance, and hence TFP. The consideration of 
political affiliation also considers the potential political impact that State influence might 
have on a firm performance through ownership of paid in capital. Forms of ownership other 
than State ownership are likely to be characterised by a relatively low impact of political 
influence arising from an affiliation. This suggests that firms whose major owners differ from 
the State are likely to record higher TFP. In the set of variables comprising vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in 
equation (48), a determinant representing firm ownership structure is included. The National 
Bureau of Statistics database, from which the dataset used in this study is sourced, includes a 
measure of firm ownership based on the fraction of paid-in capital contributed by the 
following owners: the State (p_capstate), collective firms
3
 (p_capcoll), legal entities
4
 or 
corporate investors (p_capcorporate), individual investors (p_capindividual), foreign 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (p_caphkmactai), and all other foreign 
investors excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (p_capforeign). Following 
Ding et al. (2013), investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are separated from other 
foreign investors in order to take into account the “round-tripping” FDI effect described in 
Huang (2003). According to Ding et al. (2013), Huang’s (2003) “Selling China: Foreign 
Direct Investment During the Reform Era” points out that domestic Chinese firms might 
register as foreign entities in nearby regions in order to exploit various benefits, such as tax 
and legal benefits, which are provided by the Chinese government to foreign entities.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the majority of sample firm’s paid-in capital 
over the entire time period is owned by individuals (37.9%). This is followed by 
corporations/legal entities (20.9%), the State (14.5%), collective firms (12.5%), foreigners 
(6.9%) and investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (7.4%). The figures point to a 
decreasing role of the State over the sample period, since the proportion of paid-in capital 
owned diminishes from 33.5% in 1998 to 3.7% in 2007. The same trend occurs for the 
                                                          
3
 Collective firms are typically owned by communities in either urban or rural areas. Those in rural areas are 
also commonly known as township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
4
 Legal entities refer to industrial enterprises, construction and real estate firms, development companies, 
transportation and power companies, security companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and 
funds, banks, technology and research institutions, and so on. 
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proportion of paid-in capital owned by collective firms, which decreases from 28.4% in 1998 
to 4.6% in 2007. In comparison, the trend moves in the opposite direction for 
corporations/legal entities (from 12% in 1998 to 26.9% in 2007), individuals (from 14.2% in 
1998 to 49.4% in 2007), investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (from 6.5% in 1998 
to 7.5% in 2007) and foreigners (from 5.4% in 1998 to 7.9% in 2007). Overall, the figures 
point to a decreasing role of the State in the manufacturing sector, accompanied by an 
increasing role of other forms of owners, including individuals, corporations/legal entities, 
and foreign investors.  
Based on the empirical results of Zhang et al. (2001), Jefferson et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. 
(2003), an increasing share of State-owned paid-in capital is expected to have a negative 
effect on firms’ TFP. At the same time, an increasing share of firms’ paid-in capital owned by 
other investors, such as collective firms, legal entities or corporations, individuals and foreign 
investors, is expected to have a positive impact on firms’ TFP.  
3.4.2. Political Affiliation 
As was discussed in Section 2.4.2, politically connected firms are likely to benefit through 
preferential access to credit, government contracts, regulatory protection, and lower taxation. 
As these benefits would make it easier for a firm to operate, they are likely to result in higher 
TFP. However, there are cases in which political affiliation might not be beneficial to firms’ 
TFP, since a firm’s managers might make decisions that are politically motivated, which 
might negatively affect TFP.  
The vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48) include a determinant representing the extent of a 
firm’s political affiliation. Firms are classified as highly politically affiliated when the 
affiliation is with the central or provincial governments (high_politics); medium politically 
affiliated when the affiliation is with the local government (medium_politics); and not 
politically affiliated when there is no affiliation with any level of government (no_politics). A 
firm’s political affiliation is proxied by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when it 
belongs to one of the previous groups and 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for political affiliation. It is interesting to note that 
during the sample period, 51.6% of firms on average are not politically affiliated. Strikingly, 
only 15.5% of firms were not politically affiliated in 1998, while 75.8% of firms were not 
politically affiliated in 2007. While 71.5% of firms had a political affiliation with local 
governments in 1998, only 21% had such a relationship in 2007. At the same time, only 3.2% 
of firms were affiliated with a central or provincial government in 2007, while 13% were 
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affiliated in 1998. Overall, these figures point to a declining trend in the political affiliation of 
firms. Based on the empirical results of Li et al. (2008) and Du and Girma (2010), a negative 
relationship between high_politics and firms’ TFP is expected. Moreover, a positive 
relationship between no_politics and firms’ TFP is expected. 
3.4.3. Exporting 
A variable representing a firm’s exporting activity is included in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in 
equation (48). This variable captures the “learning by exporting” effect discussed in Section 
2.4.8. By exporting, a firm is expected to become more productive since it faces a larger 
number of competitors, which will push it to undertake TFP-enhancing measures. Moreover, 
the firm is also likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP from the commercial interactions that 
exporting entails. Such interactions include contact with foreign economic agents, learning 
from customer feedback, and observing competitors’ innovative technologies, products and 
working practices.  
In order to measure the effect of exporting on TFP, a firm’s exporting status is proxied by a 
dummy variable (no_exporter). This takes the value of 1 when a firm does not export abroad 
and 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the two exporting variables used as determinants 
of exporting. Interestingly, it seems that the share of non-exporting firms does not change 
significantly over the years, as it was 78.4% in 1998 and 76.3% in 2007. Based on the 
empirical results obtained by Sun and Hong (2011) and Du et al. (2012b), no_exporter is 
expected to have a negative effect on firms’ TFP, which would suggest that Chinese firms are 
likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP from exporting. 
3.4.4. Competition 
Section 2.4.5 discussed how competition can positively affect productivity. This is because 
by facing an increasing number of competitors, managers are incentivised not just to increase 
their efforts but also to innovate, hence increasing firms’ TFP.  
The vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48) includes a variable representing the extent of 
competition faced by the firm within its industry. In this study, the extent of competition is 
proxied by the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl index (lherf). This measures the extent of 
industrial concentration by the two-digit industry Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
Since it is important to look at the percentage change in competition resulting in a change in 
productivity, or elasticity between the two variables, the natural logarithm is applied to the 
value of the index. Based on the empirical results discussed in Section 2.4.2, lherf is expected 
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to have a negative coefficient, meaning that a higher extent of industrial concentration is 
expected to have a negative impact on firms’ TFP.  
The descriptive statistics for the Herfindahl index presented in Table 1 show that industrial 
concentration diminishes over the sample period, pointing to increased competition in the 
market. This is suggested by the decrease in the Herfindahl index from 0.004 in 1998 to 
0.002 in 2007. Overall, markets do not seem to be concentrated, since the average Herfindahl 
index during the period of 1998-2007 is 0.003. Based on the empirical results obtained by 
Zhang et al. (2001) and Lin et al. (2009) in the literature for Chinese firms, lherf is expected 
to negatively affect firms’ TFP, suggesting that Chinese firms are not likely to benefit from a 
high level of industrial concentrations. In other words, they are likely to benefit from the 
presence of industrial competition. 
3.4.5. Marshallian (or MAR) Spillovers 
The vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48) includes a determinant representing Marshallian 
spillovers (lagglom). This is because, as discussed in Section 2.4.6, Marshallian spillovers 
provide a wide range of benefits to firms arising from being in close proximity to its industry 
peers, and these benefits are likely to result in higher firm TFP levels. Such spillovers can 
manifest through the channels of imitation/demonstration, synergies, commercial 
relationships, asset sharing, and labour pooling. 
In this study, Marshallian spillovers are measured by the percentage share of industry output 
in the province where a firm is based. Since we are looking at the percentage change in MAR 
spillovers resulting in a change in productivity, or the elasticity between the two variables, 
the natural logarithm is applied to their values. 
As seen in Table 1, Marshallian or MAR spillovers increase from 1998 to 2007. This is 
shown by the increase in the percentage of industry output for each province, which was 
7.98% in 1998 and 10.06% in 2007, while having an average of 9.31% over the sample 
period. Based on the empirical results obtained by Lin et al. (2011) and Yang et al. (2013), a 
positive relationship between lagglom and firm TFP is expected. 
3.4.6. Jacobian Spillovers 
In contrast to Marshallian spillovers, Section 2.4.6 discussed how Jacobian spillovers occur 
when plants are located in an area characterised by different industrial activities and benefit 
from the economies of scope this provides. Firms are likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP 
from the industrial diversity because it favours the transmission of innovations across 
different industries.  
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A variable representing Jacobian spillovers, also known as diversification or urbanisation 
externalities, is included in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48). In this study, Jacobian 
spillovers (ldivers) are measured as the natural logarithm of the proportion of three-digit 
industries (maximum 226) located in 208 city areas where the firms are based. Since we are 
looking at the percentage change in Jacobian spillovers resulting in a change in productivity, 
or the elasticity between the two variables, the natural logarithm is applied to their values. 
Jacobian spillovers seem to decrease over the sample period, as seen in the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1. The proportion of three-digit industries located in the city areas where a 
firm is based is, on average, 55.3% over the entire period, decreasing from 66% in 1998 to 
54.6% in 2007. Based on the discussion in this section, ldivers is expected to have a positive 
effect on firms’ TFP, meaning that Chinese firms are expected to benefit in terms of higher 
TFP from being based in areas characterized by industrial diversity. 
3.4.7. City Location Spillovers 
The discussion in Section 2.4.7 suggested that firms are likely to benefit in terms of higher 
TFP by being based in a major city, as this can potentially provide firms with the following 
benefits: high transfer of knowledge among workers and city residents; deeper insight into 
the customer base; availability of a large, skilled labour pool; and high availability of 
business services, such as legal, accounting and financial services. These positive aspects 
conferred by cities are likely to positively impact TFP. Despite this, there are cases in which 
the benefits might be counterbalanced by the high costs of being in a city, including the costs 
of transporting goods and renting or purchasing buildings, and commuting or living in the 
city, which would result in lower TFP. In this study, a dummy variable representing city 
location spillovers is included in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 within the equation (48). City 
location spillovers are proxied by a dummy variable (city200) that is equal to 1 if a firm is 
located in the largest 200 cities according to population size, and 0 otherwise.  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that firms have increasingly located 
themselves within the major Chinese cities. In 2007, 87.4% of firms were based in the top 
200 cities, compared to 27.1% in 1998. Based on the empirical results of Pan and Zhang 
(2002), city200 is expected to have a positive effect on TFP, suggesting that Chinese firms 
are expected to benefit in terms of higher TFP levels by being based in a major city. 
3.4.8. Liquidity 
Following Chen and Guariglia (2013), two variables representing liquidity as a determinant 
of TFP are included in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48). The first variable (lliquid) 
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is the ratio of working capital divided by total assets. This variable is used as an indicator of 
internal sources of finance. This is because if firms are facing difficulties in obtaining 
external financing, they must rely on their own internal funds. Such a situation would 
constrain firms’ ability to pursue productivity-enhancing projects such as R&D expenditures 
and capital investments. Therefore, the higher the availability of internal funds, the more 
likely a firm is to purse productivity-enhancing projects and thus to achieve higher TFP 
levels. 
The second variable (neg_liquid) is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has a 
negative liquidity, and 0 otherwise. It is expressed as the natural logarithm of working 
capital, or the difference between current assets and current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Since we are looking at the percentage change in liquidity resulting in a change in 
productivity, or the elasticity between the two variables, the natural logarithm is applied to 
their values.  Moreover, the constant 1 is added to each firm’s liquidity value, expressed in 
RMB billions, in order to handle related values between 0 and 1 that, if naturally logged, 
would become negative. Hence, adding 1 enables us to obtain positive values from the natural 
logarithm. This variable is adopted because negative liquidity could make it difficult for firms 
to raise external funds, as it increases the cost of bankruptcy. Thus, firms with negative 
liquidity are likely to be more dependent on their cash flow to finance productivity-enhancing 
activities. This suggests that the higher the level of liquidity recorded by firms, the higher 
TFP is expected to be. 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that the share of firms having a negative 
working capital to total assets ratio (neg_liquid) decreases from 51.7% in 1998 to 37.9% in 
2007, while averaging 42.6% during the sample period. At the same time, the ratio of 
working capital to total assets (lliquid) increases from 11.2% in 1998 to 16.2% in 2007. The 
figures suggest that firms have become more liquid over the sample period.  
Based on the empirical results of Chen and Guariglia (2013), neg_liquid is expected to be 
significant and to have a negative effect on TFP, while lliquid is expected to be significant 
and to have a positive effect. 
3.4.9. Age 
As was discussed in Section 2.4.1, a firm is expected to acquire more knowledge and 
therefore become more productive over the years as a product of experience, according to a 
“learning by doing” process. However, as a firm becomes older, it can also become slower to 
adapt its characteristics and strategies to the markets in which it operates and to keep its 
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technology up to date with the industry best practices, likely resulting in lower TFP. In this 
study, a variable representing the age of the firm (lage), measured as the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s age based on its year of inception, is included in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in 
equation (48).  
Since we are looking at the percentage change in age resulting in a change in productivity, or 
the elasticity between the two variables, the natural logarithm is applied to the variables’ 
value.  
As seen in the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the age of the firms in the sample decreases 
over the time period considered. Firm age, calculated according to the year it was founded, is, 
on average, 15 years during the sample period, decreasing from 19 in 1998 to 12 in 2007. The 
figures suggest that new firms might have entered the market, thus reducing the average age 
of firms in the sample. According to the empirical results of Zheng et al. (2003) and Hsieh 
and Klenow (2009), lage is expected to have a negative effect on firms’ TFP. 
3.4.10. R&D Spending as a Source of Knowledge 
Section 2.4.1 discussed how R&D expenditure enables a firm to build up absorptive capacity, 
or the ability to absorb and utilize knowledge for productive purposes. Moreover, it enables a 
firm to undertake both product and process improvements. Those are two channels through 
which R&D expenditure can result in higher firm TFP.  
In the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48), a dummy variable proxying the firm’s R&D 
expenditure is included. The variable takes the value of 1 if the firm has undertaken any R&D 
spending, and 0 otherwise. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that only 10.9% of firms in the sample have 
undertaken R&D expenditure during the sample period, although the share increases from 
9.5% in 1998 to 10.6% in 2007. Based on the discussion in Section 2.4.1 and the empirical 
results of Hu (2001) and Wu et al. (2007), R&D spending is expected to have a positive 
effect on Chinese firms’ TFP.  
3.4.11. Time Trend or Hicks-neutral Technical Change 
It was stressed in Section 2.4.1 that, other than age, intangible assets and R&D, knowledge 
can be represented by a time trend, or a Hicks-neutral technical change. In the vector of 
variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48), a variable representing the time trend or the Hicks-neutral 
technical change (t_trend) is included. This represents the impact on TFP resulting from 
exogenous technological improvements affecting all firms over time. Based on the discussion 
in Section 2.4.1, t_trend is expected to have a positive impact on firms’ TFP. In other words, 
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firms are expected to become more productive over time as a result of Hicks-neutral technical 
change.  
3.4.12. Marketing Capabilities 
Section 2.4.10 argued that marketing capabilities represent a firm’s ability to distinguish its 
products and services from competitors and to build successful brands, enabling the firm to 
charge higher prices and increase its productivity as a result.  
In this study, in the vector of variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (48), a variable representing the firm’s 
marketing capabilities is included. The availability of data does not enable us to construct 
broad measures of marketing capabilities such as those used by Nath et al. (2010) and Yu et 
al. (2014). Therefore, marketing capabilities are proxied by the value of selling and 
distribution costs as a share of sales. The resulting variable (lfc) is similar to the one adopted 
by Lee and Rugman (2012). Since we are looking at the percentage change in marketing 
capabilities resulting in a change in productivity, or the elasticity between the two variables, 
the natural logarithm is applied to their values.  
As shown by the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the firms improve their marketing 
capabilities during the sample period. This is indicated by the decrease in selling and 
distribution costs as a percentage of sales from 5.6% in 1998 to 3.9% in 2007. More efficient 
firms are expected to have a lower ratio of selling and distribution costs as a percentage of 
sales, meaning that they are more able to transform their resources into valuable output, to 
distinguish their products and services from the competition, and to forge successful brands. 
Although there is no empirical evidence for China at the firm level, the discussion and the 
empirical results presented in Section 2.4.11 lead us to expect a negative relationship between 
lfc and firms’ TFP. 
This section has discussed the variables adopted in the empirical analysis of this study, the 
related descriptive statistics, and the underlying hypotheses. The next section discusses the 
results of the SYS-GMM estimation. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in TFP estimation, China 1998-2007 
    1998-2007 1998 2007 
Variable Definition Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
y Sales (billion RMB 2002 prices) 0.074 0.716 0.042 0.386 0.107 1.017 
m Intermediate inputs (billion RMB 2002 prices) 0.050 0.448 0.034 0.241 0.065 0.607 
e Employment  286.482 1331.806 405.083 1891.556 235.527 1149.528 
k Real net tangible fixed assets (billion RMB 2002 prices) 0.031 0.442 0.027 0.275 0.033 0.538 
age Firm age (based on year-of-inception) 15.858 68.807 19.952 85.590 12.141 44.387 
no_politics Proportion of firms with no political affiliation  0.516 0.500 0.155 0.362 0.758 0.428 
med_politics Proportion of firms with medium political affiliation with local governments  0.421 0.494 0.715 0.451 0.210 0.407 
high_politics Proportion of firms with high political affiliation with central or provincial governments  0.063 0.243 0.130 0.336 0.032 0.175 
p_capstate Proportion of paid-in capital owned by the State 0.145 0.341 0.335 0.456 0.037 0.181 
p_capcoll Proportion of paid-in capital owned by collective firms 0.125 0.314 0.284 0.421 0.046 0.200 
p_capcorporate Proportion of paid-in capital owned by corporations/legal entities 0.209 1.179 0.120 0.289 0.269 2.892 
p_capindividual Proportion of paid-in capital owned by individuals 0.379 1.209 0.142 0.318 0.494 2.902 
p_caphkmactai Proportion of paid-in capital owned by HK/Macao/Taiwan 0.074 0.247 0.065 0.223 0.075 0.251 
p_capforeign Proportion of paid-in capital owned by foreigners 0.069 0.235 0.054 0.200 0.079 0.255 
no_exporter Dummy variable for non-exporting firms 0.749 0.434 0.784 0.411 0.763 0.425 
herf Herfindahl index of industrial concentration (by 2-digit SIC) 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.004 
divers % of 3-digit industries (max 226) in city areas where a firm is based (Jacob) 0.553 0.158 0.660 0.198 0.546 0.128 
agglom % of industry output (2-digit SIC) in the province where a firm is based (MAR) 9.307 8.101 7.975 7.513 10.060 8.210 
rd Dummy variable for firm undertaking R&D spending 0.109 0.311 0.095 0.293 0.106 0.307 
lfc Selling & distribution costs as % of sales 4.729 6.588 5.561 8.084 3.924 4.814 
neg_liquid Dummy variable for negative working capital to total assets 0.426 0.494 0.517 0.500 0.379 0.485 
lliquid Ratio of working capital to total assets 0.144 0.195 0.112 0.177 0.162 0.203 
city200 Dummy variable for firm located in top 200 cities according to population size 0.780 0.414 0.271 0.445 0.874 0.331 
N No. of observations 2,183,709 148,474 331,453 
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3.5. Results of the SYS-GMM Estimation 
Table 2 presents the results of the SYS-GMM estimation of the determinants of total factor 
productivity levels for 26 industries. The table also includes the diagnostic tests associated 
with each estimated equation: the Hansen test of the validity of the instrument set used, and 
two Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in differenced residuals (AR(1) and 
AR(2)).  
The results of the test for AR(1) in first differences reject the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation in differenced residuals since there is a negative first-order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals for all models. The results of the test for AR(2) point to the 
existence of second-order serial correlation in first-differenced residuals for most models. 
Despite this issue of autocorrelation, the models pass (at the 5% level or better) the Hansen 
test of over-identification and this provides the basis for treating the models estimated as 
adequate.  
The elasticities of output with respect to labour, intermediate inputs and capital vary across 
industries, but they are positive and significant for most. The results also indicate the 
existence of increasing returns to scale for most industries (18 out of 26), with an average 
sum of output elasticities equal to 1.2, suggesting that firms produce a higher proportion of 
output from a given proportion of inputs utilised.  
The results for the parameter estimates associated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 will be discussed by grouping 
them into variables related to political affiliation/ownership, spatial variables (Marshallian, 
Jacobian and city spillovers), internal and external knowledge variables (age, R&D and time 
trend), and all other variables (exporting, competition, liquidity and marketing capabilities).  
Regarding the political affiliation/ownership variables, for most industries the coefficients for 
the “high level of political affiliation” variable (high_politics) are statistically significant and 
negative, while the coefficients of the “no political affiliation” variable (no_politics) are 
statistically significant and positive. Such is the case for typically competitive industries, such 
as metal and non-metal products, machinery and equipment, and furniture. These results 
suggest that a high level of political affiliation has a negative effect on firm TFP while the 
lack of political affiliation has a positive effect. Consistent with the initial expectations, 
Chinese industrial firms do not seem to benefit in terms of a higher TFP level from a political 
affiliation with the central or provincial governments. This could be because politically 
affiliated firms are unlikely to focus on maximising TFP, but rather on pursuing politically 
motivated objectives. The finding suggests that an increasing role of the markets, and a 
decreasing influence of the government, both central and provincial, on firms’ activities, is 
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conducive to increased firm TFP. These findings are similar to those of Du and Girma 
(2010), who found that politically unaffiliated firms perform better in terms of TFP growth 
than politically affiliated ones. However, in industries typically characterized by a high level 
of industrial concentration, such as gas and water production, a high level of political 
affiliation positively affects TFP. A potential explanation for this finding could be that, in 
sectors with national strategic importance, political affiliation would provide firms with 
benefits such as ease in access to credit, regulatory protection, lower taxation and greater 
market power, resulting in higher TFP. 
The consideration of political affiliation also involves the potential political impact that State 
influence might have on firms’ TFP by being a major shareholder. The results suggest that 
forms of ownership other than the State one are likely to be characterised by a relatively low 
impact of political affiliation. In general, the coefficients for the variable representing the 
proportion of paid-in capital owned by the State (p_capstate) are statistically significant and 
negative, while the coefficients of the variables representing the proportion of paid-in capital 
owned by collective investors (p_capcoll), corporations (p_capcorporate), individuals 
(p_capindividual) and foreigners (p_capforeign) are positive for most industries. As initially 
expected, firms do not seem to benefit in terms of higher TFP from an increasing proportion 
of paid-in capital owned by the State, but rather from an increasing proportion of paid-in 
capital possessed by other types of owners. It can be inferred that decreases in State 
ownership and increases of other forms of ownership in Chinese industrial firms is conducive 
to higher firm TFP. Different types of paid-in capital owners might have different 
motivations for their ownership, which is ultimately reflected in decisions that impact the 
firms’ TFP. Compared to other owners of paid-in capital, the State might be driven by 
political motivations, such as maximising employment, which in some cases might be 
inconsistent with maximising TFP levels. However, the findings are different for the medical, 
electronic power and water production sectors, in which an increasing share of paid-in capital 
owned by private investors is associated with a decrease in TFP, and an increasing share of 
paid-in capital owned by the State is associated with increased TFP. This suggests that in 
strategic or monopolistic sectors, State ownership is conducive to higher TFP. In a large 
number of sectors, Chinese industrial firms seem to positively benefit from a higher 
proportion of paid-in capital owned by foreigners (p_capforeign). In line with the view of 
Hymer (1976), this finding suggests that foreign owners are likely to have more favourable 
characteristics than domestic owners, such as more advanced managerial practices, highly 
innovative technology and better marketing capabilities, which would lead to higher TFP 
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levels. In summary, the findings for the relationship between firms’ TFP levels and 
ownership variables indicate that private forms of ownership are more conducive to higher 
TFP levels than State forms of ownership. These results are similar to those of Zhang et al. 
(2001), Jefferson et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. (2003), who found that State-owned 
enterprises are the least efficient and have achieved the lowest rate of TFP growth. 
Spatial variables are included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in order to measure whether firms benefit in 
terms of higher TFP levels from the spillovers arising from the location where they are based. 
These spatial variables are Marshallian spillovers (lagglom), Jacobian spillovers (ldivers) and 
city spillovers (city200). For 16 out of the 26 industries, the coefficients for the variable 
representing Marshallian spillovers (lagglom) are statistically significant and positive. The 
effects are particularly strong in the non-metal products, other mining and medical industries. 
In line with the arguments of Marshall (1890), the existence of positive Marshallian 
spillovers indicates that firms are likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP levels from the 
externalities arising from being geographically close to industry peers. In such a situation, 
firms are likely to undertake TFP-enhancing actions, such as imitating and adopting ideas 
from other firms, cooperating through sharing assets, pursuing joint R&D projects or 
engaging in joint ventures. Moreover, by being based in the same area, firms are likely to 
develop commercial relationships with suppliers and customers and to enjoy the higher 
availability of an industry-specialised labour pool, enabling them to improve their 
productivity. From these results, it can be inferred that policy measures aimed at increasing 
industrial agglomeration within specific geographical areas are conducive to higher firm TFP. 
These findings are in line with those of Lin et al. (2011) and Yang et al. (2013), who found 
that industrial agglomeration has a significant and positive impact on firms’ TFP.  
The coefficients for the variable representing Jacobian spillovers (ldivers) are statistically 
significant and positive for 23 out of 26 industries. The effects are the strongest in the 
machinery & equipment, other manufacturing, and apparel & footwear industries. These 
results suggest that Chinese industrial firms are likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP from 
the spillovers arising by being located in an area characterised by different industrial 
activities. This is in line with Jacob’s (1970) argument that plants having different knowledge 
and capabilities can complement each others’ skills sets, resulting in mutual benefits, and that 
the industrial and occupational diversity that characterises urban economies favours the 
spillover of innovations across different industries, ultimately resulting in higher TFP. The 
results indicate that policy measures aimed at increasing industrial diversity within specific 
geographical areas are likely to result in higher firm TFP. These findings are similar to those 
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of Liu (2002) and Batisse (2002), who found a positive effect of Jacobian spillovers on firms’ 
TFP.  
While Chinese industrial firms based in geographical areas where they are close to their 
industry peers, or which are characterized by industrial diversity, seem to benefit in terms of 
higher TFP, they do not seem to benefit from being based in the major Chinese cities. This is 
suggested by the statistically significant and negative coefficients for the variable 
representing city spillovers (city200) for 17 out of 26 industries. A city was expected to 
provide several benefits to firms, such as insight into the customer base, the availability of a 
wide labour pool, and plenty of business services, which would have resulted in higher TFP. 
However, in most industries, other aspects of cities probably dominate these, hence 
hampering TFP. For example, as argued by Carlino (1987), the time and cost of transporting 
goods and commuting are likely to be high in cities, as well as both the commercial and 
residential rents, which would result in higher costs and thus lower TFP levels. Based on 
these results, it can be inferred that policy measures aimed at increasing firms’ presence 
within cities are not likely to result in higher TFP. This suggests that it might be better to 
locate firms outside cities, in areas characterised by industrial agglomeration or diversity, 
where firms are more likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP. These results contrast with 
those of Pan and Zhang (2002), who found that firms based in larger cities have higher TFP.  
In order to measure both internal and external knowledge, which a firm can take advantage of 
in order to become more productive, three variables are included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡: a firm’s 
age (lage), an R&D dummy (rd_dum) indicating whether a firm invests in R&D, and a time 
trend (t_trend). Chinese industrial firms are expected to acquire more knowledge and, 
therefore, to become more productive over the years as a product of experience according to a 
“learning by doing” process. However, for most industries, it seems that this is not the case, 
as suggested by the statistically significant and negative coefficients for the age variable in 17 
out of 26 industries. A potential explanation for this negative relationship is that older firms 
are likely to be overtaken by more productive younger firms, which adopt more innovative 
technology, according to what Jensen et al. (2001) describe as the “vintage effect.” Another 
potential explanation is that older firms are slower to adjust to the dynamic environment in 
which they operate than their younger peers, as a result of the “inertia effect” postulated by 
Hannan and Freeman (1984). From these results, it can be inferred that policy measures 
aimed at favouring the entrance of younger and more dynamic firms into their respective 
industries, are likely to result in higher TFP. These results contrast with those of Zheng et al. 
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(2003) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who found a positive effect of firms’ age on their total 
factor productivity.   
In only 6 industries out of 26, the results indicate that productivity improves by undertaking 
R&D expenditures, as indicated by the statistically significant and positive coefficients for 
those industries. This positive finding might be explained by the ability of R&D expenditures 
to positively and directly affect firms’ TFP levels by allowing both product and process 
improvements. In line with the arguments of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), R&D expenditure 
might also have a positive and indirect effect on firms’ TFP levels through the development 
of absorptive capacity, or a firm’s ability to identify, absorb and exploit external knowledge 
for productive purposes. For these 6 industries, the results indicate that policy measures 
aimed at incentivizing firms’ R&D expenditure, for example, via tax cuts or subsidised 
funding, are likely to generate higher firm TFP. However, there is only limited evidence for 
the positive effect of R&D and TFP, hence suggesting that Chinese firms do not make a 
productive use of their R&D expenditure. 
In addition to R&D expenditures and age, knowledge is represented by the time trend, or 
Hicks-neutral technical change. The results indicate that Chinese firms are likely to become 
more productive over time as they are affected by positive exogenous technological 
improvements. This is indicated by the statistically significant and positive coefficients for 
the variable (t_trend) in 24 out of 26 industries. The effect is particularly strong in industries 
such as the non-metal and metal products, and transport equipment, as these tend to be more 
dynamic and closer to the technological frontier.  
In summary, regarding internal and external knowledge variables, Chinese firms in most 
industries seem to benefit from the positive effect on TFP of the time trend, while they tend 
to become less productive as they age. Furthermore, R&D does not seem to result in higher 
firm TFP. 
In addition to ownership/political affiliation, spatial and knowledge variables, other variables 
are included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as potential determinants of TFP in Chinese industrial firms. 
These are variables proxying for firms’ export activity, industrial competition, liquidity and 
marketing capabilities.  
For only 6 out of 26 industries, the results indicate that Chinese firms engaged in export 
activities are likely to be more productive than those not engaged, as suggested by the 
statistically significant and negative coefficients on the variable representing a non-exporting 
firm (no_exporter). A potential explanation for the positive relationship is that, by 
participating in foreign markets in addition to the domestic market, firms are likely to face a 
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larger number of competitors. In order to survive in such a competitive environment, firms 
would need to constantly increase their efficiency and undertake technological 
improvements, both of which are TFP-enhancing measures. Moreover, in line with the 
arguments of Grossman and Helpman (1991), firms are also likely to benefit from the 
commercial interactions that exporting entails, including interacting with foreign economic 
agents, learning from customer feedback, and observing the innovative technologies, 
products and working practices of competitors – all activities that would stimulate firms to 
undertake additional TFP-enhancing actions. However, this view is not supported by the data. 
This could potentially be explained by the “processing trade” argument. According to Wang 
and Yu (2011), between 2000 and 2006, 60% of Chinese exports were in the form of 
“processing trade.” Jarreau and Poncet (2012) argue that exporting is beneficial to firm 
performance only when it is in the form of ordinary exports and not in the form of 
“processing trade.” The empirical results of Dai et al. (2011) indicate that Chinese firms that 
only engage in processing trade are 4% to 30% less productive than non-exporters. When 
processing exporters are removed from the sample, Dai et al.’s (2011) findings indicate that 
exporters record higher productivity than non-exporters. From these results, it can be inferred 
that policy measures supporting firms’ export activities, such as tax incentives, government 
subsidies, or the provision of market intelligence, are likely to be successful only when firms 
are not processing exporters.  
For 14 out of 26 industries, the statistically significant and negative coefficients for the 
variable representing the Herfindahl index of industrial concentration (lherf) indicate that the 
higher an industry’s concentration is, the lower the related firms’ TFP. This effect is the 
strongest in the petroleum processing, coal mining and medical industries. For these 
industries, the findings indicate that policy measures aimed at increasing the level of 
industrial competition can augment firms’ TFP levels. These results are in line with the view 
of Nickell (1996), who suggests that by facing an increasing number of competitors in their 
industries, firms might be more inclined to undertake measures aimed at improving their TFP 
in order to survive. Moreover, a higher level of competition is also likely to reduce monopoly 
rents, which would result in increased managerial efforts. Competition can also lower the 
wages within an industry, thus reducing the cost of labour and improving firms’ TFP. 
However, in this study, a higher level of competition does not result in higher firm TFP for 9 
industries. The negative effect of competition on TFP is especially strong for the cultural, 
textile and gas production industries. This might be explained by Hermalin’s (1992) 
argument that increased competition is likely to diminish a firm’s profits and managers’ 
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income, resulting in reduced managerial effort and lower TFP. In general, for the majority of 
industries, the findings are similar to those of Zhang et al. (2001), who found a negative 
effect of industrial concentration on firms’ productivity, although that analysis was limited to 
firms based in Shanghai. The findings are also similar to those of Lin et al. (2009), who found 
that industrial concentration negatively affects firms’ productivity, although that study 
adopted a smaller sample over a shorter time period. 
Among the variables included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 as potential determinants of TFP in Chinese 
industrial firms, two variables measure firms’ liquidity. The first variable is the negative 
working capital to total assets dummy (neg_liquid), for which the coefficients are statistically 
significant and negative for all industries, except for tobacco and coal mining. The effect is 
particularly strong for the metal products, non-metal products and measuring instruments 
industries. The second variable is the natural logarithm of the working capital to total assets 
ratio (lliquid), for which the coefficients are statistically significant and positive for all 
industries, except for electronic power. The effect is the strongest for the non-metal products, 
metal products and tobacco industries. These results indicate that firms with a higher level of 
liquidity tend to record higher TFP. In line with the arguments of Chen and Guariglia (2013), 
when firms experience difficulties in raising external funds, they must rely on internal funds. 
Such funds might be vital for pursuing productivity-enhancing projects. Hence, the 
availability of liquid internal assets is likely to improve the firms’ capacity to obtain cash on 
short notice to be used to finance highly productive investments. Moreover, liquidity might 
also be used to finance activities such as product and process improvements, which are likely 
to cause a shift in firms’ efficiency frontier, or best practice technology, resulting in higher 
TFP. From these findings, it can be inferred that policy measures aimed at facilitating 
Chinese firms’ access to external sources of liquidity, would enable them to pursue 
investments and improve their productivity. The results are consistent with those of Chen and 
Guariglia (2013), who found that Chinese firms’ TFP is positively and significantly affected 
by the availability of internal liquid assets.  
The statistically significant and negative coefficients for the variable representing firms’ 
marketing capabilities (lfc) in 23 out of 26 industries suggest that firms with lower selling and 
distribution costs as a percentage of sales tend to be more productive. A potential explanation 
for this finding might be that such firms are more able to transform their resources into 
valuable output, to distinguish their products from competitors, and to build brands that allow 
them to charge higher prices, all of which would lead to higher TFP levels. These results are 
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in line with those of Morgan et al. (2009), Nath et al. (2010), Lee and Rugman (2012) and Yu 
et al. (2014).  
In summary, although the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests point to the issue of 
autocorrelation, the SYS-GMM results indicate that the estimates obtained are economically 
sensible since they pass the Hansen test, pointing to the validity of the instrument set adopted, 
and providing the basis for treating the models estimated as adequate. The elasticity of output 
with respect to labour, intermediate inputs and capital vary across industries, but are positive 
and significant for most. The results also indicate the existence of increasing returns to scale, 
suggesting that firms produce a higher proportion of output from a given proportion of inputs. 
In addition, these indicate that the inclusion of multiple determinants of TFP in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
does not generate a multicollinearity issue, since there are not insignificant small parameters 
estimates and not large standard errors. The SYS-GMM results suggest that Chinese 
industrial firms tend to benefit in terms of higher TFP levels from a lack of political 
affiliation, an increasing proportion of paid-in capital owned by shareholders other than the 
State, the presence of Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers, age, time trend, industrial 
competition, the availability of internal liquid assets and marketing capabilities. Policy 
measures aimed at targeting positive determinants of TFP are likely to result in higher TFP 
levels across Chinese industrial firms. 
Following the above discussion of the results of the SYS-GMM estimation, the next section 
will review the results from the estimation done using the semiparametric approach of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
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Table 2: Two-step System-GMM Production Function, Various Industries, China 1998-2007 
 
Dependent variable:  
Other 
Mining 
Food 
Production Tobacco Textile 
Apparel & 
Footwear Leather 
 ln sales (SIC10+80) (SIC14) (SIC16) (SIC17) (SIC18) (SIC19) 
lr_input 0.308*** 0.366** 0.386*** 0.853*** 0.653*** 0.763*** 
  (0.074) (0.157) (0.082) (0.019) (0.049) (0.058) 
Lemp 0.505*** 0.311* 0.613** 0.153*** 0.294*** 0.095* 
  (0.064) (0.174) (0.287) (0.033) (0.041) (0.053) 
lr_capital 0.225*** 0.357* 0.387** 0.037** 0.085** 0.143* 
  (0.065) (0.196) (0.161) (0.019) (0.038) (0.073) 
t_trend 0.067*** 0.040*** 0.042*** -0.020*** 0.045*** 0.024*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
lage -0.014 -0.011 -0.045 -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.034* 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.082) (0.006) (0.008) (0.019) 
no_politics 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.184* 0.036*** 0.016*** -0.002 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.097) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
high_politics -0.233*** 0.017 -0.072 0.016 0.023 -0.105 
  (0.050) (0.029) (0.159) (0.015) (0.025) (0.065) 
p_capstate -0.361*** -0.119*** 0.429 -0.101*** -0.097*** -0.282*** 
  (0.086) (0.040) (0.389) (0.015) (0.027) (0.081) 
p_capcoll 0.131* 0.066 0.561 0.050*** 0.024* 0.004 
  (0.074) (0.047) (0.399) (0.011) (0.014) (0.037) 
p_capcorporate 0.002 0.035 0.391 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.002 
  (0.058) (0.036) (0.396) (0.008) (0.013) (0.034) 
p_capindividual 0.014 0.052 0.814* 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.020 
  (0.062) (0.045) (0.436) (0.010) (0.016) (0.041) 
p_capforeign -0.056 -0.031 0.015 0.029*** 0.012* 0.008 
  (0.062) (0.035) (0.528) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
no_exporter -0.268 -0.003 -0.310* -0.014*** -0.018** 0.053 
  (0.243) (0.015) (0.163) (0.005) (0.009) (0.127) 
rd_dum 0.036 0.015 -0.242 0.015** 0.027** 0.142 
  (0.116) (0.019) (0.168) (0.006) (0.011) (0.204) 
lagglom 0.157*** 0.060*** 0.140** -0.017* 0.057*** 0.051*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.062) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) 
lherf -0.157*** -0.147*** 0.110 0.303*** 0.062*** -0.051** 
  (0.018) (0.028) (0.082) (0.011) (0.022) (0.021) 
ldivers 0.058*** 0.083*** 0.068 0.131*** 0.198*** 0.108*** 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.052) (0.009) (0.015) (0.020) 
lfc -0.053*** -0.067*** -0.057** -0.017*** -0.000 -0.038*** 
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.026) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) 
neg_liquid -0.038*** -0.049*** -0.035 -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.053) (0.004) (0.009) (0.014) 
lliquid 0.617*** 0.451** 0.865*** 0.168*** 0.220*** 0.236** 
  (0.111) (0.187) (0.220) (0.027) (0.047) (0.092) 
city200 0.005 -0.028* -0.054 -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.084*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.054) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Constant -4.557*** -3.007** -2.435 1.357*** -1.862*** -0.352 
  (0.679) (1.462) (2.129) (0.232) (0.462) (0.566) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37,858 25,785 2,244 165,590 94,106 46,267 
Number of Firms 13,060 9,455 483 46,533 27,447 13,223 
AR(1) z-statistic -10.48 -4.951 -4.743 -18.55 -15.22 -11.62 
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) z-statistic -2.362 -1.585 0.449 -4.815 -3.019 -3.735 
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.0182 0.113 0.653 0 0.00254 0.000188 
Hansen Test 7.585 4.648 10.63 10.90 7.298 12.97 
Hansen Test p-value 0.270 0.325 0.474 0.0916 0.199 0.0729 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.0374 0.0346 0.386** 0.0432*** 0.0323* 0.00117 
z-statistic RTS 1.020 0.490 2.075 2.700 1.696 0.0468 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: PANEL B 
 
Dependent variable:  Timber Furniture Papermaking Printing Cultural 
Petroleum 
Processing 
ln sales (SIC20) (SIC21) (SIC22) (SIC23) (SIC24) (SIC25+70) 
lr_input 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.843*** 0.634*** 0.754*** 0.265* 
  (0.118) (0.068) (0.032) (0.046) (0.051) (0.145) 
lemp 0.483*** 0.446*** 0.166*** 0.230** 0.239*** 0.743*** 
  (0.114) (0.078) (0.045) (0.104) (0.067) (0.145) 
lr_capital 0.130* 0.169*** 0.040*** 0.174*** 0.059* 0.245** 
  (0.076) (0.046) (0.009) (0.049) (0.031) (0.100) 
t_trend 0.054*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.074*** -0.005 
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
lage -0.022** -0.058*** -0.018** -0.105*** -0.005 -0.080*** 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.027) (0.013) (0.027) 
no_politics 0.025* 0.018 0.014*** 0.035*** 0.004 0.053*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) 
high_politics -0.223*** -0.093* -0.000 0.064*** -0.008 -0.034 
  (0.085) (0.050) (0.019) (0.019) (0.035) (0.070) 
p_capstate -0.160* -0.219*** -0.114** 0.080 -0.164** -0.214** 
  (0.085) (0.065) (0.050) (0.065) (0.078) (0.087) 
p_capcoll 0.181*** 0.202*** -0.042 0.259*** -0.054 -0.031 
  (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.069) (0.047) (0.089) 
p_capcorporate 0.126*** 0.223*** -0.048 0.215*** -0.041 -0.018 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.045) (0.062) (0.039) (0.077) 
p_capindividual 0.124*** 0.201*** -0.045 0.222*** -0.030 0.011 
  (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.065) (0.041) (0.082) 
p_capforeign 0.050** 0.059*** 0.016 0.051* 0.023* 0.185** 
  (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.013) (0.086) 
no_exporter -0.091 -0.074 0.169 -0.339** 0.261 -0.563*** 
  (0.057) (0.064) (0.127) (0.148) (0.160) (0.185) 
rd_dum 0.592* -0.008 0.168** 0.106** 0.023 0.005 
  (0.348) (0.018) (0.072) (0.042) (0.015) (0.046) 
lagglom 0.133*** 0.119*** 0.076*** 0.091*** -0.005 0.106*** 
  (0.034) (0.024) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) 
lherf 0.036 -0.174*** -0.141*** 0.092*** 0.347*** -0.323*** 
  (0.025) (0.036) (0.012) (0.026) (0.059) (0.078) 
ldivers 0.207*** 0.223*** 0.200*** 0.264*** 0.127*** 0.147*** 
  (0.034) (0.030) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.054) 
lfc -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.010 -0.045*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) 
neg_liquid -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.023*** -0.062*** -0.026*** -0.078*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) 
lliquid 0.348** 0.408*** 0.195*** 0.465*** 0.197*** 0.740*** 
  (0.136) (0.075) (0.027) (0.087) (0.056) (0.179) 
city200 -0.034* -0.073*** -0.096*** -0.149*** 0.002 0.019 
  (0.020) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) 
Constant -3.128*** -4.049*** -1.707*** -0.546 0.107 -5.308*** 
  (0.841) (0.779) (0.297) (0.821) (0.743) (1.121) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,762 22,234 57,792 39,503 24,427 12,378 
Number of Firms 12,942 6,980 15,111 10,452 6,963 4,129 
AR(1) z-statistic -10.55 -5.504 -13.63 -14.05 -9.141 -5.800 
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) z-statistic -1.765 -2.385 -4.454 -2.994 -1.081 -2.379 
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.0776 0.0171 0 0.00275 0.280 0.0174 
Hansen Test 12.84 13.83 6.341 22.17 12.47 11.79 
Hansen Test p-value 0.117 0.129 0.386 0.0752 0.188 0.108 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.106* 0.109*** 0.0496*** 0.0383 0.0526* 0.253*** 
z-statistic RTS 1.702 3.263 2.244 0.699 1.741 3.745 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: PANEL C 
 Dependent variable:  Chemical Medical Rubber Plastic Nonmetal Products Metal Products 
 ln sales (SIC26+28) (SIC27) (SIC29) (SIC30) (SIC31) (SIC32+33+34) 
lr_input 0.850*** 0.550*** 0.555*** 1.039*** 0.191*** 0.752*** 
  (0.022) (0.040) (0.112) (0.054) (0.040) (0.067) 
lemp 0.203*** 0.768*** 0.249* 0.133** 0.700*** 0.587*** 
  (0.052) (0.102) (0.146) (0.059) (0.182) (0.070) 
lr_capital 0.016** 0.065** 0.153* 0.079*** 0.449*** 0.788*** 
  (0.006) (0.027) (0.080) (0.031) (0.133) (0.114) 
t_trend 0.017*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.028*** 0.098*** 0.137*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.008) 
lage -0.040*** -0.162*** -0.052* -0.014 -0.132*** -0.251*** 
  (0.014) (0.027) (0.026) (0.014) (0.027) (0.024) 
no_politics 0.031*** 0.071*** 0.030*** 0.002 0.068*** 0.077*** 
  (0.005) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) 
high_politics 0.001 -0.015 -0.005 -0.021 -0.130*** -0.541*** 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.053) (0.024) (0.034) (0.074) 
p_capstate -0.131*** -0.219*** -0.150* -0.054 -0.296*** -0.029 
  (0.028) (0.037) (0.083) (0.036) (0.061) (0.070) 
p_capcoll -0.015 -0.028 0.121 0.034 0.168* 0.749*** 
  (0.014) (0.033) (0.099) (0.042) (0.093) (0.098) 
p_capcorporate -0.035** -0.077*** 0.099 0.031 0.136* 0.601*** 
  (0.014) (0.029) (0.089) (0.038) (0.072) (0.080) 
p_capindividual -0.030** -0.023 0.100 0.027 0.175** 0.725*** 
  (0.013) (0.029) (0.095) (0.041) (0.088) (0.093) 
p_capforeign 0.051*** 0.079** 0.025 0.028*** 0.091 0.043 
  (0.010) (0.032) (0.028) (0.009) (0.055) (0.039) 
no_exporter -0.027 0.079 -0.149 0.042 0.221 0.089 
  (0.037) (0.110) (0.173) (0.066) (0.145) (0.147) 
rd_dum 0.043 0.222* 0.261 0.163* -0.247*** 0.002 
  (0.061) (0.129) (0.196) (0.097) (0.062) (0.021) 
lagglom 0.025*** 0.155*** -0.011 0.041* 0.203*** 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.035) 
lherf -0.051*** -0.234*** -0.201*** -0.041** -0.187*** 0.200*** 
  (0.008) (0.029) (0.068) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) 
ldivers 0.138*** 0.165*** 0.198*** 0.163*** 0.266*** 0.407*** 
  (0.008) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020) (0.022) (0.030) 
lfc -0.028*** -0.129*** -0.046*** -0.022** -0.059*** -0.157*** 
  (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) 
neg_liquid -0.028*** -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.021** -0.100*** -0.183*** 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.022) 
lliquid 0.194*** 0.495*** 0.337*** 0.317*** 1.192*** 1.610*** 
  (0.026) (0.055) (0.096) (0.052) (0.215) (0.172) 
city200 -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.114*** -0.129*** -0.047*** -0.153*** 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) 
Constant -1.259*** -5.495*** -3.005*** -0.768* -6.030*** -1.590*** 
  (0.347) (0.468) (1.042) (0.426) (1.407) (0.592) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 154,348 33,367 22,894 55,225 173,374 93,059 
Number of Firms 42,297 8,952 6,611 18,323 47,034 32,965 
AR(1) z-statistic -21.29 -12.44 -5.941 -8.279 -16.28 -11.34 
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) z-statistic -2.047 -3.147 -1.431 -2.315 -7.577 -5.068 
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.0406 0.00165 0.152 0.0206 0 0 
Hansen Test 7.224 13.92 14.18 10.33 12.06 15.98 
Hansen Test p-value 0.614 0.0838 0.116 0.412 0.0606 0.100 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.0686** 0.383*** -0.0432 0.0352* 0.340*** 0.247*** 
z-statistic RTS 2.140 4.584 -0.767 1.778 4.592 9.940 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: PANEL D 
 
Dependent variable:  
Machinery & 
Equipment 
Transport 
Equipment 
Measuring 
Instruments 
Other 
Manufacturing 
Electronic 
Power 
Gas 
Production 
ln sales (SIC35+36) (SIC37) (SIC41) (SIC42+43) (SIC44) (SIC45) 
lr_input 0.626*** 0.640*** 0.562*** 0.649*** 0.169*** 0.265*** 
  (0.035) (0.071) (0.142) (0.045) (0.044) (0.092) 
lemp 0.450*** 0.383*** 0.460** 0.162*** 0.392** 0.348*** 
  (0.065) (0.104) (0.197) (0.053) (0.153) (0.110) 
lr_capital 0.104** 0.094* 0.202* 0.135*** 0.086 0.461*** 
  (0.046) (0.050) (0.117) (0.030) (0.052) (0.117) 
t_trend 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.081*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
lage -0.109*** -0.076*** -0.186** -0.073*** -0.062 -0.042 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.078) (0.016) (0.039) (0.052) 
no_politics 0.031*** 0.012** 0.040** -0.015*** 0.090*** 0.140** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.027) (0.059) 
high_politics -0.063*** -0.030 -0.046 0.034 0.031 0.324*** 
  (0.016) (0.028) (0.042) (0.026) (0.044) (0.121) 
p_capstate -0.208*** -0.049 -0.333* -0.050 -0.155* -0.226** 
  (0.032) (0.047) (0.193) (0.062) (0.092) (0.092) 
p_capcoll 0.116*** 0.059 -0.001 0.170*** -0.057 0.297** 
  (0.034) (0.047) (0.152) (0.049) (0.074) (0.132) 
p_capcorporate 0.075*** 0.065 -0.040 0.164*** -0.067 0.088 
  (0.026) (0.041) (0.144) (0.042) (0.064) (0.085) 
p_capindividual 0.098*** 0.067 0.010 0.166*** -0.095 0.206* 
  (0.029) (0.044) (0.156) (0.042) (0.074) (0.113) 
p_capforeign 0.084*** 0.037* 0.096** 0.045*** -0.025 0.062 
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.042) (0.014) (0.038) (0.094) 
no_exporter -0.039 -0.116* 0.622 -0.361** -0.519* -0.578 
  (0.052) (0.069) (0.428) (0.180) (0.275) (0.580) 
rd_dum 0.000 -0.308* 0.076 0.009 0.085*** 0.005 
  (0.051) (0.177) (0.242) (0.012) (0.025) (0.078) 
lagglom -0.016 -0.003 -0.061** -0.007 0.046*** 0.138*** 
  (0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.016) (0.015) (0.043) 
lherf -0.054*** -0.080*** 0.061*** 0.062*** -0.028 0.205** 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.033) (0.089) 
ldivers 0.241*** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.223*** 0.006 0.188*** 
  (0.010) (0.017) (0.041) (0.022) (0.015) (0.065) 
lfc -0.057*** -0.033*** -0.069*** -0.034*** -0.019*** -0.100*** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) 
neg_liquid -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.117*** -0.072*** -0.046*** -0.022 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.029) (0.010) (0.014) (0.035) 
lliquid 0.437*** 0.301*** 0.613** 0.351*** 0.236 0.789*** 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.250) (0.055) (0.163) (0.238) 
city200 -0.119*** -0.084*** -0.057** -0.072*** -0.002 0.057 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) (0.008) (0.015) (0.057) 
Constant -3.431*** -2.785*** -2.631* -0.854** -2.084** -1.198 
  (0.569) (0.798) (1.407) (0.427) (0.879) (0.886) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 276,450 72,401 42,265 60,473 36,854 2,238 
Number of Firms 84,449 22,159 14,731 19,250 7,845 695 
AR(1) z-statistic -29.24 -10.37 -10.01 -15.56 -6.976 -3.176 
AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0.00149 
AR(2) z-statistic -5.363 -2.587 -2.118 -2.329 2.312 -1.438 
AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0 0.00968 0.0341 0.0199 0.0208 0.150 
Hansen Test 18.33 13.40 6.520 6.529 12.67 27.83 
Hansen Test p-value 0.106 0.0629 0.480 0.367 0.0806 0.114 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.181*** 0.117** 0.224* -0.0547 0.437** 0.0739 
z-statistic RTS 8.258 2.556 1.710 -1.420 2.227 0.710 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: PANEL E 
 
Dependent variable:  
Water 
Production Coal Mining 
     ln sales (SIC46) (SIC60)         
lr_input 0.142* 0.568*** 
      (0.082) (0.027) 
    lemp 1.220*** 0.391*** 
      (0.161) (0.062) 
    lr_capital 0.216** 0.083* 
      (0.092) (0.044) 
    t_trend 0.051*** 0.034*** 
      (0.006) (0.004) 
    lage -0.221*** -0.079*** 
      (0.046) (0.016) 
    no_politics 0.174*** 0.061*** 
      (0.040) (0.011) 
    high_politics 0.239*** -0.015 
      (0.064) (0.032) 
    p_capstate -0.474*** -0.212*** 
      (0.157) (0.081) 
    p_capcoll 0.136 -0.051 
      (0.146) (0.078) 
    p_capcorporate -0.191 0.001 
      (0.140) (0.078) 
    p_capindividual -0.138 -0.012 
      (0.149) (0.078) 
    p_capforeign -0.099 -0.234 
      (0.145) (0.146) 
    no_exporter -0.009 -0.103*** 
      (0.360) (0.027) 
    rd_dum -0.020 0.238*** 
      (0.184) (0.085) 
    lagglom 0.032 0.103*** 
      (0.033) (0.013) 
    lherf 0.055** -0.247*** 
      (0.023) (0.023) 
    ldivers 0.071*** 0.019* 
      (0.023) (0.011) 
    lfc -0.049*** -0.000 
      (0.008) (0.003) 
    neg_liquid -0.041*** -0.044*** 
      (0.014) (0.007) 
    lliquid 0.305** 0.376*** 
      (0.134) (0.062) 
    city200 -0.033 -0.059*** 
      (0.024) (0.009) 
    Constant -8.343*** -4.078*** 
      (1.278) (0.534) 
    Province Dummies Yes Yes 
    Observations 19,451 32,920 
    Number of Firms 3,183 10,866 
    AR(1) z-statistic -8.935 -17.74 
    AR(1) z-statistic p-value 0 0 
    AR(2) z-statistic -0.642 -3.644 
    AR(2) z-statistic p-value 0.521 0.000268 
    Hansen Test 11.26 6.614 
    Hansen Test p-value 0.258 0.251 
    Returns to Scale (-1) 0.578*** 0.0417 
    z-statistic RTS 6.065 1.080         
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.6. Results of the Semiparametric Estimation 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the determinants of TFP levels for 26 industries 
according to the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semiparametric methodology.  
The results suggest that for the majority of industries, the coefficients for employment (lemp) and 
capital (lr_capital) are higher in the SYS-GMM estimation results than in the results from the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semiparametric estimation. However, the coefficients for intermediate 
inputs (lr_input) are lower in the SYS-GMM results than with the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
estimation. Moreover, the results based on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation indicate the 
existence of increasing returns to scale for 4 out of 26 industries, and decreasing returns to scale for 
10 out of 26 industries, with the average sum of output elasticities equalling 0.95. In contrast, the 
results based on the SYS-GMM estimation indicate the existence of increasing returns to scale for 
18 out of 26 industries, since the average sum of output elasticities equals 1.2. Increasing returns to 
scale are more likely for the fast growing Chinese economy than decreasing ones. This suggests that 
the results based on the SYS-GMM estimation are more plausible than the ones based on the 
semiparametric estimation following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  
As with the SYS-GMM results, the results of the semiparametric estimation can be summarized by 
grouping the variables included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 into categories: political affiliation/foreign 
ownership variables, spatial variables (Marshallian, Jacobian and city spillovers), knowledge 
variables (age, R&D and time trend), and all other variables (exporting, competition, liquidity and 
marketing capabilities).  
Regarding political affiliation/ownership variables, the statistically significant and positive 
coefficients of the “high level of political affiliation” variable (high_politics) for 13 out of 26 
industries indicate that a high level of political affiliation has a positive effect on firms’ TFP levels. 
This effect is strongest for the tobacco, apparel & footwear and water production industries. Only 
the timber industry showed a negative effect of a high level of political affiliation on firms’ TFP 
levels. The results suggest that Chinese industrial firms benefit in terms of higher TFP from being 
affiliated with the central or provincial governments. Moreover, the statistically significant and 
positive coefficients for the “no political affiliation” variable (no_politics) for 20 out of 26 
industries indicate that a lack of political affiliation also has a positive effect on firms’ TFP levels. 
Here, firms appear to benefit in terms of higher TFP from not being politically affiliated with any 
level of government. The industries in which this effect is the strongest are the tobacco, electronic 
power and water production industries. Based on these results, a high level of political affiliation 
with the central or provincial governments and the lack of a political affiliation are both conducive 
to higher firm TFP levels. These results are inconsistent, and also partly differ from the initial 
expectations and the results of the SYS-GMM estimation, in which the coefficients of the “high 
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level of political affiliation” variable are mostly statistically significant and negative and those on 
the “no political affiliation” are mostly statistically significant and positive. These findings also 
differ from those of Du and Girma (2010), which indicate that, conditional on survival, politically 
unaffiliated firms perform better in terms of TFP growth than politically affiliated ones. 
The consideration of political affiliation also takes into account the potential political impact that 
State influence might have on a firm’s performance by being a major shareholder. This is because 
forms of ownership other than the State ownership are likely to be characterised by a relatively low 
impact of political influence from an affiliation. In the semiparametric results, the coefficients for 
the variable representing the proportion of paid-in capital owned by the State (p_capstate) are 
statistically significant and negative in 21 out of 26 industries (this effect is the highest in the 
leather, furniture and water production industries), while the variables representing the proportion 
of paid-in capital owned by collective investors (p_capcoll), corporations (p_capcorporate), 
individuals (p_capindividual) and foreigners (p_capforeign) are statistically significant and positive 
for most industries. These results indicate that a higher proportion of paid-in capital owned by the 
State results in lower firm TFP levels, while a higher proportion of paid-in capital owned by 
collective investors, corporations, individuals and foreign investors is conducive to higher firm TFP 
levels. These findings are consistent with the results from the SYS-GMM estimation and with initial 
expectations. They are also similar to the findings of Zhang et al. (2001), Jefferson et al. (2003) and 
Zhang et al. (2003), who found that State-owned enterprises were the least efficient and had 
achieved the lowest rate of TFP growth, although the studies looked at smaller samples and shorter 
time periods. 
Regarding spatial variables, the coefficients for the variable representing Marshallian spillovers 
(lagglom) are statistically significant and positive for 13 out of 26 industries, but negative in 4 
industries. The positive effect is the strongest in the electronic power, tobacco and plastics 
industries. The coefficients for the variable representing Jacobian spillovers (ldivers) are 
statistically significant and positive in 22 out of 26 industries, with the highest effect seen in the 
machinery & equipment, other manufacturing, and apparel & footwear industries. The coefficients 
for the variable representing city spillovers (city200) are negative for 18 out of 26 industries, with 
the strongest negative effect seen in the leather, transport equipment and measuring instruments 
industries. These results indicate that firms are likely to benefit in terms of higher TFP from the 
externalities arising by being geographically close to their industrial peers, and by being located in 
an area characterised by different industrial activities. The results also indicate that firms do not 
benefit in terms of higher TFP levels from being based in a major city. The positive relationship 
between Marshallian spillovers and TFP levels is consistent with the results of the SYS-GMM 
estimation and similar to those of Lin et al. (2011), who found that industrial agglomeration has a 
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significant positive impact on the productivity of firms, although the relationship takes an inverted 
U-shape and only the textile industry was examined. The findings are also similar to those of Yang 
et al. (2013), who found that production agglomeration has a positive relationship with firms’ 
productivity, although their analysis is limited to the electronics industry. The positive relationship 
between Jacobian spillovers and TFP is consistent with the SYS-GMM results and similar to the 
findings of Liu (2002), who found that Jacobian spillovers positively affect the productivity of 29 
manufacturing industries based in Shenzhen. The results are also similar to those of Batisse (2002), 
who found Jacobian spillovers to positively affect firms’ added value in 30 industrial sectors across 
29 Chinese provinces. The negative relationship between firms’ TFP levels and city spillovers is 
consistent with the SYS-GMM estimation, but contrasts with the results of Pan and Zhang (2002), 
who found that for firms spread across 28 industries in 224 Chinese cities, firms’ productivity 
increases as the city size doubles. In summary, in line with the results of the SYS-GMM estimation 
presented in the previous section, firms benefit in terms of higher TFP from being based in areas 
characterized by industrial agglomeration and diversity, while not benefiting from being based in 
cities.  
Among the three knowledge variables examined, the coefficients for the variable representing 
firms’ age (lage), are statistically significant and negative in 13 out of 26 industries, indicating that 
firms tend to become less productive as they age. These results are consistent with those of the 
SYS-GMM estimation but contrast with those of Zheng et al. (2003) who found a significant and 
positive effect of age on firms’ technical efficiency for 600 SOEs during 1980-1994, and Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009), who found that the productivity of Chinese and Indian firms rises through the 
youngest tenth of firms and then remains flat before falling for the oldest tenth of firms. In contrast 
to the previous finding, the coefficients for the variable representing firms’ R&D expenditures are 
statistically significant and positive for most industries, indicating that firms benefit in terms of 
higher TFP levels by undertaking R&D. These results are consistent with those from the SYS-
GMM estimation and those of Wu et al. (2007), who found that R&D positively affected the 
technical efficiency of 145 firms belonging to the watch and clock manufacturing industry. The 
results also support those of Hu (2001), who found a positive relationship between both firm and 
government R&D and the productivity of 813 firms. The coefficients for the variable representing 
the time trend (t_trend), or Hicks-neutral technical change, are statistically significant and positive 
for 20 out of 26 industries, suggesting that Chinese firms benefit in terms of TFP level increases 
over time as they are affected by positive exogenous technological improvements. In summary, 
among knowledge variables, R&D expenditure and the time trend positively affect firms’ TFP, 
while age negatively affects TFP. These results differ from the SYS-GMM results, in which a 
higher level of R&D expenditure resulted in lower TFP levels for most industries. 
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In addition to ownership/political affiliation, spatial and knowledge variables, others variables are 
included in the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡: exporting, competition, liquidity and marketing capabilities.  
For 14 out of 26 industries, the statistically significant and negative coefficients for the variable 
representing a non-exporting firm (no_exporter) indicate that exporting has a positive effect on 
firms’ TFP levels. The results thus suggest that firms benefit from exporting. These findings are not 
consistent with those from the SYS-GMM estimation, although they are consistent with those of 
Sun and Hong (2011), who found a positive effect of exporting on Chinese firms’ TFP, and Du et 
al. (2012b), who found that domestic firms achieve productivity gains by exporting while foreign 
firms do not.  
The statistically significant coefficients for the variable representing the Herfindahl index of 
industrial concentration (lherf) indicate that the higher the industrial concentration, the worse the 
firm TFP level. This was the case for 15 out of 26 industries, including non-metal products, 
chemical and food production, but was not the case for 10 out of 26 industries, including the water 
production, gas production and tobacco industries. In other words, most industries’ firms benefit in 
terms of higher TFP levels from an increased level of competition. These results are consistent with 
those of the SYS-GMM estimation and similar to those of Zhang et al. (2001), who found a 
negative effect of industrial concentration on firms’ productivity, although their analysis was 
limited to firms based in Shanghai. The results are also similar to those of Lin et al. (2009), who 
found that industrial concentration negatively affects firms’ productivity, although they looked at a 
smaller sample over a shorter time period. 
In terms of liquidity, the coefficients for the negative working capital to total assets dummy 
(neg_liquid) are statistically significant for all industries except tobacco. The coefficients for the 
natural logarithm of the working capital to total assets ratio (lliquid) variable are statistically 
significant and positive for all industries except for gas production. These results are consistent with 
those of the SYS-GMM estimation and those of Chen and Guariglia (2013), who found that a firm’s 
productivity is positively and significantly affected by the level of internal liquidity.  
For 18 out of 26 industries, the coefficients for the variable representing marketing capabilities (lfc) 
are statistically significant and negative, indicating that firms having lower selling and distribution 
costs as a percentage of sales tend to be more productive. Such firms are likely to be more able to 
transform their resources into valuable output, to better distinguish their products from competitors, 
and to build brands that enable them to charge higher prices, thus increasing their TFP level. These 
findings are consistent with those of the SYS-GMM estimation but contrast with those of Morgan et 
al. (2009), Nath et al. (2010), Lee and Rugman (2012) and Yu et al. (2014).  
In summary, the empirical analyses in this study suggest that the SYS-GMM estimation results are 
more valid than those from the Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) semiparametric estimation. Firstly, 
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coefficients for the political affiliation variables based on the semiparametric estimation indicate 
that Chinese firms benefit from having both a high level of political affiliation and no political 
affiliation at all. This is somewhat inconsistent and contrasts with the results obtained using the 
SYS-GMM estimation, as well as with the empirical results reported in the literature. Secondly, 
elasticities with respect to output are much lower for capital and labour but higher for intermediate 
inputs when the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) semiparametric estimation methodology is adopted. 
Thirdly, the evidence based on the Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) semiparametric approach 
suggests the existence of decreasing returns to scale, which are unlikely for the dynamic and fast 
growing Chinese economy. In contrast, the results based on the SYS-GMM methodology indicate 
the existence of increasing returns to scale. In summary, the empirical results based on the SYS-
GMM estimation seem to be more valid than those based on Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) 
methodology, strengthening the case for using SYS-GMM as the preferred estimator of TFP in this 
study. 
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Table 3: Long-run Levinsohn and Petrin Semi Production Function, Various Industries, China 1998-2007 
    Food-     Apparel &   
Dependent variable:  Other 
Mining 
Production Tobacco Textile Footwear Leather 
ln sales 
        (SIC10+80) (SIC14) (SIC16) (SIC17) (SIC18) (SIC19) 
  
          
lr_input 1.000*** 0.810*** 0.328*** 0.675*** 0.861*** 0.881*** 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.084) (0.012) (0.005) (0.086) 
lr_capital 0.007* 0.168*** 0.784*** 0.057*** 0.019*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.124) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) 
lemp 0.040*** 0.102*** 0.220*** 0.079*** 0.118*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.039) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
t_trend 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.026*** -0.037*** 0.038*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
lage 0.007*** -0.018*** -0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.027) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
no_politics 0.007** 0.024*** 0.118* 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.066) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
high_politics 0.016** 0.034** 0.099* 0.010 0.074*** -0.062 
 
(0.008) (0.016) (0.056) (0.014) (0.023) -0.062 
p_capstate -0.023 -0.190*** -0.056 -0.197*** -0.211*** -0.433*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.310) (0.012) (0.017) (0.044) 
p_capcoll -0.000 -0.020 -0.062 0.017*** -0.015** -0.017 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.299) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) 
p_capcorporate -0.000 -0.018 -0.150 0.015*** -0.007 0.002 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.302) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
p_capindividual -0.011 -0.016 0.134 0.010*** -0.012*** 0.008 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.312) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
p_capforeign -0.010 -0.004 -0.021 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.007 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.399) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
no_exporter -0.009* -0.017*** -0.067* -0.025*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.036) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
rd_dum 0.017* 0.041*** 0.130*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.028) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
lagglom 0.023*** 0.023** 0.093 -0.026*** 0.019* 0.025** 
 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.062) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
lherf -0.135*** -0.517*** 0.441*** 0.382*** 0.217*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.005) (0.023) (0.060) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
ldivers -0.010* 0.088*** 0.010 0.055*** 0.154*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.036) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015) 
lfc -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.045** -0.009*** 0.008*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.021) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
neg_liquid -0.014*** -0.042*** -0.007 -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.053) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
lliquid 0.100*** 0.242*** 0.607*** 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.011) (0.024) (0.178) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) 
city200 -0.002 -0.050*** -0.050 -0.033*** -0.054*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.035) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 37,858 47,250 2,244 165,590 94,106 46,267 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.047*** 0.081*** 0.332*** -0.189*** -0.002 -0.001 
z-statistic RTS 8.252 7.485 2.938 -15.41 -0.787 -0.00813 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: PANEL B 
      Paper-     Petroleum- 
Dependent variable:  Timber Furniture Making Printing Cultural Processing 
ln sales 
        (SIC20) (SIC21) (SIC22) (SIC23) (SIC24) (SIC25+70) 
 
            
lr_input 0.880*** 0.657*** 0.632*** 0.972*** 0.852*** 0.913*** 
 
(0.007) (0.049) (0.013) (0.008) (0.109) (0.013) 
lr_capital 0.035*** 0.045*** 0.063*** 0.006 0.035*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
lemp 0.083*** 0.107*** 0.094*** 0.052*** 0.102*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
t_trend 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.034*** 0.015*** 0.084*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
lage 0.000 -0.010* -0.004 -0.007*** 0.001 0.006** 
 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
no_politics 0.010* 0.010 0.013*** 0.003 0.014** 0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
high_politics -0.060* 0.023 -0.001 0.040*** 0.017 0.007 
 
(0.033) (0.050) (0.017) (0.006) (0.035) (0.011) 
p_capstate -0.136*** -0.355*** -0.145*** 0.001 -0.224*** -0.049** 
 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.015) (0.008) (0.036) (0.021) 
p_capcoll 0.042*** 0.008 -0.002 0.015* -0.019 -0.014 
 
(0.013) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) 
p_capcorporate 0.024** 0.047*** 0.003 0.001 -0.020** -0.010 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019) 
p_capindividual 0.017* 0.013 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) 
p_capforeign 0.013 0.011 0.051*** 0.026** 0.005 0.034 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.028) 
no_exporter -0.019*** -0.014* -0.003 0.010** -0.007 0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
rd_dum 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.052*** 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
lagglom 0.006 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.034*** -0.012 -0.011** 
 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.005) 
lherf 0.086*** -0.086*** -0.283*** -0.080*** 0.479*** -0.001 
 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.045) (0.008) 
ldivers 0.065*** 0.135*** 0.110*** 0.063*** 0.102*** -0.061*** 
 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008) 
lfc -0.014*** -0.012* -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.001 0.005* 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
neg_liquid -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
lliquid 0.088*** 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.127*** 0.158*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.011) (0.023) (0.020) 
city200 -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.056*** 0.006 0.017** 
 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.007) 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 38,762 22,234 57,792 31,177 24,427 12,378 
Returns to Scale (-1) -0.002 -0.191*** -0.210*** 0.030*** -0.012 -0.012* 
z-statistic RTS -0.581 -3.664 -15.29 8.746 -0.115 -1.894 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: PANEL C 
          Nonmetal- Metal- 
Dependent variable:  Chemical Medical Rubber Plastic  Products Products 
ln sales  
      
 
(SIC26+28) (SIC27) (SIC29) (SIC30) (SIC31) (SIC32+33+
34) 
 
            
lr_input 0.984*** 0.884*** 0.874*** 0.868*** 0.542*** 0.922*** 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.045) (0.004) (0.010) (0.045) 
lr_capital 0.000 0.051*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.080*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
lemp 0.025*** 0.042*** 0.110*** 0.089*** 0.120*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
t_trend 0.005*** -0.006*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
lage -0.001 -0.004 -0.020*** -0.007** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
no_politics 0.011*** 0.009** 0.039*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
high_politics 0.019*** 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.040*** 0.011 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.033) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) 
p_capstate -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.213*** -0.205*** -0.115*** -0.132*** 
 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.034) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
p_capcoll -0.004 -0.027** 0.015 0.015** 0.036*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
p_capcorporate -0.007** -0.012 0.011 0.022*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
p_capindividual -0.009*** -0.011 -0.001 0.014** 0.028*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
p_capforeign 0.019*** 0.017 0.023* 0.046*** 0.063*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
no_exporter -0.004*** -0.016*** -0.001 0.001 -0.019*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
rd_dum 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
lagglom 0.002 0.045*** -0.052** 0.074*** 0.017*** 0.015* 
 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.022) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) 
lherf -0.019*** -0.526*** -0.304*** -0.164*** -0.514*** 0.352*** 
 
(0.001) (0.016) (0.035) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
ldivers 0.014*** 0.052*** 0.137*** 0.094*** 0.137*** 0.108*** 
 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
lfc -0.001 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
neg_liquid -0.016*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
lliquid 0.086*** 0.199*** 0.174*** 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.150*** 
 
(0.005) (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) 
city200 -0.017*** -0.010 -0.084*** -0.042*** -0.081*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 129,000 33,367 22,894 80,982 173,374 139,488 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.009 -0.023** 0.013 -0.002 -0.259*** 0.027 
z-statistic RTS 0.904 -2.156 0.346 -0.722 -25.46 0.641 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: PANEL D 
  Machinery 
& 
Transport- Measuring- Other- Electronic- Gas 
Dependent variable:  Equipment Equipment Instrument Manufacturi
ng 
 Power Production 
ln sales 
        (SIC35+36) (SIC37) (SIC41) (SIC42+43) (SIC44) (SIC45) 
 
            
lr_input 0.861*** 0.907*** 0.886*** 0.858*** 0.357*** 0.825*** 
 
(0.104) (0.003) (0.007) (0.121) (0.015) (0.060) 
lr_capital 0.036** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.194*** 0.093* 
 
(0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.052) 
lemp 0.106*** 0.041*** 0.054*** 0.101*** 0.242*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) 
t_trend 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.056*** 0.009*** 0.046*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) 
lage -0.018*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.019*** 0.071*** -0.011 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) 
no_politics 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.007* -0.009 0.085*** 0.018 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.024) 
high_politics 0.059*** 0.024*** 0.017** 0.051** 0.137*** 0.027 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.014) (0.031) 
p_capstate -0.239*** -0.040*** -0.007 -0.248*** -0.148*** -0.094*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) 
p_capcoll 0.029*** 0.003 0.027*** 0.016* -0.066** -0.014 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.032) (0.039) 
p_capcorporate 0.005 -0.005 0.033*** 0.034*** -0.091*** -0.009 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.030) (0.032) 
p_capindividual 0.001 -0.008* 0.018*** 0.022*** -0.074** -0.008 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.031) (0.037) 
p_capforeign 0.065*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.047*** -0.050 0.052 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.045) (0.046) 
no_exporter -0.020*** 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.080** -0.032 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.033) (0.055) 
rd_dum 0.054*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.067*** 0.112*** -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.020) (0.039) 
lagglom -0.001 0.003 -0.007 -0.051*** 0.102*** 0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) 
lherf -0.108*** -0.150*** 0.017*** 0.040*** -0.232*** 0.306*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036) (0.089) 
ldivers 0.193*** 0.096*** 0.066*** 0.176*** 0.034*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.026) 
lfc -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.021*** -0.010 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) 
neg_liquid -0.047*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.051*** -0.038*** -0.032** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) 
lliquid 0.188*** 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.781*** 0.053 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) (0.061) (0.064) 
city200 -0.105*** -0.077*** -0.063*** -0.057*** 0.025** 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021) 
Province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 276,450 72,401 35,460 60,473 46,033 2,238 
Returns to Scale (-1) 0.003 -0.002 -0.012** -0.005 -0.207*** -0.050 
z-statistic RTS 0.0312 -0.886 -1.976 -0.0457 -8.118 -0.927 
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: PANEL E 
  Water-           
Dependent variable:  Production Coal Mining 
    ln sales 
        (SIC46) (SIC60)         
 
            
lr_input 0.463*** 0.834*** 
    
 
(0.034) (0.012) 
    lr_capital 0.258*** 0.041*** 
    
 
(0.010) (0.005) 
    lemp 0.207*** 0.087*** 
    
 
(0.007) (0.003) 
    t_trend 0.052*** 0.009*** 
    
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
    lage 0.019*** 0.000 
    
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
    no_politics 0.046** 0.009* 
    
 
(0.018) (0.005) 
    high_politics 0.068*** 0.003 
    
 
(0.022) (0.011) 
    p_capstate -0.265*** -0.058 
    
 
(0.049) (0.044) 
    p_capcoll -0.059 -0.006 
    
 
(0.053) (0.044) 
    p_capcorporate -0.168*** 0.013 
    
 
(0.052) (0.045) 
    p_capindividual -0.122** 0.005 
    
 
(0.055) (0.045) 
    p_capforeign -0.022 -0.156** 
    
 
(0.078) (0.073) 
    no_exporter -0.059** -0.033*** 
    
 
(0.025) (0.009) 
    rd_dum 0.001 0.043*** 
    
 
(0.029) (0.012) 
    lagglom 0.010 0.072*** 
    
 
(0.013) (0.006) 
    lherf 0.200*** -0.181*** 
    
 
(0.010) (0.014) 
    ldivers 0.029*** -0.012* 
    
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
    lfc -0.014*** 0.005** 
    
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
    neg_liquid -0.039*** -0.030*** 
    
 
(0.008) (0.004) 
    lliquid 0.188*** 0.112*** 
    
 
(0.043) (0.015) 
    city200 0.001 -0.019*** 
    
 
(0.010) (0.004) 
    Province dummies yes yes 
    
       Observations 19,451 32,920 
    Returns to Scale (-1) -0.072** -0.038*** 
    z-statistic RTS -2.404 -3.722         
Standard Errors in Parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.7. Relative importance of TFP determinants 
After having analysed what determines higher TFP levels across Chinese industrial firms, it is 
important to underline which determinants are likely to exert the largest impact on TFP. This would 
enable policymakers to understand which determinants they should focus on in order to achieve 
higher TFP levels. 
In order to measure such impacts, the parameter estimates resulting from the SYS-GMM estimation 
are taken. The weighted mean of the parameter estimates is calculated for each variable. In this 
case, the weight is measured as the number of firms in each industry as a proportion of the total 
number of firms in all industries. The weighted mean of the parameter estimates for each variable is 
standardized by multiplying it by the respective variable standard deviation. This is then divided by 
the dependent variable standard deviation. In all the calculations, only the parameter estimates of 
the industries that were statistically significant in the SYS-GMM estimation are included.  
In table 4, the figures are ordered in a decreasing order, according to the extent of the impact on 
TFP levels. For some variables, in order to measure their positive impact on TFP, the weighted 
mean of parameter estimates is multiplied by the negative value of the respective independent 
variable standard deviation. These are the variables representing: exporting (no_exporter), age 
(lage), competition (lherf), liquidity (neg_liquid) and marketing capabilities (lfc).  
Based on these results, it can be seen that the time trend (t_trend), or Hicks-neutral technical 
change, has the largest impact on TFP levels. In other words, firms largely increase their 
productivity over time as a result of exogenous technological improvements. 
The figures in table 4 also indicate that a significant positive impact on TFP levels comes from the 
share of Chinese industrial firms’ proportion of paid-in capital owned by either individuals 
(p_capindividual) or corporations (p_capcorporate). At the same time, a significant negative impact 
on TFP levels comes from the proportion of paid-in capital owned by the State (p_capstate). In 
comparison with other owners, such as the State, individuals or corporates are more likely to 
influence firms’ decision towards the maximization of TFP, rather than the pursuit of politically 
motivated objectives, such as maximum employment. This is also indicated by the variable 
representing the political affiliation of a firm with either the central or provincial government 
(high_politics), which has a large negative effect on TFP. It can be therefore inferred that policy 
measures aimed at decreasing State influence on Chinese firms, in terms of both ownership and 
political affiliation, and at increasing private forms of ownership, could have a large positive impact 
on firms’ TFP.  
Among the negative effects on TFP, the second worst has been recorded by the variable 
representing city spillovers (city200). Although firms seem to benefit from being based in areas 
characterized by industrial agglomeration and diversity, as indicated by the positive values for the 
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variables representing Marshallian (lagglom) and Jacobian (ldivers) spillovers, they do not seem to 
benefit from being based in cities. While cities are likely to provide firms with many positive 
advantages, such as access to a wide customer base, these are likely to be dominated by other 
disadvantages, such as higher rent and transportation costs, which might hamper their TFP. This 
suggests that policy measures incentivizing firms to be based in areas characterized by industrial 
agglomeration and diversity other than cities are likely to have a large positive effect on firms’ TFP.  
 
Table 4: Relative importance of different TFP effects based on equation (47) 
Variable  Impact 
t_trend 0.103 
p_capindividual 0.086 
p_capcorporate 0.068 
lliquid 0.053 
lage 0.050 
ldivers 0.050 
lagglom 0.037 
lfc 0.029 
p_capcoll 0.025 
neg_liquid 0.020 
no_exporter 0.013 
no_politics 0.012 
lherf 0.007 
p_capforeign 0.006 
rd_dum 0.001 
high_politics -0.012 
city200 -0.023 
p_capstate -0.035 
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3.8.Results of the KS Testing 
Tables 5 through 7 present the results of the two-sample Kolmogorov and Smirnov (KS) tests of 
equality of TFP distribution functions. Figures 1 through 15 complements the tables by plotting the 
related empirical cumulative TFP distributions.  
 
Table 5: Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics for Equality of Distribution Functions   
  Industry Year 
  Group D p-Value   Group D p-Value 
  
 
  
    0 Apparel & Footwear 0 1 0 1998 0.0005 0.945 
1 Machinery & Equipment -0.5476 0 1 2007 -0.262 0 
  
 
  
      Political Affiliation Political Affiliation 
  Group D p-Value   Group D p-Value 
  
 
  
    
0 No Political Affiliation 0.0005 0.945 0 
No High Political 
Affiliation 
0.0071 0 
1 High Political Affiliation -0.262 0 1 High Political Affiliation -0.1879 0 
  
 
  
      Political Affiliation   State Ownership 
  Group D p-Value   Group D p-Value 
  
 
  
    0 Political Affiliation 0.1814 0 0 State Ownership<0.25 0 1 
1 No Political Affiliation 0 0.999 1 State Ownership>0.25 -0.3428 0 
  
 
  
      Province   R&D 
  Group D p-Value   Group D p-Value 
  
 
  
    0 Guizhou 0.4121 0 0 No R&D 0.0158 0 
1 Shanghai 0 1 1 R&D -0.0917 0 
  
 
  
      Exporting         
  Group D p-Value         
  
 
  
    0 Non Exporter 0.0069 0 
  
  1 Exporter -0.1391 0 
  
                  
The first line represents a hypothesis test that TFP for group 0 has smaller values than for group 1. The related D-
statistic indicates the largest difference between the distribution functions in this direction. The second line represents a 
hypothesis test that TFP for group 0 has larger values than for group 1. The related D-statistic indicates the largest 
difference between the distribution functions in this direction.  
 
Figure 1 compares the productivity distribution between firms belonging to the “Apparel and 
Footwear” and “Machinery and Equipment” industries. Firms belonging to the “Apparel & 
 140 
Footwear” industry have a productivity distribution to the right of those belonging to the 
“Machinery & Equipment” industry, indicating that the former stochastically dominate the latter in 
terms of its TFP distribution (KS tests in Table 5 indicate that the maximum gap between the 
distribution for firms belonging to the Apparel & Footwear industry and firms belonging to the 
Machinery and Equipment industry has a value of 0.55, and is significant at the 1% level). Based on 
the same rationale, Figures 12 and 13 indicate that the productivity distribution of firms belonging 
to the “Leather” industry stochastically dominates the one of the firms belonging to the “Other 
Manufacturing” industry, for both 1998 and 2007. Moreover, Figures 14 and 15 indicate that the 
productivity distribution of firms belonging to the “Other Manufacturing” industry stochastically 
dominates the productivity distribution of firms belonging to the “Apparel & Footwear” industry in 
both 1998 and 2007. In Figures 14 and 15, there is some evidence of significant crossover in terms 
of TFP distribution between the two sub-groups at high values of the empirical cumulative 
distributions. These results point to the existence of heterogeneity in empirical cumulative 
distributions of TFP levels for groups of firms according to their industry, suggesting that it is 
important to estimate TFP levels separately for each of them.  
Figure 2 compares the empirical cumulative distributions of TFP levels between firms operating in 
1998 and firms operating in 2007. Consistent with the results presented in Table 2, firms operating 
in 2007 have a productivity distribution to the right of those operating in 1998, indicating that the 
former stochastically dominate the latter in terms of their TFP distribution (a KS test shows that the 
maximum gap between the distribution for firms operating in 1998 and firms operating in 2007 has 
a value of 0.26, and is significant at the 1% level). This points to the existence of TFP growth 
between 1998 and 2007. 
Figure 3 indicates the existence of heterogeneity between the productivity distributions of non-
politically affiliated firms and politically affiliated ones. Firms with no political affiliation have a 
productivity distribution to the right of those with high political affiliation and medium political 
affiliation, indicating that the former distribution stochastically dominates the other two (a KS test 
shows that the maximum gap between the distribution for firms with no affiliation and firms having 
high political affiliation is 0.18, and is significant at the 1% level). There is also evidence of some 
significant crossover in the figures representing the sub-groups at high values of the empirical 
cumulative distributions. These findings suggest that non-politically affiliated firms are more 
productive than politically affiliated ones, consistent with the findings in Table 2. 
Figure 4 compares the TFP distribution between firms in which the State owns more than 25% of 
paid-in capital and those in which the State owns less than 25%. The figure shows that the 
productivity distribution for firms in which the State owns less than 25% of paid-in capital is on the 
right of the distribution for firms in which the State owns more than 25% of paid-in capital, 
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suggesting that the former stochastically dominates the latter. The KS test indicates that the 
maximum gap between the two distributions is 0.34 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These findings indicate that firms having a share of State paid-in capital ownership lower than 25% 
have higher TFP levels than firms in which the share is higher, and are again in line with the 
findings in Table 2.  
Figure 5 compares the TFP distribution for firms based in the Shanghai province to those based in 
the Guizhou province. The distribution for firms based in Shanghai is on the right of the distribution 
for firms based in Guizhou, suggesting that firms based in Shanghai are more productive than firms 
based in Guizhou (the value of the KS test statistic is 0.41 and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level). Moreover, Figures 8 and 9 indicate that firms based in Guizhou are more productive than 
firms based in Guangdong both in 1998 and 2007. Figures 10 and 11 indicate that firms based in 
Guangdong are more productive than firms based in Yunnan both in 1998 and 2007. These results, 
which are in line with those presented in Section 3.5, point to the existence of heterogeneity in TFP 
levels across groups of firms based in different provinces, and suggest that it is important to take 
geographical differences into account when estimating TFP. 
Figure 6 compares the empirical cumulative productivity distributions between firms undertaking 
R&D and those not doing so. The figure indicates that the former dominates the latter (a KS test 
shows that the maximum gap between the distribution for firms undertaking R&D and firms not 
doing so has a value of 0.09 and is significant at the 1% level). These results indicate that firms 
undertaking R&D have higher TFP levels than firms not doing so. 
Figure 7 compares the productivity distribution between exporting firms and non-exporting ones. 
The first group has a productivity distribution to the right of the second group, indicating that the 
empirical cumulative distribution of TFP levels for exporting firms dominates that of the non-
exporting firms. KS tests show that the maximum gap between the two distributions has a value of 
0.14, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that firms engaged in 
exporting activities have higher TFP levels than non-exporting firms. 
In summary, the results of the KS tests and the related empirical cumulative TFP distributions are in 
line with the findings represented in Table 2. The results indicate that empirical cumulative 
distributions of TFP levels differ across groups of firms having different characteristics in terms of 
political affiliation, paid-in capital share ownership, R&D expenditure and exporting. The results 
also point to the existence of heterogeneity in TFP levels across groups of firms belonging to 
different industries and based in different provinces, thus suggesting that it is important to estimate 
TFP separately for each industry, and to take into account the geographical differences across firms 
when estimating TFP levels. Moreover, the KS tests and empirical cumulative distributions indicate 
the existence of TFP growth between 1998 and 2007. 
Table 6: Industry Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Equality of Distribution Functions 
 Group SIC Industry D P-value   SIC Industry D P-value 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 10 Other Mining -0.9534 0 
 
14 Food Production -0.5538 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0.5213 0 
1 16 Tobacco -0.9347 0 
 
17 Textile -0.0001 1 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0.8617 0 
1 18 Apparel & Footwear -0.807 0 
 
19 Leather 0 1 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 20 Timber -0.9617 0 
 
21 Furniture -0.9348 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0.4861 0 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 22 Papermaking 0 1 
 
23 Printing -0.219 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0.0023 0.83 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 24 Cultural -0.3644 0 
 
25 Petroleum 
Processing 
-0.9767 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0.1454 0 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 26 Chemical -0.0155 0 
 
27 Medical -0.9853 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0.8326 0 
1 29 Rubber -0.6539 0 
 
30 Plastic 0 1 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0.3321 0 
1 31 Non-metal Products -0.9492 0 
 
32 Metal Products -0.0768 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 35 Machinery & 
Equipment 
-0.8969 0 
 
37 Transport & 
Equipment 
-0.8393 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 41 Measuring 
Instruments 
-0.7885 0 
 
44 Electric & Heat 
Power 
-0.9892 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0.0179 0.102 
 
42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
1 45 Gas Production -0.6643 0 
 
46 Water Production -0.9988 0 
          0 42 Other Manufacturing 0 1 
     1 60 Coal Mining -0.9195 0 
     The first line represents a hypothesis test that TFP for group 0 has smaller values than for group 1. The related D 
indicates the largest difference between the distribution functions in this direction. The second line represents a 
hypothesis test that TFP for group 0 has larger values than for group 1. The related D indicates the largest difference 
between the distribution functions in this direction. 
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 Table 6: Province Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Equality of Distribution Functions 
Group Code Province D P-value   Code Province D P-value 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0111 0 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0396 0 
1 11 Beijing -0.0875 0 
 
12 Tianjin -0.0269 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0019 0.675 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 13 Hebei -0.141 0 
 
14 Shanxi -0.3555 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0019 0.904 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0037 0.23 
1 15 Inner Mongolia -0.2411 0 
 
21 Liaoning -0.1563 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0003 0.997 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 22 Jilin -0.2959 0 
 
23 Heilongjiang -0.3087 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0788 0 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0423 0 
1 31 Shanghai -0.0096 0 
 
32 Jiangsu -0.0317 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0708 0 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0006 0.976 
1 33 Zheijiang -0.0173 0 
 
34 Anhui -0.1501 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0004 0.983 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0027 0.678 
1 35 Fujian -0.0707 0 
 
36 Jiangxi -0.2454 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0022 0.415 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0028 0.395 
1 37 Shandong -0.0562 0 
 
41 Henan -0.1789 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0037 0.313 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 42 Hubei -0.1593 0 
 
43 Hunan -0.2045 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0024 0.753 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 45 Guanxi -0.2671 0 
 
46 Hainan -0.2996 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0023 0.814 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0004 0.985 
1 50 Chongqing -0.2054 0 
 
51 Sichuan -0.204 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0035 0.686 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0002 0.999 
1 52 Guizhou -0.3337 0 
 
53 Yunnan -0.3107 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0009 0.997 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 54 Tibet -0.506 0 
 
61 Shaanxi -0.3108 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0003 0.997 
 
44 Guangdong 0.0014 0.987 
1 62 Gansu -0.3594 0 
 
63 Qinghai -0.3846 0 
          0 44 Guangdong 0.0002 1 
 
44 Guangdong 0 1 
1 64 Ningxia -0.1785 0 
 
65 Xinjiang -0.3033 0 
The first line represents a hypothesis test that TFP for group 0 has smaller values than for group 1. The related D indicates the 
largest difference between the distribution functions in this direction. The second line represents a hypothesis test that TFP for 
group 0 has larger values than for group 1. The related D indicates the largest difference between the distribution functions in 
this direction.  
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Figure 1: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms belonging to the Apparel & Footwear and Machinery 
& Equipment Industries 
Figure 2: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms operating in 1998 and 2007 
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Figure 3: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms according to their political affiliation 
Figure 4: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms according to their State paid-in capital 
ownership share 
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Figure 5: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms based in the Guizhou and Shanghai provinces 
Figure 6: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms undertaking R&D and those not doing so 
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Figure 7: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for exporting firms vs. non-exporting ones 
Figure 8: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms based in Guangdong and Guizhou in 1998 
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Figure 9: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms based in Guangdong and Guizhou in 2007 
Figure 10: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms based in Guangdong and Yunnan in 1998 
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Figure 12: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms belonging to the Other Manufacturing and Leather 
industries in 1998 
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Figure 11: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms based in Guangdong and Yunnan in 2007 
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Figure 13: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms belonging to the Other Manufacturing and Leather 
industries in 2007 
Figure 14: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms belonging to the Other Manufacturing and 
Apparel & Footwear industries in 1998 
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Figure 15: Empirical cumulative TFP distributions for firms belonging to the Other Manufacturing and Apparel & 
Footwear industries in 2007 
 152 
4. An Analysis of the Determinants of TFP Growth  
Chapter 3 analysed the determinants of TFP levels across Chinese firms during the period of 
1998-2007. This chapter analyses the determinants of TFP growth during the same period. A 
decomposition of TFP growth can provide policymakers with an understanding of the 
underlying determinants. Policy measures targeting them would spur TFP growth and 
consequently drive national economic growth. 
The decomposition of TFP growth is performed in Section 4.1 using the Haltiwanger (1997) 
approach, which breaks down aggregate TFP growth into the contributions provided by the 
following: firms becoming more productive over time, the reallocation of resources through 
contraction and expansion of output shares between firms characterized by different TFP 
levels, the entrance of relatively high productive firms, and the exit of relatively low 
productive firms. In order to gain an additional understanding of the determinants of TFP 
growth, the decomposition is also performed at the industry, province and political 
affiliation/ownership levels.  
Melitz and Polanec (2012) have found that the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition 
methodology generates biases in the measurement of the contribution to TFP growth from 
entering and exiting firms. Thus, their methodology is also adopted in Section 4.2 in order to 
check which set of results is the most appropriate. 
 
4.1. Haltiwanger’s (1997) Decomposition 
In this study, a decomposition of aggregate TFP growth is applied using following the 
methodology of Haltiwanger (1997), which represents a modified version of Baily et al.’s 
(1992) approach. In this section, the description of the methodology follows that of 
Haltiwanger (1997). Using the firm-level TFP estimates resulting from the application of 
SYS-GMM, an industry index of aggregate productivity in year 𝑡 is determined as a weighted 
average of individual firm-level productivity: 
                                                              ln 𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑖
                                                         (58) 
Its growth rate between year 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 𝑘 is then calculated as follows: 
                                                           ∆ ln 𝑃𝑡 = ln 𝑃𝑡 − ln 𝑃𝑡−𝑘                                                     (59) 
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In (58), 𝜃𝑖𝑡 represents the share of gross output for firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 in its industry (using 
1998 prices), while 𝑃𝑖𝑡 represents TFP for firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡.  
In general, the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition approach disentangles TFP growth into the 
contributions provided by the following: firms that continue to operate between time 𝑡 
and 𝑡 − 𝑘; firms that enter into their related industry at time 𝑡; and firms that exit from their 
related industries at time 𝑡 − 𝑘.  
The productivity growth between time 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 𝑘, expressed in (59) as ∆ ln 𝑃𝑡, can be further 
decomposed into the following terms: 
 
∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡−𝑘∆ ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + ∑( ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − ln 𝑃𝑡−𝑘) ∆𝜃𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∆ ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡∆𝜃𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡 (ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑃𝑡−𝑘)
−  ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡−𝑘(ln 𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑘 − ln 𝑃𝑡−𝑘)                                                                        (60) 
 
The first term represents the impact on TFP of the resource reallocation within firms 
operating both at times 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 𝑘, according to their initial shares of output in their related 
industries. The second term represents a between-firm component indicating a change in 
output share, weighted by the deviation of the firm’s initial productivity from the initial 
industry index. The third term represents the covariance effect, which measures whether a 
firm’s increasing productivity corresponds to an increasing market share. The fourth term 
describes the contribution of entrant firms to their related industry’s TFP growth, measured 
with respect to the initial industry index. The fifth term measures the contribution of exiting 
firms to their related industry’s TFP, measured with respect to the initial industry index.  
The between-firm, the entry and exit components are expressed in terms of their deviation 
from the overall industry productivity index ln 𝑃𝑡−𝑘. Therefore, the second term suggests that 
an existing firm contributes positively to the between-firm productivity component only if its 
productivity is higher than the initial industry average aggregate productivity. The fourth 
term suggests that an entering firm contributes positively to the entry component only if it has 
a higher productivity than the initial industry average aggregate productivity. The fifth term 
suggests that an exiting firm contributes positively to the exit component only if it has lower 
productivity than the initial industry average aggregate productivity. If exiting firms record a 
lower productivity than the initial industry average, the fifth term is expected to be negative. 
In (60), the fifth term takes a negative sign in order for it to contribute positively to TFP 
growth. 
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One issue that may arise in the TFP growth decompositions is selection bias. In this study, 
“entering” not only refers to a firm joining its respective industry but can also mean 
becoming large enough to be part of the NBS sample. At the same time, “exiting” not only 
refers to a firm leaving the industry, but can also indicate that a firm becomes too small to be 
part of the NBS sample. While one might conclude that the exclusion of small firms could 
generate a selection bias, the empirical results in the literature suggest that most firms that 
decline and become small in size usually close (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991; Bernard and 
Jensen, 2002; Disney et al., 2003; Dunne et al., 1998). Moreover, by adopting the full census 
of firms carried out for China in 2004, Brandt et al. (2012) found that the firms omitted from 
the National Bureau of Statistics sample (80% of total) only accounted for about 9.9% of 
output and 2.5% of exports in 2004. This indicates that even if firms that become small do 
not close, their importance is minimal, suggesting that such exclusion is not likely to have a 
significant impact on the results of the TFP growth decompositions, thus not generating a 
selection bias.  
In summary, the Haltiwanger (1997) approach disentangles TFP growth into within-firm 
increases, between-firm increases
5
 and the contribution provided by entering and exiting 
firms. It therefore provides a complete overview of what drives TFP growth within the 
Chinese industrial sector. Moreover, in order to gain an additional understanding of the 
determinants of TFP growth, the decomposition is also performed at the industry, province 
and political affiliation/ownership levels. The Haltiwanger approach is a more informative 
measure, as it allows for output reallocation across sub-groups. It must be stressed that when 
a large number of sub-groups are considered, or when these have different shares in the total 
aggregate output, the results can be difficult to interpret. This is because the results are 
determined by the importance of each group (e.g. industry) within the economy, which is 
measured in terms of its share of total output, in addition to what is happening to TFP within 
each group. Therefore, in order to better interpret the Haltiwanger (1997) approach results, 
the figures from the decomposition are weighted to take into account the relative size of each 
group.
6
 A standard TFP index for each sub group is also produced.  
                                                          
5
 The between-firm and cross-firm effects obtained through the Haltiwanger (1997) approach are combined into 
a unique ‘between firm’ effect. Although the separate information provided by each component is relevant, the 
main focus in this study is the change in annual TFP growth within firms, between firms, or through entry and 
exit. 
6
 When results are produced for all industries or all provinces, the weighted and actual figures are the same. 
When firms are then sub-divided into single industries or single provinces, the results differ since there are 
differences in the relative size of each sub-group within the whole economy. 
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Although the Haltiwanger (1997) approach is a valuable methodology for decomposing TFP 
growth, Melitz and Polanec (2012) found that it generates biases in the measurement of the 
contribution to TFP growth from entering and exiting firms. By decomposing TFP growth for 
a sample of Slovenian firms for the years 1995-2000, they compared the Haltiwanger (1997) 
approach with other methodologies, and argue that it suffers from an over-measurement of 
the contribution of entering and exiting firms to TFP growth. They also compared their own 
TFP decomposition methodology, which represents an extension of that developed by Olley 
and Pakes (1996), with those of Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001), who 
adopt the Haltiwanger (1997) approach. Melitz and Polanec’s (2012) results show a large 
positive contribution of entering firms when the Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. 
(2001) methodologies are adopted, an effect that increases over the sample period. Their 
decomposition, in contrast, indicates that entry provides an almost null contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth, as entering firms have, on average, nearly the same TFP level 
as existing firms for each time period. These results highlight that the TFP dynamic 
decomposition developed by Melitz and Polanec (2012) provides a more suitable measure 
than Haltiwanger’s (1997) because it utilises different TFP reference levels to measure the 
contribution of surviving, entering and exiting firms to aggregate TFP, thus eliminating the 
measurement biases that characterise the Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001) 
methodologies. In order to confirm this finding, and to verify which set of results is the most 
appropriate, the Melitz and Polanec (2012) decomposition methodology is also adopted. 
4.1.1.  Results of the Haltiwanger (1997) Decomposition 
Table 8: Firm-level TFP Growth (average % p.a.) in Chinese Industrial Sector (1998-2007) 
          China 
Haltiwanger Approach 
    
SYS-GMM 
Actual TFP Growth 
    
9.68 
     
 
Decomposition of TFP Growth 
    
 
Within Firm 
    
2.13 
Between Firm 
    
2.42 
Entering Firms 
    
7.03 
Exiting Firms 
    
-1.90 
     
 
TFP Index 
    
 
1998 
    
1.00 
2007         2.39 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
 
 156 
Table 8 reports the main results from the decomposition of TFP growth for the Chinese 
industrial sector according to the Haltiwanger (1997) approach. The annual average TFP 
growth recorded between 1998 and 2007 by Chinese firms is 9.68%. The figures suggest that 
this growth is mainly due to the entrance of new firms having higher TFP than existing ones, 
with the former contributing 7.03% to the aggregate annual average TFP growth. This finding 
is in line with the results of Brandt et al. (2012), who found that the net entry of firms 
accounts for more than two-thirds of annual average growth in TFP. The exit of more 
productive firms contributes negatively to the overall figure, with -1.9%. Moreover, the 
contribution to the overall annual average TFP growth resulting from existing firms 
becoming more productive over time is just 2.13%. There is also a small positive contribution 
of 2.42% to the aggregate TFP growth resulting from the between-firm effect, or the 
reallocation of resources through the contraction and expansion of output shares between 
firms characterized by different productivity levels. The TFP index for the whole sample 
increases from 1.00 in 1998 to 2.39 to 2007. 
The approach used to decompose the aggregate annual average TFP growth can also be used 
to measure the contributions from related sub-groups according to industry, province and 
political affiliation/ownership levels. These groups can be also decomposed, hence indicating 
the impact of intra- and inter-resource reallocations, and the impact of firms’ entry and exit 
from their industries.  
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4.1.2. Results for Industry, Province and Political Affiliation/Ownership Decompositions  
Table 9: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) in Industry Sub-sectors, 1998-2007, China 
  
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Within Between Entering Exiting      
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Firms Firms 1998 2007 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
      
Water Production 0.24 45.05 2.86 26.89 -7.09 22.39 0.53 0.24 
Petroleum Processing 2.56 26.22 3.93 18.70 -4.00 7.59 9.77 3.39 
Machinery & Equipment 1.08 15.82 4.23 1.42 9.09 1.08 6.84 11.52 
Nonmetal Products 0.81 15.34 4.01 2.66 -2.94 11.61 5.30 5.18 
Metal Products 2.03 14.32 1.85 2.37 16.68 -6.57 14.16 18.29 
Transport Equipment 0.94 13.92 4.51 0.66 9.65 -0.90 6.75 9.02 
Other Mining 0.20 13.41 5.01 1.61 1.28 5.50 1.50 1.78 
Gas Production 0.04 13.21 1.99 0.21 13.31 -2.31 0.31 0.31 
Electric power and heating 1.02 12.65 6.77 5.00 -9.93 10.80 8.09 6.75 
Medical 0.28 12.20 2.64 4.98 -5.92 10.51 2.33 1.83 
Measuring instrument 0.50 11.30 1.39 1.54 11.42 -3.06 4.41 7.30 
Food Production 0.14 8.06 1.95 -1.60 14.06 -6.34 1.75 1.83 
Coal Mining 0.21 7.89 3.34 0.71 2.89 0.95 2.62 2.31 
Tobacco 0.18 7.24 3.06 0.35 -0.57 4.41 2.45 1.16 
Furniture 0.03 5.98 0.40 -0.07 6.12 -0.47 0.47 0.74 
Timber 0.04 5.58 1.21 0.22 1.83 2.32 0.80 1.16 
Apparel & Footwear 0.08 2.58 2.32 -1.96 8.05 -5.82 3.10 2.81 
Rubber 0.02 1.86 1.39 -0.09 6.70 -6.14 1.30 1.12 
Papermaking 0.01 0.29 0.04 -1.43 14.90 -13.21 2.10 1.96 
Chemical -0.07 -0.75 -2.03 -1.54 11.84 -9.02 9.61 8.40 
Cultural -0.01 -1.01 2.44 -5.80 9.22 -6.87 0.88 0.66 
Plastic -0.04 -1.68 -2.74 -3.17 19.96 -15.74 2.44 2.38 
Printing -0.02 -2.51 0.72 -5.11 9.76 -7.87 0.88 0.63 
Textile -0.25 -3.44 -0.28 -2.72 13.74 -14.18 7.30 6.08 
Leather -0.07 -3.45 -0.16 -5.56 19.18 -16.90 1.89 1.61 
Other manufacturing -0.27 -11.14 -5.16 -2.54 8.05 -11.49 2.42 1.56 
 
      
  
      
All Sectors 9.68 9.68 2.13 2.42 7.03 -1.90 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
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Table 9 reports the results for the industry-level decomposition of actual annual average 
growth in TFP according to the Haltiwanger (1997) approach. Column (1) reports the average 
percentage per annum TFP growth according to equation (60). However, these figures do not 
account for the differences in the relative size of each sub-group, measured in terms of the 
output shares indicated in columns (7) and (8), which correspond to 1998 and 2007, 
respectively. In column (2), the values from column (1) are weighted by the base year output 
shares shown in column (7). Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) represent the decomposition of the 
annual weighted average TFP growth, with the rows summing to make the numbers in 
column (2).  
In terms of absolute annual average TFP growth, as represented by the actual figures in 
column (1), the highest growth is recorded by the petroleum processing, metal products and 
machinery & equipment industries, while the lowest growth is recorded by the other 
manufacturing, textile and chemical industries. The figures in column (2) take into account 
the relative size of each sector in the base year. Here, the water production industry records 
the strongest annual weighted average TFP growth, followed by the petroleum processing 
and machinery & equipment industries. The lowest annual weighted average TFP growth is 
recorded by the other manufacturing, leather and textile industries.  
In terms of the TFP growth decomposition, the figures in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) show 
that the highest performing industries are characterised by a strong effect from the entry of 
new firms, which is the case for the machinery & equipment, metal products and transport 
equipment industries. The high performing industries also show a strong effect from the exit 
of firms, which is the case for the water production, petroleum processing and non-metal 
products industries. The worst performing industries are characterized by a strong effect from 
both the entry and exit of more productive firms, as is the case in the other manufacturing, 
leather and textile industries. 
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Table 10: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) in Provinces, 1998-2007, China 
 
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Within Between Entering Exiting      
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Firms Firms 1998 2007 
Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
      
Jiangxi 0.32 26.46 5.50 2.30 16.79 1.87 1.22 1.99 
Inner Mongolia 0.20 23.13 5.33 -0.37 16.98 1.18 0.84 1.54 
Xinjiang 0.27 20.21 3.95 15.40 -0.98 1.84 1.33 -0.06 
Heilongjiang 0.65 19.63 -7.32 25.61 0.27 1.07 3.33 0.91 
Shandong 1.57 17.76 3.90 2.85 10.60 0.42 8.83 12.59 
Qinghai 0.04 17.68 2.03 1.85 -1.37 15.17 0.25 2.37 
Gansu 0.15 15.30 3.94 4.78 0.53 6.05 0.99 0.78 
Hunan 0.25 14.33 1.99 1.47 10.86 0.01 1.75 1.88 
Chongqing 0.16 12.82 2.19 -0.02 6.85 3.80 1.23 1.16 
Liaoning 0.66 12.44 4.30 5.00 3.49 -0.35 5.34 4.40 
Sichuan 0.31 12.41 3.43 3.69 6.07 -0.78 2.49 2.37 
Anhui 0.27 12.38 4.63 4.83 5.14 -2.22 2.22 2.08 
Beijing 0.28 10.67 3.89 2.60 5.43 -1.25 2.59 3.14 
Henan 0.51 10.63 2.55 4.14 6.18 -2.24 4.76 4.99 
Hebei 0.51 10.38 1.73 4.87 6.75 -2.98 4.92 4.70 
Zhejiang 0.67 10.14 0.84 0.37 14.93 -6.00 6.60 9.09 
Shanxi 0.17 9.65 2.69 2.32 2.32 2.32 1.72 1.93 
Yunnan 0.18 9.56 1.69 0.43 3.45 3.98 1.86 1.16 
Jilin 0.18 9.48 3.79 -0.35 2.94 3.10 1.90 1.31 
Guangxi 0.12 9.45 3.46 0.90 5.48 -0.40 1.26 1.09 
Shaanxi 0.10 9.25 3.55 4.26 0.18 1.26 1.11 1.09 
Fujian 0.21 8.14 1.66 -0.84 10.57 -3.25 2.64 3.17 
Ningxia 0.03 7.82 0.22 0.16 4.16 3.29 0.36 0.31 
Hainan 0.02 7.39 3.58 -4.60 7.25 1.16 0.24 0.22 
Jiangsu 0.85 7.02 1.76 0.58 10.16 -5.48 12.15 13.25 
Tianjin 0.21 6.89 2.85 2.96 6.00 -4.92 3.00 2.50 
Guizhou 0.05 6.88 3.53 -0.67 1.96 2.05 0.71 0.56 
Hubei 0.17 4.61 1.44 3.02 3.83 -3.68 3.60 2.43 
Shanghai 0.24 2.88 2.64 -2.16 6.14 -3.74 8.19 6.72 
Guangdong 0.35 2.79 0.85 -1.09 5.27 -2.24 12.68 11.96 
 
      
  
      
All Provinces 9.69 9.68 2.13 2.42 7.03 -1.90 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
  
Table 10 reports the Haltiwanger (1997) sub-decomposition of annual average TFP growth 
for Chinese provinces. As represented in column (1), the highest actual TFP growths are 
recorded by Shandong, Jiangsu and Liaoning, while Hainan, Ningxia and Qinghai record the 
lowest growth. The figures in column (2) take into account the relative size of each province 
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in the base year. In this case, the provinces of Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang 
provinces record the highest annual weighted average TFP growth, while the provinces of 
Guangdong, Shanghai and Hubei record the lowest annual weighted average TFP growth. 
The fact that Western provinces such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang record high TFP 
growth while coastal provinces such as Shanghai and Guangdong record low TFP growth 
might reflect a “catch up” effect of less developed provinces with more developed ones, 
which are typically located on the coast. 
In terms of the TFP growth decomposition, the figures in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) 
indicate that provinces with high TFP growth show a strong effect of firms’ entry, such as in 
Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia and Shandong, and a strong between-firm effect, such as in Xinjiang 
and Heilongjiang. Provinces characterized by low TFP growth, such as Hubei, Shanghai and 
Guangdong, show a strong contribution from the effects of both firms’ entry and exit. 
Table 11: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) by Group 1998-2007, China 
 
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Within Between Entering Exiting      
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Firms Firms 1998 2007 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
      
State<25%/No Politics 5.86 50.39 2.33 -0.12 52.69 -4.51 11.62 54.33 
State<25%/High Politics 1.97 18.46 7.62 10.37 -2.00 2.47 10.67 11.78 
State>=50%/High Politics 2.30 8.95 2.31 3.83 -0.69 3.51 25.67 10.70 
State>=50%/No Politics 0.07 8.48 0.27 1.63 6.86 -0.28 0.82 0.63 
25<State<50%/No Politics 0.02 3.52 1.05 -1.54 5.65 -1.63 0.48 0.40 
State>=50%/Medium Politics 0.20 1.26 0.97 0.86 0.19 -0.75 15.80 3.66 
25<State<50%/Medium Politics 0.00 0.05 1.21 0.78 0.60 -2.55 2.45 0.72 
25<State<50%/High Politics -0.02 -1.21 1.94 2.13 -2.55 -2.74 1.29 0.74 
State<25%/Medium Politics -0.71 -2.28 0.78 0.50 3.85 -7.41 31.21 17.04 
        
  
      
All Groups 9.68 9.68 2.13 2.42 7.03 -1.90 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
  
Table 11 reports the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition of annual average TFP growth for 
groups of firms according to their political affiliation and State share ownership of paid-in 
capital. In terms of absolute annual average TFP growth, as represented in column (1), the 
highest is recorded by non-politically affiliated firms whose paid-in capital State share 
ownership is lower than 25%, while firms having medium political affiliation and whose 
paid-in capital State share ownership is smaller than 25% record the lowest annual average 
TFP growth. The figures in column (2) take into account the relative size of each group 
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during the base year. Of these, non-politically affiliated firms whose paid-in capital State 
share ownership is lower than 25% record the highest annual weighted average TFP growth, 
while medium politically affiliated firms whose paid-in capital State share ownership is 
below 25% record the lowest weighted annual average TFP growth per annum. These figures 
indicate that Chinese industrial firms benefit in terms of high TFP growth from a lack of 
government influence in terms of both political affiliation and paid-in capital share 
ownership.  
In terms of TFP growth decomposition, the figures in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) indicate 
that the entry of new firms underlies the strong TFP growth recorded by non-politically 
affiliated firms whose paid-in capital State share ownership is less than 25%. At the same 
time, there is a strong negative effect on TFP growth of the exit of firms that are more 
productive than the existing average for medium and highly politically affiliated firms whose 
paid-in capital State share ownership is less than 50%. 
In summary, the results from using the Haltiwanger (1997) approach show an annual average 
TFP growth of 9.68% during the period of 1998-2007 for the Chinese firms in the sample. 
The figures suggest that this growth is mainly due to the entrance of new firms having a 
relatively high TFP, with these firms contributing 7.03% to the overall annual average TFP 
growth. The contributions of the other components are mild: -1.9% due to the exit of more 
productive firms; 2.13% contribution from TFP improvements within existing firms; and 
2.42% resulting from the between-firm effect, which represents the reallocation of resources 
through the contraction and expansion of output shares between firms characterized by 
different productivity levels. The TFP index for the entire sample increases from 1.00 in 1998 
to 2.39 to 2007. These results suggest that policy measures favouring the entrance of new, 
dynamic and innovative firms would be conducive to TFP growth within the Chinese 
industrial sector. Among industries, water production records the strongest annual weighted 
average TFP growth, while the other manufacturing industry records the lowest annual 
weighted average TFP growth.  
Among provinces, Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang record the highest annual weighted 
average TFP growth, while Guangdong, Shanghai and Hubei record the lowest TFP growth. 
Such results suggest the existence of a “catch-up” effect of less developed Western provinces 
to the highly developed Eastern ones.  
Firms that are not politically affiliated and whose State paid-in capital share ownership is 
below 25% record the highest annual weighted average TFP growth, while medium 
politically affiliated firms whose State paid-in capital ownership is less than 25% record the 
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lowest TFP growth. These results indicate that policy measures aimed at decreasing the role 
of the State in the Chinese industrial sector, both in terms of political affiliation and paid-in 
capital share ownership, are conducive to higher TFP growth.  
This section has introduced the Haltiwanger (1997) approach for decomposing TFP growth 
and discussed the results based on its application in the Chinese industrial sector. The next 
section introduces the Melitz and Polanec (2012) approach and discusses the related results. 
 
4.2. Melitz and Polanec (2012) Decomposition  
This section describes the TFP decomposition methodology of Melitz and Polanec (2012). 
Firms’ aggregate productivity is calculated as: 
 
Φ𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡 + ∑(𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡)(𝜑𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡)
𝑖
 
Here, ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1  is the unweighted firm productivity mean and ?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑛𝑡
 is the mean 
market share. Melitz and Polanec (2012) use the following Olley and Pakes (1996) 
decomposition: 
                                                ∆Φ = Δ?̅?𝑆 + Δ𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆                                                          (62) 
In this case, the change in aggregate TFP is given by the sum of the change in weighted 
average TFP across firms and the covariance between firms’ productivity and market share.  
Equation (62) is subsequently decomposed into: 
 
∆Φ = (Φ𝑆2 − Φ𝑆1) + 𝑠𝐸2(Φ𝐸2 − Φ𝑆2) + 𝑠𝑋1(Φ𝑆1 − Φ𝑋1) 
= Δ?̅?𝑆 + Δ𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆 + 𝑠𝐸2(Φ𝐸2 − Φ𝑆2) + 𝑠𝑋1(Φ𝑆1 − Φ𝑋1) 
In the first line of equation (63), aggregate productivity growth is decomposed into the 
contribution provided by existing firms, entering firms and exiting firms. In the second line, 
the contribution of existing firms is further decomposed into the contribution provided by a 
shift in productivity, represented by the un-weighted mean growth in the productivity of 
existing firms Δ?̅?𝑆, and the contribution provided by market share Δ𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑆 across existing 
firms. This represents the covariance between existing firms’ market share and TFP.  
The Haltiwanger (1997) approach adopts the same TFP reference level to measure the 
contributions to aggregate TFP growth provided by existing firms, entering firms, and exiting 
(63) 
(61) 
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firms. The TFP reference level is represented by the aggregate TFP for the period 𝑡 = 1, and 
is adopted because existing firms are tracked over time. In contrast, Melitz and Polanec 
(2012) adopt three different TFP reference levels for existing, entering, and exiting firms. In 
the case of existing firms, the TFP reference level is represented by their aggregate 
productivity at time 𝑡 = 1. In the case of entering firms, it is the aggregate productivity of 
existing firms at time 𝑡 = 2. In the case of exiting firms, it is the aggregate productivity of 
existing firms at time 𝑡 = 1. Such TFP reference levels indicate that existing firms make a 
positive contribution to the aggregate figure if their productivity at time 𝑡 = 2 is higher than 
at time 𝑡 = 1. Entering firms make a positive contribution to the aggregate figure if their 
productivity when they enter at time 𝑡 = 2 is higher than the productivity of existing firms. 
Exiting firms make a positive contribution to the aggregate figure if their productivity when 
they exit at time 𝑡 = 1 is lower than the productivity of existing firms. 
Based on a sample of Slovenian manufacturing firms operating during 1995-2000, Melitz and 
Polanec’s (2012) results suggest that their decomposition approach, as well as those of 
Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001), are characterised by almost the same 
contribution of existing, entering and exiting firms when a one-year sample interval is 
considered. However, the components’ contributions seem to differ as the time interval is 
widened. The results indicate the existence of an over-measurement of the positive 
contribution of both entering and exiting firms to aggregate TFP when the Griliches and 
Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001) methodologies are adopted. Such contributions also 
seem to increase over time. This is because entering firms have almost the same productivity 
as existing ones in each year, hence lowering the TFP reference level in the Griliches and 
Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001) decomposition approaches, and increasing the entering 
firms’ contribution over time. The TFP reference level in these decomposition approaches 
seems to be below Φ𝑆2. At the same time, the TFP reference level for exiting firms seems to 
be above Φ𝑆1, thus increasing the contribution of exiting firms to aggregate TFP growth.  
The above discussion suggests the existence of an over-measurement of the contribution of 
entering and exiting firms when the Foster et al. (2001) decomposition, which follows the 
approach of Haltiwanger (1997), is adopted. Melitz and Polanec (2012) found that this 
corresponds to an under-measurement of 7-10% over five years of the contribution provided 
by existing firms. Among sub-components, this effect seems to be mainly attributable to the 
between-firm effect, or the reallocation of resources. According to the results of Melitz and 
Polanec’s (2012) methodology, the contribution from the reallocation of resources is 5% over 
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five years, or double that found using the Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (2001) 
methodologies. Moreover, the results of Melitz and Polanec’s (2012) TFP decomposition 
approach indicate that the contribution of entering firms to aggregate productivity is about 
zero and does not increase over time, thus suggesting the existence of an over-measurement 
issue in the other two methodologies particularly in the Foster et al. (2001) approach. 
These results highlight that the TFP dynamic decomposition of Melitz and Polanec (2012) 
represents a more suitable measure than the one used by Haltiwanger (1997), as it utilises 
different TFP reference levels to measure the contribution of surviving, entering and exiting 
firms to aggregate TFP, thus eliminating measurement biases that characterise Haltiwanger’s 
methodology. In order to confirm this, and to verify which set of results are the most 
appropriate, Melitz and Polanec’s (2012) methodology is also adopted in this study and its 
results discussed in the following subsection. 
4.2.1.  Results of the Melitz and Polanec (2012) Decomposition. 
Table 12: Firm-level TFP Growth (average % p.a.) in the Chinese Industrial Sector (1998-2007) 
          China 
Melitz and Polanec (2012) Approach 
    
SYS-GMM 
Actual TFP Growth 
    
9.68 
      Decomposition of TFP Growth 
     Within Firm 
    
3.15 
Between Firm 
    
6.47 
Entering Firms 
    
3.51 
Exiting Firms 
    
-3.45 
      TFP Index 
     1998 
    
1.00 
2007         2.39 
      
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
 
Table 12 reports the main results of the decomposition of productivity growth according to 
the Melitz and Polanec (2012) approach. The annual average TFP growth of Chinese firms 
recorded during the period of 1998-2007 is 9.68%. The figures indicate that such growth 
mainly results from the between-firm effect, which contributes 6.47% to the aggregate annual 
average TFP growth, a much larger contribution than the 2.42% seen in the results from the 
Haltiwanger decomposition. While in the results of the Haltiwanger decomposition approach, 
the entrance of new firms contributes 7.03% to the annual average TFP growth, this figure is 
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just 3.15% with the Melitz and Polanec (2012) approach. This finding confirms the results of 
Melitz and Polanec (2012) and provides further evidence for the existence of an over-
measurement issue of the “entering firms” component of TFP growth when the Haltiwanger 
(1997) decomposition methodology is adopted. Consistent with the -1.9% TFP growth 
obtained with the application of the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition, the results suggest a 
productivity decrease due to the exit of more productive firms, although in this case, the 
effect is stronger, with a -3.45% contribution to the overall figure. Moreover, the contribution 
resulting from existing firms becoming more productive over time is just 3.15%, slightly 
larger than the 2.13% found with the Haltiwanger decomposition. As with the results from 
the application of the Haltiwanger approach, the TFP index for the entire sample increases 
from 1.00 in 1998 to 2.39 to 2007. 
  
 166 
4.2.2. Results for Industry Sub-sectors, Provinces and Ownership/Political Affiliation 
Table 13: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) in Industry Sub-sectors, 1998-2007, China 
  
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Within Between 
 
    
 
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Enterers Exitors 1998 2007 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
    
 
Water Production 0.38 71.90 23.38 35.25 -7.98 21.25 0.53 0.24 
Petroleum Processing 4.36 44.68 0.82 42.46 -5.36 6.76 9.77 3.39 
Machinery & Equipment 0.97 14.12 14.54 -2.52 2.59 -0.49 6.84 11.52 
Nonmetal Products 0.91 17.21 20.03 -5.34 -7.09 9.61 5.30 5.18 
Metal Products 1.67 11.78 -2.71 9.92 12.73 -8.15 14.16 18.29 
Transport Equipment 0.84 12.48 5.33 3.90 5.39 -2.13 6.75 9.02 
Other Mining 0.22 14.37 15.59 -1.39 -3.47 3.64 1.50 1.78 
Gas Production 0.04 12.52 8.22 -0.67 9.09 -4.12 0.31 0.31 
Electric power and heat power 0.79 9.81 4.64 7.53 -12.06 9.70 8.09 6.75 
Medical 0.29 12.24 6.20 5.28 -8.37 9.14 2.33 1.83 
Measuring instruments 0.13 2.95 1.83 1.76 4.33 -4.97 4.41 7.30 
Food Production 0.12 6.94 5.83 -0.53 9.75 -8.11 1.75 1.83 
Coal Mining 0.19 7.32 4.10 2.21 1.10 -0.09 2.62 2.31 
Tobacco 0.14 5.74 0.78 3.66 -1.25 2.54 2.45 1.16 
Furniture 0.00 -0.24 4.94 -0.64 -1.99 -2.55 0.47 0.74 
Timber 0.00 -0.55 7.18 -2.01 -5.70 -0.01 0.80 1.16 
Apparel and Footwear 0.10 3.35 8.51 -2.04 4.52 -7.64 3.10 2.81 
Rubber 0.03 2.51 4.60 1.26 4.46 -7.81 1.30 1.12 
Papermaking 0.00 0.20 -0.23 4.17 11.42 -15.17 2.10 1.96 
Chemical -0.39 -4.07 -0.56 -1.62 8.72 -10.62 9.61 8.40 
Cultural 0.00 -0.36 5.97 -4.48 6.44 -8.29 0.88 0.66 
Plastic -0.12 -4.84 -12.00 8.68 16.05 -17.57 2.44 2.38 
Printing 0.00 -0.29 4.13 -2.25 7.19 -9.36 0.88 0.63 
Textile -0.48 -6.52 -0.98 0.23 10.45 -16.22 7.30 6.08 
Leather -0.13 -6.64 -1.07 -2.49 15.67 -18.75 1.89 1.61 
Other manufacturing -0.38 -15.68 -9.29 0.72 6.08 -13.19 2.42 1.56 
 
      
  
    
 
All Sectors 9.68 9.68 3.15 6.47 3.51 -3.45 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
  
The results from the industry sub-decomposition represented in Table 13 suggest that, in 
terms of actual annual average TFP growth, as represented by the figures in column (1), the 
highest growth is seen for the petroleum processing, metal products, and machinery & 
equipment industries, while the lowest growth is seen for the other manufacturing, chemical 
and textile industries. These results are similar to those obtained from the Haltiwanger (1997) 
decomposition. When the relative size of each industry during the base year is taken into 
account, resulting in the figures in column (2), the water production, petroleum processing 
and non-metal products industries record the highest annual weighted average TFP growth, 
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while the textile, leather and other manufacturing industries record the lowest performance. 
These results are similar to those obtained from the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition.  
Looking at the figures in columns (3), (4), (5), (6), which are decomposed for each industry, 
the industries that have experienced rapid TFP growth are characterized by a strong impact of 
the within-firm effect, including the water production, non-metal products and other mining 
industries. These also show a strong impact of the between-firm effect, such as in the water 
production and petroleum processing industries. On the other hand, the industries recording 
the lowest growth see a strong impact of the exit of more productive firms and the entrance of 
new ones. This is the case for the other manufacturing, leather and textile industries. 
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Table 14: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) in Provinces, 1998-2007, China 
 
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Within Between 
 
    
 
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Enterers Exitors 1998 2007 
Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
    
 
Jiangxi 0.27 22.16 6.88 4.31 10.71 0.26 1.22 1.99 
Inner Mongolia 0.16 18.95 7.35 3.37 8.39 -0.16 0.84 1.54 
Xinjiang 0.47 35.85 2.04 36.10 -2.97 0.67 1.33 0.59 
Heilongjiang 1.20 36.11 1.45 34.98 -0.55 0.23 3.33 0.91 
Shandong 1.47 16.66 4.22 7.76 5.81 -1.13 8.83 12.59 
Qinghai 0.03 13.28 1.60 3.17 -4.45 12.96 0.25 0.20 
Gansu 0.16 15.80 4.03 8.35 -0.71 4.13 0.99 0.78 
Hunan 0.22 12.64 7.62 1.05 6.17 -2.20 1.75 1.88 
Chongqing 0.14 11.10 4.09 1.67 3.38 1.96 1.23 1.16 
Liaoning 0.90 16.95 3.00 15.22 0.39 -1.66 5.34 4.40 
Sichuan 0.33 13.20 8.27 4.27 2.96 -2.31 2.49 2.37 
Anhui 0.36 16.42 3.12 14.92 2.07 -3.69 2.22 2.08 
Beijing 0.20 7.69 1.58 6.47 2.16 -2.52 2.59 3.14 
Henan 0.48 10.12 5.84 4.65 3.31 -3.68 4.76 4.99 
Hebei 0.51 10.31 2.90 8.26 3.71 -4.56 4.92 4.70 
Zhejiang 0.52 7.86 1.82 4.43 9.41 -7.81 6.60 9.09 
Shaanxi 0.10 9.14 4.57 7.33 -2.61 -0.15 1.11 1.09 
Yunnan 0.19 10.41 3.85 2.19 1.81 2.56 1.86 1.16 
Jilin 0.19 10.02 3.09 4.27 0.87 1.79 1.90 1.31 
Guangxi 0.13 9.94 7.04 2.65 2.49 -2.23 1.26 1.09 
Shanxi 0.12 6.88 3.13 3.43 -0.59 0.91 1.72 1.93 
Fujian 0.16 6.19 1.33 3.23 6.15 -4.53 2.64 3.17 
Ningxia -0.003 -0.84 2.04 -5.28 1.15 1.24 0.36 0.31 
Hainan 0.01 4.92 4.23 -1.95 2.84 -0.19 0.24 0.22 
Jiangsu 0.81 6.76 3.50 3.99 6.36 -7.09 12.05 13.15 
Tianjin 0.27 9.14 2.34 10.02 3.14 -6.37 3.00 2.50 
Guizhou 0.06 9.03 9.25 -0.06 -0.76 0.61 0.71 0.56 
Hubei 0.19 5.17 2.89 5.65 2.03 -5.41 3.60 2.43 
Shanghai 0.08 1.03 1.80 1.12 3.25 -5.14 8.19 6.72 
Guangdong -0.07 -0.55 0.98 1.29 1.22 -4.03 12.68 11.96 
 
      
  
    
 
  9.68 9.68 3.15 6.47 3.51 -3.45 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
  
Table 14 reports the Melitz and Polanec (2012) sub-decomposition of annual average TFP 
growth for Chinese provinces. In terms of actual annual average TFP growth, as represented 
in column (1), the highest is recorded by Shandong, Heilongjiang and Liaoning, while 
Hainan, Ningxia and Guangdong provinces record the lowest. These results partly contrast 
those obtained from the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition, in which the best performing 
provinces were Shandong, Jiangsu and Liaoning, while Hainan, Ningxia and Qinghai were 
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the worst performing. In terms of annual weighted average TFP growth, Heilongjiang, 
Xinjiang and Jiangxi record the best performance, while Shanghai, Guangdong and Ningxia 
record the worst. These results differ from those from the Haltiwanger decomposition, in 
which the best performing provinces were Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, while 
Hubei, Shanghai and Guangdong had the worst performance.  
The figures in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6), which represent the decomposition of annual 
weighted average TFP growth, indicate that the fastest growing provinces are characterized 
by a strong positive contribution from the between-firm effect, as is the case for the 
Heilongjiang, Xinjiang and Liaoning provinces. Moreover, the slowest growing provinces are 
characterised by a strong negative contribution from the exit of more productive firms, such 
as in the Guangdong and Shanghai provinces. 
Table 15: Firm-level TFP Growth (average per annum) in Groups 1998-2007, China 
 
  TFP Growth (% p.a.) Decomposition of Weighted TFP Growth Output Share (%) 
 
    Wirhin Between 
 
    
 
 
Actual  Weighted Firm Firm Enterers Exitors 1998 2007 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
      
  
    
 
State<25%/No Politics -2.92 -25.15 -52.63 1.61 31.50 -5.64 11.62 54.33 
State<25%/High Politics 0.99 9.30 -6.04 18.43 -4.74 1.64 10.67 11.78 
State>=50%/High Politics 4.45 17.35 4.59 11.85 -1.29 2.20 25.67 10.70 
State>=50%/No Politics 0.22 27.33 24.85 0.30 3.84 -1.66 0.82 0.63 
25<State<50%/No Politics -0.03 -6.56 2.34 -9.59 2.94 -2.24 0.48 0.40 
State>=50%/Medium Politics 3.26 20.64 26.36 -3.18 -0.10 -2.44 15.80 3.66 
25<State<50%/Medium Politics 0.27 11.10 15.87 -0.62 0.09 -4.23 2.45 0.72 
25<State<50%/High Politics 0.22 17.06 1.30 24.00 -3.87 -4.36 1.29 0.74 
State<25%/Medium Politics 3.22 10.30 12.64 4.90 2.25 -9.49 31.21 17.04 
        
  
    
 
All Groups 9.68 9.68 3.15 6.47 3.51 -3.45 100.00 100.00 
The second and third terms of equation (60) have been combined into the “between” component of TFP growth. 
  
Table 15 reports the Melitz and Polanec (2012) decomposition of annual average TFP growth 
for groups of firms according to their extent of political affiliation and State ownership of 
paid-in capital. Column (1) indicates that non-politically affiliated firms in which the State 
has a paid-in capital share larger than 50% record the highest actual TFP growth. On the 
other hand, non-politically affiliated firms with a State paid-in capital share ownership 
smaller than 25% record the lowest performance. These results contrast with those obtained 
from the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition, in which non-politically affiliated firms with a 
State paid-in capital ownership smaller than 25% recorded the highest growth, while medium 
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politically affiliated firms with a State paid-in capital share ownership smaller than 25% 
recorded the lowest growth.  
The figures in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) indicate an important role for within-firm TFP 
improvements for the best performing group of firms, such as those whose State paid-in 
capital ownership is larger than 50% and which are characterized by either a lack of political 
affiliation or a medium affiliation (with either the central or provincial governments). 
In summary, the results of the Melitz and Polanec (2012) decomposition approach show an 
annual average growth in TFP of 9.68% during 1998-2007 for the Chinese firms in the 
sample. The figures indicate this is mainly due to the between-firm effect, while the 
contribution from the other components is small. The TFP index for the entire sample 
increases from 1.00 in 1998 to 2.39 to 2007. Across industries, the water production, 
petroleum processing and non-metal industries record the highest annual weighted average 
TFP growth, followed by the petroleum processing and non-metal products industries, while 
the other manufacturing, leather and textile industries record the lowest growth. Across 
provinces, the Heilongjiang, Xinjiang and Jiangxi provinces record the highest annual 
weighted average TFP growth, while Ningxia, Guangdong and Shanghai record the lowest 
growth. When firms are grouped according to the extent of their political affiliation and the 
share of paid-in capital owned by the State, the firms whose State capital share ownership is 
larger than 50% and that lack political affiliation record the highest TFP growth, while firms 
having a state ownership smaller than 25% and no political affiliation record the lowest TFP 
growth. 
  
 171 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Total factor productivity is important because it generates benefits both within firms, largely 
by increasing efficiency and technological change, and beyond, by being the main driver of 
national long-run economic growth and higher living standards. Analysing TFP and its 
determinants enables an understanding of which factors policymakers can target in order to 
achieve higher TFP. While macro-level analyses are important for multi-country studies, they 
ignore the fact that firms are heterogeneous in many respects, among them TFP. A micro-
level analysis, on the other hand, enables us to infer what determines TFP levels and growth 
rates across firms, providing guidance for policymakers on how to target such determinants to 
improve TFP. Because they tend to be more targeted, micro-level analyses are more likely to 
be successful than macro-level ones, which tend to adopt a “one size fits all” approach. 
Micro-level analyses could therefore contribute to the creation of more competitive firms, 
increased living standards for citizens and sustainable long-run economic growth.  
The Chinese economy has recorded a very strong economic performance over the last three 
decades, significantly outpacing the global growth rate. Moreover, it is the second largest 
contributor to global output, after the United States. Surprisingly, the shift from a socially 
planned to a market-oriented economic system has been achieved through a slow and gradual 
approach to reform. This shift has enabled China to become an upper middle-income country 
according to the World Bank (2013) classification. The next step in China’s economic 
development would be the move to high-income country status. Such a shift could be 
achieved by pursuing policies aimed at increasing total factor productivity. 
In light of this, the study conducted in this thesis has aimed to answer the following research 
questions: 
- What factors determine TFP levels and TFP growth in Chinese industrial firms during 
the period of 1998-2007? 
- How does TFP growth differ across firms differentiated by industry, province and 
ownership/political affiliation?  
Four other studies have analysed multiple determinants of TFP in China at the firm level 
(Yao et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010; Brandt et al., 2012; Shen and Song, 2013). However, the 
current study distinguishes itself in four main respects. Firstly, the set of TFP determinants 
analysed is more comprehensive. These include political affiliation, ownership, exporting, 
competition, Marshallian (or MAR) spillovers, Jacobian (or Jacob) spillovers, city spillovers, 
liquidity, age, R&D, time trend, and marketing capabilities. It is important to include all of 
these determinants of TFP, since omitting any would produce biased estimates of the 
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production function, leading to biased estimates of TFP. The choice of determinants is also 
motivated by the empirical results in the literature and the information available in the 
Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) database. Secondly, the set of industries 
analysed is wider than in most previous studies, with 26 industries belonging to the mining, 
manufacturing and public utilities sectors. This allows for differences in technology among 
firms, thus avoiding the assumption that all firms operate using a standard technology. The 
sample adopted in this study includes both State-owned and non-State-owned firms having 
annual sales of at least RMB 5mn. The firms are located in 31 provinces, or province-
equivalent municipal cities. This unbalanced sample comprises 2,183,709 firm-year 
observations, which correspond to a large number of firms, ranging from 148,474 in 1998 to 
331,453 in 2007. Thirdly, the analysis of the determinants of TFP levels adopts the SYS-
GMM methodology, which contrasts with the semiparametric methodologies of Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) used in previous studies. The major advantage 
of this methodology, compared to the semiparametric ones, is the allowance for firms’ fixed 
effects, since previous studies have indicated that firms have unmeasured productivity 
advantages that remain constant over time and that need to be captured. Moreover SYS-
GMM has the advantage of tackling both endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables 
(including the lagged dependent variable) and selection bias by using lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments in the first differences equation, and first-differences of 
the same variables as instruments in the levels equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). SYS-
GMM is particularly preferable to the semiparametric methodologies of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), as these do not allow for fixed effects and are based 
on strong and unintuitive assumptions, which generate collinearity problems in the first stage 
of estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2006). Fourth, the analysis of the determinants of TFP growth 
is conducted using the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition approach, which separates TFP 
growth into the contributions provided by the following: a within-firm component 
representing the impact of the resource reallocation within existing firms, according to their 
initial shares of output in their related industries; a between-firm component indicating a 
change in the output share of firms, weighted by the deviation of the firm’s initial 
productivity from the initial industry index; a covariance component, measuring whether a 
firm’s increasing productivity corresponds to an increasing market share; an entering 
component indicating the contribution of entrant firms to their related industry’s TFP growth, 
measured with respect to the initial industry index; an exiting component indicating the 
contribution of exiting firms to their related industry’s TFP, measured with respect to the 
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initial industry index. In order to gain an additional understanding of how the determinants of 
TFP growth differ across firms having different characteristics, the decomposition is also 
performed at the industry, province and political affiliation/ownership levels. Since Melitz 
and Polanec (2012) find the approach developed in Haltiwanger (1997) to be characterized by 
biases, their methodology is also adopted in order to understand which set of results is the 
most appropriate. The combination of these four features distinguishes this study from 
existing studies on firm-level TFP estimation in China. 
The results of the SYS-GMM estimation of the determinants of TFP levels indicate the 
existence of increasing returns to scale in most industries, suggesting that firms produce a 
higher proportion of output from a given proportion of factor inputs. Moreover, the findings 
suggest that firms are subject to exogenous technological change. 
Various factors are found to be important in determining higher TFP levels across Chinese 
industrial firms. Firstly, the lack of State influence on firms in terms of both paid-in capital 
share ownership and political affiliation results in higher TFP. This may be due to the greater 
ability of non-politically influenced firms to enjoy the freedom to undertake decisions in their 
best interest, rather than politically motivated ones. While this is the case in most sectors, 
strategic or monopolistic sectors such as the medical, electronic power and water production 
industries obtain benefits to TFP from State influence. Despite this special case, the evidence 
indicates that policy measures aimed at decreasing the role of the State in the economy while 
increasing the role of private actors is conducive to higher total factor productivity.  
Secondly, there is evidence of a positive effect on firms’ TFP from being based in areas 
characterized by either industrial agglomeration or industrial diversity, although large city 
areas tend to generate high costs for firms that hamper their productivity. Policy measures 
favouring industrial agglomeration, such as the creation of geographic industrial clusters, 
would result in higher TFP, as firms would benefit from knowledge spillovers manifested 
through the channels of imitation/demonstration, synergies, commercial relationships, asset 
sharing, and labour pooling. Also, measures favouring industrial diversity would be 
beneficial to firms, since such a diverse environment would facilitate the transmission of 
innovation across industries. 
Thirdly, the findings indicate that younger firms tend to be more productive than their older 
counterparts. This might be explained by the ability of younger firms to adapt their business 
processes and strategies to the dynamic markets in which they operate and keep their 
technology up to date with industry best practices. Thus, policy measures aimed at facilitating 
the entrance of younger firms into the market, for example, by lowering the regulatory 
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barriers to entry and offsetting initial business costs through tax cuts or subsidies, would be 
beneficial for firms’ TFP.  
Fourth, increased levels of competition within industries are found to result in higher firm 
TFP. This is because in a competitive environment, firms are likely to be motivated to 
undertake TFP-enhancing decisions such as increasing their efficiency and undertaking 
technological change. Such a positive effect suggests that policy measures aimed at 
increasing competition within Chinese industries, such as the disbanding of cartels and the 
liberalization of both monopolistic and strategic sectors, would generate higher TFP levels. 
Chinese industrial firms are found to benefit in terms of higher TFP levels from the 
possession of marketing capabilities. Such capabilities enable firms to transform their 
resources into valuable output, to better distinguish their products from competitors, and to 
build successful brands so that they can charge a premium to customers. A higher TFP level 
can therefore be achieved by pursuing policy measures that support firms’ marketing 
capabilities, such as the provision of business consulting so that firms can better target their 
consumers. 
The positive relationship between firms’ liquidity and TFP indicates the existence of financial 
constraints, suggesting that Chinese firms have difficulties in raising external finance and 
must therefore rely on their internal liquidity to finance productive investments. A shortage of 
internal liquidity pushes firms to either postpone or cancel productive investments. Since the 
existence of financial constraints distorts the allocation of capital and thus hampers firms’ 
TFP, policy steps aimed at addressing this issue, such as the development of the bond market, 
would be beneficial.  
There are also factors that, contrary to initial expectations, do not determine higher TFP 
levels: R&D expenditure and exporting. Although R&D expenditure was expected to have 
both direct and indirect positive effects on TFP, this is not the case in most industries. It 
might be that such expenditure is focusing on the wrong areas. For example, R&D might be 
focused on improving low-priority products and processes. The findings also indicate that 
exporting does not seem to lead to higher TFP. Chinese firms were expected to learn by 
exporting how to become more productive, since they would face a larger number of 
competitors with more innovative technologies, working practices and products. However, 
this is not the case in most industries. This finding can potentially be explained by the 
“processing trade” argument of Jarreau and Poncet (2012), which suggests that exporting is 
beneficial to firms’ performance only when it is in form of ordinary exports rather than 
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“processing trade.” Empirical evidence from Wang and Yu (2011) and Dai et al. (2011) 
supports this idea.  
Following an analysis of the determinants of TFP levels, it has been assessed which 
determinants have the largest impact on TFP levels. The findings indicate that exogenous 
technological improvements have the largest positive effect on firms’ TFP levels.  
The results also indicate a large positive effect of an increasing proportion of firms’ paid-in 
capital owned by either individuals or corporates, and large negative effects from an 
increasing proportion of firms’ paid-in capital owned by the State, and firms’ high level of 
political affiliation with either the central or local government. From this result, it can be 
inferred that policy measures aiming at reducing the State influence on firms, through either 
ownership or political affiliation, are likely to have the largest positive effect on Chinese 
firms’ TFP.  
The large negative effect for the variable representing city spillovers, and the positive effects 
for the variables representing Marshallian and Jacobian spillovers, indicate that policy 
measures favoring industrial agglomeration and diversity in areas other than cities are also 
likely to have a large positive effect on firms’ TFP. 
The results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and the related empirical cumulative TFP 
distributions are in line with the SYS-GMM findings, since they indicate that TFP differs 
across firms having diverse characteristics such as political affiliation, paid-in capital share 
ownership, R&D and exporting. The KS test results also stress the importance of estimating 
TFP separately for each industry and taking into account the geographical differences 
between firms. Moreover, the results indicate the existence of TFP growth between 1998 and 
2007. 
The application of the methodologies of Haltiwanger (1997) and Melitz and Polanec (2012) 
indicate that Chinese industrial firms have recorded an aggregate annual average TFP growth 
of 9.68% between 1998-2007. The latter methodology, whose results are more appropriate 
since the method addresses the measurement biases characterizing the former, indicates that 
such growth largely results from a between-firm effect, which represents the reallocation of 
resources through the contraction and expansion of output shares between firms characterized 
by different productivity levels. The results indicate a small contribution to aggregate TFP 
growth from within-firm TFP improvements and the entrance of new firms, and a negative 
contribution from the exit of more productive firms. High growth industries are characterized 
by a strong impact from the within-firm effect (e.g. in the water production, non-metal 
products and other mining industries) and the between-firm effect (e.g. in the water 
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production and petroleum processing industries). TFP growth across provinces is 
characterized by a strong contribution from the between-firm effect (e.g. in Heilongjiang, 
Xinjiang and Liaoning). When firms are grouped according to their political affiliation and 
State ownership share of paid-in capital, non-politically affiliated firms in which the State has 
a paid-in capital share larger than 50% record the highest actual TFP growth, while non-
politically affiliated firms with a State paid-in capital share ownership smaller than 25% have 
record the lowest performance. Within-firm TFP improvements drive the strong performance 
of the former. The results of the aggregate TFP decomposition indicate that policy measures 
favouring the entry of more productive firms, within-firm TFP improvements, and especially 
the reallocation of resources across existing firms, are conducive to higher TFP growth.  
Since this study has only considered medium and large-sized firms, future research should 
also consider small firms, thus offering a more comprehensive understanding of the 
determinants of TFP in the Chinese industrial sector. Such research would indicate whether 
the determinants of TFP vary across firms of different sizes. It would also indicate whether 
small or medium-to-large firms are the main drivers of aggregate TFP growth. 
As the industrial sector has been the main focus of this study, an extension to the research 
should include the service sector. Such research would indicate whether one sector or the 
other largely drives national aggregate TFP and whether TFP is differentially determined in 
each. Since China is undergoing a shift from the dominance of the industrial sector towards 
the service sector, the inclusion of the latter would help determine whether such a shift is 
beneficial to national aggregate TFP growth.  
In light of the major role of total factor productivity in raising living standards and in driving 
national long-run within- and cross-country economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 2001; 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), policy measures targeting 
the determinants of TFP levels and TFP growth would enable Chinese firms to become more 
competitive and allow the achievement of sustainable long-run economic growth and higher 
living standards in China, enabling the country to raise its status to a high-income economy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Structure of the unbalanced panel 
 
Panel I. 
 
Year Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
1998 148,474 6.8 6.8 
1999 148,474 6.8 13.6 
2000 162,004 7.4 21.0 
2001 168,275 7.7 28.7 
2002 180,751 8.3 37.0 
2003 195,389 9.0 46.0 
2004 277,827 12.7 58.7 
2005 270,564 12.4 71.1 
2006 300,498 13.8 84.8 
2007 331,453 15.2 100 
Total 2,183,709 100  
 
Panel II.  
 
Number of 
observations  per 
firm 
Number of 
firms 
Percen
t 
Cumulati
ve 
Number of 
firm-year 
observations 
Percen
t 
Cumulati
ve 
1 109,513 19.6 19.6 109,513 5.0 5.0 
2 103,878 18.6 38.1 207,756 9.5 14.5 
3 74,800 13.4 51.5 224,400 10.3 24.8 
4 98,547 17.6 69.1 394,188 18.1 42.9 
5 41,828 7.5 76.6 209,140 9.6 52.4 
6 36,373 6.5 83.1 218,238 10.0 62.4 
7 26,356 4.7 87.8 184,492 8.4 70.9 
8 19,746 3.5 91.3 157,968 7.2 78.1 
9 8,616 1.5 92.8 77,544 3.6 81.7 
10 40,047 7.2 100 400,470 18.3 100.0 
Total 559,704 100  2,183,709 100  
 
